Share count
195Mpeak FY2025
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GRND, Grindr Inc.
Software asset-light
Grindr platform offers a variety of location-based social features and functions, including identity expression; connection; and interaction; with trust and safety tools across the experience, and subscriptions for premium features offering further access and control.
We manage and operate the Grindr platform, a global social networking platform primarily serving and addressing the needs of gay, bisexual, and sexually explorative adults around the world.
We enable our users to find and engage with one another, share content and interests, discover products and experiences relevant for them, and generally express their unique selves.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$440M
+27.6% YoY · 32% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $476M 5-yr avg $277M
Revenue $130M +38.3% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 32.9% yr-ago 27.0%
Net income $27M yr-ago $27M
Net margin 20.6% yr-ago 28.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Direct revenue (77%) and Advertising (15%).
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 21% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from 6.7% to 29% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Stock-based pay runs about 11% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 22%, above 15% in 3 of 5 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Direct revenue is 77% of revenue, with Advertising the other meaningful line at 15%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Direct revenue77%$366M
- Advertising15%$74M
By geographyUnited States53%International39%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $146M | $195M | $260M | $345M | $440M | $476M | RevenueRevenue |
| 21% | 39% | 31% | 33% | 33% | 32% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 7% | 9% | 11% | 10% | 11% | 11% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $24M | $13M | $55M | $93M | $126M | $144M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 16.3% | 6.7% | 21.4% | 26.9% | 28.7% | 30.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $5M | $852K | ($56M) | ($131M) | $95M | $94M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 20% | — | — | — | 20% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $34M | $51M | $36M | $95M | $142M | $151M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $43M | $38M | $27M | $17M | $9M | $6M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($16M) | ($16M) | $49M | $172M | ($17M) | ($8M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $269K | $430K | $509K | $945K | $746K | $654K | CapexCapex |
| 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $34M | $50M | $36M | $94M | $141M | $151M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 23.4% | 25.7% | 13.7% | 27.3% | 32.0% | 31.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $34M | $50M | $36M | $94M | $141M | $151M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 23.4% | 25.7% | 13.7% | 27.3% | 32.0% | 31.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $0 | $0 | $451M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 22% | 3% | 15% | 73% | 28% | 30% | ROICROIC |
| — | 21% | — | — | 202% | 11261% | Return on equityROE |
| — | 21% | — | — | 202% | n/m | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $16M | $9M | $28M | $59M | $87M | $24M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $18M | $22M | $34M | $50M | $68M | $70M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2M | $5M | $4M | $3M | $2M | $4M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $15M | $17M | $30M | $46M | $66M | $66M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $44M | $43M | $72M | $117M | $166M | $105M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $30M | $62M | $61M | $68M | $85M | $79M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.5× | 0.7× | 1.2× | 1.7× | 2.0× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $259M | $276M | $276M | $276M | $276M | $276M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $450M | $439M | $445M | $479M | $531M | $471M | Total assetsAssets |
| $137M | $361M | $341M | $291M | $396M | $391M | Total debtDebt |
| $121M | $352M | $313M | $231M | $309M | $367M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($36M) | $4M | ($18M) | ($132M) | $47M | $839K | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.8% | 14.6% | 6.1% | 10.8% | 12.4% | 12.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| 153M | 159M | 174M | 176M | 195M | 185M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.95 | $1.23 | $1.49 | $1.96 | $2.25 | $2.57 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.01 | $-0.32 | $-0.74 | $0.49 | $0.51 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.22 | $0.32 | $0.20 | $0.53 | $0.72 | $0.81 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.22 | $0.32 | $0.20 | $0.53 | $0.72 | $0.81 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-0.24 | $0.03 | $-0.11 | $-0.75 | $0.24 | $0.00 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +24.0%/yr | +24.0%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +34.0%/yr | +34.0%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | +95.7%/yr | +95.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +21.4%/yr | +21.4%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
28%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.2×peak FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$141Mowner earningsvs.$95Mnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2021FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $95M of profit into $141M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $95M | ($131M) | ($56M) | $852K | $5M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$9M | +$17M | +$27M | +$38M | +$43M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$55M | +$37M | +$16M | +$28M | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$17M | +$172M | +$49M | −$16M | −$16M |
| Cash from operations | $142M | $95M | $36M | $51M | $34M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$746K | −$945K | −$509K | −$430K | −$269K |
| Owner earnings | $141M | $94M | $36M | $50M | $34M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 32% | 27% | 14% | 26% | 23% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $55M), owner earnings is nearer $86M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $309M · 2.4× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $87M − debt $396M
What this means
Netting $87M of cash and short-term investments against $396M of debt leaves $309M owed, about 2.4× a year's operating profit (3.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle5-yr median, range 3%–73%; 28% latest = NOPAT $101M ÷ invested capital $356MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 28% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle5-yr median margin, range 14%–32%; latest $141M = operating cash $142M − maintenance capex $746KIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $55M of SBC) leaves $86M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $142M ÷ net income $95M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $451M ÷ Owner Earnings $141M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $141M of Owner Earnings, $451M (320%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $451M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $55M stock comp, the real buyback was about $396M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.08×HarvestingCapex $746K ÷ depreciation $9M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $440M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.96×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $396M vs $81M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.17/share (latest year $0.53), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.26/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 11% → 28% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 11% early to 28% lately, median 21% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +29%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 29% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · 6.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +6.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“The online social networking and dating industries in which we operate are highly and increasingly competitive, particularly as powerful AI tools further reduce barriers to entry and otherwise enable the emergence of AI-powered companion and digital relationship products that may reduce demand for traditional dating or…”
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$105M
- Cash & short-term investments$24M
- Receivables$70M
- Other current assets$11M
Current liabilities$79M
- Debt due within a year$20M
- Accounts payable$4M
- Other current liabilities$55M
Current ratio1.32×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.32×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.30×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$25Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$20M due · $24M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+38.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($341M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($366M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$395M$4M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $358M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$3M · 1%
- Buybacks$451M · 126%
- Returned to owners$451M
127% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $451M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$96M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $96M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $137M to $391M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$17.93
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 25M shares were bought for $451M, about $17.93 each.
- Net change in share count21.1%
The diluted count rose from 153M to 185M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$342M64% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$0over 5 years buying other businesses, against $3M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | George Arison | $5.5M | $16.5M | $36M |
| 2024 | George Arison | $6.5M | $40.4M | $94M |
| 2025 | George Arison | $56.2M | $33.3M | $141M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$55M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 12% of revenue, equal to 43% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Grindr Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?21.1%
Diluted shares grew 21.1% over 2021–2025, even as the company spent $451M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$137M → $391M
Debt rose from $137M to $391M while owner earnings went from about $40M to $90M — about 3.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DVDoubleVerify | $748M | 83% | 12.5% | 7% | 18% |
| EVEREverQuote Inc. | $693M | 94% | -3.7% | -34% | 1% |
| ZIPZipRecruiter Inc. | $449M | 89% | 0.3% | 10% | 14% |
| GRNDGrindr Inc. | $440M | — | 21.4% | 22% | 26% |
| DSPViant Technology Inc. | $344M | 46% | 1.2% | -8% | 13% |
| HSTMHealthStream Inc. | $304M | 86% | 5.8% | 4% | 18% |
| PUBMPubMatic Inc. | $283M | 68% | 7.5% | 8% | 25% |
| NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc. | $258M | 83% | -55.8% | -24% | -28% |
| Group median | — | — | 3.5% | 5% | 16% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Grindr Inc. has delivered.
Grindr Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Grindr Inc. earns about $113M on its 25.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 32.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $151M on 178M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-06; net debt $367M. The if-converted diluted count is 185M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Grindr Inc. (GRND), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GRND, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GRMN its page in the Manual GRNQ →
Industry order: ← GOOGN the Software chapter GRRR →