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ZIP, ZipRecruiter Inc.
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 89% and operating margin about 0.3% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −4.3% to 15% — on a steadier 89% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −72 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $430M | $418M | $741M | $905M | $646M | $474M | $449M | $446M | RevenueRevenue |
| 87% | 87% | 89% | 90% | 90% | 89% | 89% | 89% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 9% | 9% | 20% | 12% | 15% | 15% | 15% | 15% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 15% | 17% | 15% | 14% | 22% | 28% | 28% | 26% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($6M) | $64M | ($8M) | $97M | $79M | $1M | ($19M) | ($9M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −1.5% | 15.4% | −1.1% | 10.7% | 12.3% | 0.3% | −4.3% | −2.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($6M) | $86M | $4M | $61M | $49M | ($13M) | ($33M) | ($25M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| ($2M) | $88M | $144M | $129M | $103M | $46M | $11M | $17M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $9M | $10M | $9M | $11M | $12M | $12M | $12M | $12M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($11M) | ($14M) | $24M | ($20M) | ($42M) | ($18M) | ($16M) | ($11M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $3M | $1M | $6M | $3M | $918K | $922K | $1M | $923K | CapexCapex |
| 0.6% | 0.3% | 0.8% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($5M) | $87M | $138M | $126M | $102M | $45M | $10M | $16M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −1.1% | 20.7% | 18.6% | 13.9% | 15.8% | 9.5% | 2.2% | 3.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($5M) | $87M | $138M | $126M | $102M | $45M | $10M | $16M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −1.1% | 20.7% | 18.6% | 13.9% | 15.8% | 9.5% | 2.2% | 3.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $12M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $19M | $3M | $339M | $148M | $40M | $102M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | — | 24% | 21% | 0% | -5% | -3% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 2% | 215% | 587% | -96% | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 2% | 215% | 587% | −96% | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $36M | $115M | $255M | $227M | $283M | $218M | $188M | $251M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $21M | $42M | $44M | $27M | $23M | $26M | $24M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $14M | $25M | $21M | $12M | $11M | $9M | $8M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $8M | $17M | $23M | $15M | $13M | $17M | $16M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $145M | $311M | $632M | $562M | $544M | $449M | $431M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $71M | $143M | $130M | $85M | $82M | $71M | $59M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.0× | 2.2× | 4.9× | 6.6× | 6.7× | 6.3× | 7.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $9M | $9M | $9M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $212M | $399M | $715M | $660M | $664M | $570M | $551M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $25M | $0 | $542M | $543M | $544M | $545M | $545M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($89M) | ($255M) | $314M | $260M | $325M | $357M | $294M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -11.0× | 62.1× | -9.2× | 3.4× | 2.7× | 0.0× | -0.7× | -0.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($122M) | ($50M) | $235M | $29M | $8M | $13M | ($77M) | ($84M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.6% | 1.4% | 14.5% | 8.5% | 13.0% | 13.6% | 10.6% | 9.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 79.3M | 94.2M | 115M | 121M | 106M | 98.6M | 89.9M | 83.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.41 | $4.44 | $6.42 | $7.45 | $6.10 | $4.81 | $5.00 | $5.34 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.08 | $0.91 | $0.03 | $0.51 | $0.46 | $-0.13 | $-0.37 | $-0.30 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.06 | $0.92 | $1.20 | $1.04 | $0.97 | $0.45 | $0.11 | $0.20 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.06 | $0.92 | $1.20 | $1.04 | $0.97 | $0.45 | $0.11 | $0.20 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.05 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-1.54 | $-0.53 | $2.03 | $0.24 | $0.08 | $0.14 | $-0.86 | $-1.00 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −1.3%/yr | +2.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −34.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −15.0%/yr | −3.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $33M loss into $10M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($33M) | ($13M) | $49M | $61M | $4M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$12M | +$12M | +$12M | +$11M | +$9M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$48M | +$64M | +$84M | +$77M | +$107M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$16M | −$18M | −$42M | −$20M | +$24M |
| Cash from operations | $11M | $46M | $103M | $129M | $144M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1M | −$922K | −$918K | −$3M | −$6M |
| Owner earnings | $10M | $45M | $102M | $126M | $138M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 2% | 9% | 16% | 14% | 19% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $48M), owner earnings is nearer ($38M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.7×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($19M) ÷ interest expense $30M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $188M − debt $545M
What this means
Netting $188M of cash and short-term investments against $545M of debt leaves $357M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 21 + DIO 0 − DPO 69 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -5%–24%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($15M) ÷ invested capital $280MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -1%–21%; latest $10M = operating cash $11M − maintenance capex $1MIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $48M of SBC) leaves ($38M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($33M) · cash from operations $11M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $102M ÷ Owner Earnings $10M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $10M of Owner Earnings, $102M (1033%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $102M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $48M stock comp, the real buyback was about $54M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.09×HarvestingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation $12M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $449M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 6.33×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $545M vs $378M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −96%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.02/share (latest year $-0.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 3% lately, median 0%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −7%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −4.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$251M
- Receivables$24M
- Other current assets$157M
- Accounts payable$8M
- Other current liabilities$51M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $519M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$16M · 3%
- Buybacks$651M · 126%
- Returned to owners$651M
129% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $651M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$148M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $148M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $651M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count5.5%
The diluted count rose from 79M to 84M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Ian Siegel | $35.2M | $34.4M | $138M |
| 2022 | Ian Siegel | $1.1M | −$7.4M | $126M |
| 2023 | Ian Siegel | $465k | −$14.0M | $102M |
| 2024 | Ian Siegel | $5.7M | $3.8M | $45M |
| 2025 | Ian Siegel | $2.9M | $1.4M | $10M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$48M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 11% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why ZipRecruiter Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?9.2% vs 12.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 12.8% early in the record and 9.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.5%
Diluted shares grew 5.5% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $651M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DVDoubleVerify | $748M | 83% | 12.5% | 7% | 18% |
| EVEREverQuote Inc. | $693M | 94% | -3.7% | -34% | 1% |
| ZIPZipRecruiter Inc. | $449M | 89% | 0.3% | 10% | 14% |
| GRNDGrindr Inc. | $440M | — | 21.4% | 22% | 26% |
| DSPViant Technology Inc. | $344M | 46% | 1.2% | -8% | 13% |
| HSTMHealthStream Inc. | $304M | 86% | 5.8% | 4% | 18% |
| PUBMPubMatic Inc. | $283M | 68% | 7.5% | 8% | 25% |
| NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc. | $258M | 83% | -55.8% | -24% | -28% |
| Group median | — | 83% | 3.5% | 5% | 16% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ZipRecruiter Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $16M on 71M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2025-12-31; net debt $294M. The if-converted diluted count is 84M, 17% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ZIONP its page in the Manual ZLAB →
Industry order: ← ZETA the Software chapter ZM →