Owner Scorecard


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DSP, Viant Technology Inc.

Software asset-light Cyclical

We are an advertising technology company.

Our cloud-based demand side platform ("DSP") enables the programmatic purchase of advertising, which is the electronification of the digital advertising buying process.

Programmatic advertising is rapidly taking market share from traditional ad sales channels, which require more staffing, offer less transparency, and involve higher costs to buyers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
DSP · Viant Technology Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$344M
+19.0% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $362M 5-yr avg $256M
Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 44%
Operating margin 3.6% 5-yr avg −9.5%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 46% and operating margin about 1.2% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −25% to 13% — on a steadier 46% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 7.3% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 1 of 6 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$165M$165M$224M$197M$223M$289M$344M$362MRevenueRevenue
43%47%42%41%46%46%46%45%Gross marginGross mgn
12%11%21%23%20%18%15%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$13M$22M($43M)($49M)($18M)$3M$12M$13MOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.8%13.2%−19.1%−25.0%−8.2%1.2%3.5%3.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$9M$6M($8M)($12M)($3M)$2M$8M$9MNet incomeNet inc.
0%0%10%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$13M$19M$29M($4M)$38M$52M$53M$60MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$10M$10M$11M$13M$15M$16M$19M$20MDepreciationDeprec.
($7M)$3M($44M)($34M)($6M)$12M$713K$5MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$423K$434K$441K$758K$1M$2M$926K$1MCapexCapex
0.3%0.3%0.2%0.4%0.5%0.9%0.3%0.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$13M$18M$28M($4M)$37M$49M$52M$59MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.6%11.2%12.6%−2.2%16.4%17.0%15.0%16.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$13M$18M$28M($4M)$37M$49M$52M$59MFree cash flowFCF
7.6%11.2%12.6%−2.2%16.4%17.0%15.0%16.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$10M$549K$234KAcquisitionsAcquis.
$5M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
84%-44%-66%-21%6%12%ROICROIC
56%31%-13%-20%-5%4%10%11%Return on equityROE
6%−13%−20%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$90M$111M$102M$117M$147M$177M$146MReceivablesReceiv.
$30M$33M$37M$47M$71M$84M$54MAccounts payablePayables
$60M$78M$65M$70M$76M$94M$93MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$104M$352M$315M$340M$362M$376M$338MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$80M$83M$87M$109M$145M$157M$118MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×4.2×3.6×3.1×2.5×2.4×2.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$12M$12M$12M$12M$19M$19M$19MGoodwillGoodwill
$134M$389M$378M$405M$441M$475M$439MTotal assetsAssets
$24M$18M$0$0$0$0$0Total debtDebt
$24M$18M$0$0$0$0($186M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.1×20.0×-48.4×-108.5×28.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$15M$20M$60M$59M$68M$54M$82M$85MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.0%30.7%14.7%14.5%7.3%7.2%7.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
1.0M1.0M12.4M14.2M15.2M20.5M67.0M63.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$164.89$165.25$18.13$13.90$14.64$14.13$5.14$5.71Revenue / shareRev/sh
$8.58$6.25$-0.63$-0.84$-0.23$0.12$0.12$0.14EPS (diluted)EPS
$12.61$18.44$2.28$-0.30$2.40$2.41$0.77$0.93Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$12.61$18.44$2.28$-0.30$2.40$2.41$0.77$0.93Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$5.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.42$0.43$0.04$0.05$0.08$0.12$0.01$0.02Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.21$20.12$4.87$4.18$4.48$2.63$1.23$1.34Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×12.36 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×3.27 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−43.9%/yr−50.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−37.2%/yr−47.0%/yr
EPS−50.6%/yr−54.3%/yr
Capital spending / share−43.5%/yr−49.8%/yr
Book value / share−34.3%/yr−42.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+19.0%
    “Sales and Marketing Year Ended December 31, 2025 vs 2024 Change 2024 vs 2023 Change 2025 2024 2023 $ % $ % Sales and marketing $ 64,801 $ 53,750 $ 50,650 $ 11,051 21 % $ 3,100 6 % Percentage of revenue 19 % 19 % 23 % Sales and marketing expense increased by $11.1 million, or 21%, during the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. This increase was primarily due to a $4.0 million increase in personnel costs, a $3.9 million increase in advertising expense, a $2.6 million increase in stock-based compensa…”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
67Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
12%low FY2022
Gross margin
46%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$52Mowner earningsvs.$8Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $8M of profit into $52M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$8M
Owner earnings$52M · 15% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$8M$2M($3M)($12M)($8M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$19M+$16M+$15M+$13M+$11M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$25M+$21M+$32M+$29M+$69M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$713K+$12M−$6M−$34M−$44M
Cash from operations$53M$52M$38M($4M)$29M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$926K−$2M−$1M−$758K−$441K
Owner earnings$52M$49M$37M($4M)$28M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%17%16%-2%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $25M), owner earnings is nearer $27M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $12M ÷ interest expense $454K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Cash equals debt
    Cash $0 − debt $0
    What this means

    Netting $0 of cash and short-term investments against $0 of debt leaves $0 owed. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 188 + DIO 0 − DPO 163 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -66%–84%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -2%–17%; latest $52M = operating cash $53M − maintenance capex $926K
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25M of SBC) leaves $27M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $53M ÷ net income $8M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $52M
    What this means

    Of $52M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.05×
    Harvesting
    Capex $926K ÷ depreciation $19M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $344M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.40×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $219M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +3%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.14/share (latest year $0.47), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 1% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 1% early, −1% lately, median 1%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +22%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 22% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −25.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“For those customers utilizing our self-service or AI capabilities, we may not be successful at educating and training customers, particularly our newer customers, on how to use our platform, in order for our customers to get the most benefit from our platform and increase their usage.…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$338M
  • Cash & short-term investments$186M
  • Receivables$146M
  • Other current assets$6M
Current liabilities$118M
  • Accounts payable$54M
  • Other current liabilities$64M
Current ratio2.87×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.87×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.58×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$220Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+25.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 2.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$63Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$189MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$23M$23M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$551Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $199M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$7M · 3%
  • Dividends$5M · 3%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$187M · 94%
  • Returned to owners$5M

    3% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $5M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count6245.2%

    The diluted count rose from 1M to 63M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership14.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$25M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 206% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Viant Technology Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?6245.2%

    Diluted shares grew 6245.2% over 2019–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ZIPZipRecruiter Inc.$449M89%0.3%10%14%
GRNDGrindr Inc.$440M21.4%22%26%
TBRGTruBridge Inc.$347M52%6.5%6%9%
DSPViant Technology Inc.$344M46%1.2%-8%13%
AMPLAmplitude Inc.$343M70%-32.2%-77%-4%
HSTMHealthStream Inc.$304M86%5.8%4%18%
PUBMPubMatic Inc.$283M68%7.5%8%25%
NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc.$258M83%-55.8%-24%-28%
Group median70%3.5%5%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Viant Technology Inc. has delivered.

Viant Technology Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Viant Technology Inc. earns about $43M on its 12.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+43%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+22%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $59M on 18M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $186M. The if-converted diluted count is 63M, 256% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1M) runs well above depreciation ($20M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $59M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Viant Technology Inc. (DSP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DSP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DSGR its page in the Manual DT →

Industry order: ← DSGX the Software chapter DT →