← All companies ← DUOT Manual DVA → ← DUOT Software EA →

DV, DoubleVerify

Software asset-light Serial acquirer

We are one of the industry's leading media effectiveness platforms that leverages artificial intelligence to drive superior outcomes for global brands.

As the global digital advertising market has evolved, we have continued to expand our capabilities since our founding in 2008 through new product innovation and partnerships across emerging programmatic media buying platforms and digital media channels, including social and CTV.

The advertising industry continues to experience an expanding array of digital channels and platforms.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

DV · DoubleVerify

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$748M

+13.9% YoY · 25% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $764M 5-yr avg $553M

Gross margin 82% 5-yr avg 82%

Operating margin 11.5% 5-yr avg 11.8%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 19%

Free cash flow margin 18% 5-yr avg 19%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 46% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 83% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 8.0% to 21% — on a steadier 83% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 9.4% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$183M	$244M	$333M	$452M	$573M	$657M	$748M	$764M	RevenueRevenue
86%	85%	84%	83%	81%	82%	82%	82%	Gross marginGross mgn
15%	22%	24%	17%	15%	14%	15%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
17%	19%	19%	21%	22%	23%	24%	23%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$39M	$21M	$27M	$59M	$86M	$82M	$79M	$88M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
21.4%	8.8%	8.0%	13.0%	15.0%	12.5%	10.6%	11.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$23M	$20M	$29M	$43M	$71M	$56M	$51M	$55M	Net incomeNet inc.
34%	—	—	27%	25%	37%	39%	37%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$29M	$21M	$83M	$95M	$120M	$160M	$211M	$178M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$22M	$25M	$30M	$34M	$41M	$45M	$57M	$60M	DepreciationDeprec.
($16M)	($30M)	$1M	($25M)	($52M)	($32M)	($272K)	($41M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$6M	$10M	$9M	$40M	$17M	$27M	$39M	$43M	CapexCapex
3.3%	4.0%	2.8%	8.8%	3.0%	4.1%	5.1%	5.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$23M	$11M	$73M	$55M	$103M	$133M	$173M	$135M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
12.9%	4.7%	22.0%	12.1%	17.9%	20.2%	23.1%	17.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$23M	$11M	$73M	$55M	$103M	$133M	$173M	$135M	Free cash flowFCF
12.9%	4.7%	22.0%	12.1%	17.9%	20.2%	23.1%	17.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$57M	—	$149M	—	$67M	—	$83M	$83M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$2M	$10M	$5M	$128M	$132M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
8%	5%	5%	7%	8%	7%	6%	6%	ROICROIC
7%	5%	4%	5%	7%	5%	4%	5%	Return on equityROE
7%	5%	4%	5%	7%	5%	4%	5%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$11M	$33M	$222M	$268M	$310M	$311M	$259M	$179M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$95M	$123M	$167M	$207M	$226M	$221M	$223M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$3M	$4M	$7M	$13M	$12M	$15M	$12M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$91M	$119M	$160M	$194M	$215M	$206M	$210M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$142M	$368M	$445M	$533M	$559M	$519M	$451M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$34M	$57M	$69M	$84M	$103M	$122M	$95M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	4.2×	6.4×	6.5×	6.4×	5.4×	4.3×	4.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$227M	$351M	$343M	$436M	$428M	$516M	$513M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$511M	$892M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.3B	Total assetsAssets
7.5×	4.3×	22.8×	65.2×	80.4×	73.7×	45.7×	51.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$318M	$417M	$799M	$877M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	2.5%	6.6%	9.4%	10.3%	13.8%	13.9%	13.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
143M	145M	160M	171M	173M	175M	167M	164M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.28	$1.68	$2.08	$2.65	$3.30	$3.75	$4.49	$4.66	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.16	$0.14	$0.18	$0.25	$0.41	$0.32	$0.30	$0.33	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.16	$0.08	$0.46	$0.32	$0.59	$0.76	$1.04	$0.82	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.16	$0.08	$0.46	$0.32	$0.59	$0.76	$1.04	$0.82	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04	$0.07	$0.06	$0.23	$0.10	$0.16	$0.23	$0.26	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.22	$2.87	$4.99	$5.14	$6.19	$6.19	$6.79	$6.59	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+23.3%/yr	+21.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+35.9%/yr	+67.4%/yr
EPS	+10.9%/yr	+16.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+33.1%/yr	+28.1%/yr
Book value / share	+20.4%/yr	+18.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+13.9%
“Sales, Marketing and Customer Support Expenses Sales, marketing and customer support expenses increased by $23.3 million, or 14%, from $167.5 million in the year ended December 31, 2024 to $190.8 million in the year ended December 31, 2025. The increase was due primarily to an increase in personnel costs, including stock-based compensation and sales commissions, of $18.4 million, an increase in third party professional fees to support marketing and sales activities of $1.6 million, and an increase in marketing activities, including adv…”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

167Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

6%low FY2021

Gross margin

82%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$173Mowner earningsvs.$51Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $51M of profit into $173M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$51M

Owner earnings$173M · 23% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$51M	$56M	$71M	$43M	$29M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$57M	+$45M	+$41M	+$34M	+$30M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$104M	+$91M	+$59M	+$42M	+$22M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$272K	−$32M	−$52M	−$25M	+$1M
Cash from operations	$211M	$160M	$120M	$95M	$83M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$39M	−$27M	−$17M	−$40M	−$9M
Owner earnings	$173M	$133M	$103M	$55M	$73M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	23%	20%	18%	12%	22%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $104M), owner earnings is nearer $68M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 45.7×

Comfortable

Operating income $79M ÷ interest expense $2M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$255M

Net cash

Cash $259M + ST investments $18M − debt $22M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $255M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 68d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 108 + DIO 0 − DPO 40 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 7%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range 5%–8%; 5% latest = NOPAT $48M ÷ invested capital $894M

Industry peers: median -6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 18%

High through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range 5%–23%; latest $173M = operating cash $211M − maintenance capex $39M

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $104M of SBC) leaves $68M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 4.17×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $211M ÷ net income $51M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 77%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $132M ÷ Owner Earnings $173M

What this means
Of $173M Owner Earnings, $132M (77%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $132M buybacks. Net of $104M stock comp, the real buyback was about $28M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.68×

Harvesting

Capex $39M ÷ depreciation $57M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $748M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.27×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $22M vs $398M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +144%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.39/share (latest year $0.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 7

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Operating margin 13% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 13% early, 13% lately, median 13%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +43%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 43% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · 8.0% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +2.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Advancements in technology such as AI and machine learning are changing the way people work by automating tasks, enhancing communication, and improving decision-making processes, and our business may be harmed or we may face competitive disadvantage if we are slow to adopt these new technologies.…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$451M

Cash & short-term investments$179M
Receivables$223M
Other current assets$50M

Current liabilities$95M

Accounts payable$12M
Other current liabilities$82M

Current ratio4.77×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio4.77×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.89×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$357Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters7.0× → 4.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$474Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$258MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$107M$85M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $719M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$148M · 21%
Buybacks$277M · 39%
Retained (debt / cash)$294M · 41%

Returned to owners$277M
48% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $277M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $168M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $277M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count14.7%
The diluted count rose from 143M to 164M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$618M46% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity46%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$356Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $148M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mark Zagorski	$7.4M	$46.7M	$73M
2022	Mark Zagorski	$8.6M	−$8.8M	$55M
2023	Mark Zagorski	$10.8M	$30.9M	$103M
2024	Mark Zagorski	$1.1M	−$17.9M	$133M
2025	Mark Zagorski	$11.8M	$6.9M	$173M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$104M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 14% of revenue, equal to 132% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why DoubleVerify is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?14.7%
Diluted shares grew 14.7% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $277M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TEMTempus AI Inc.	$1.3B	—	-59.8%	-210%	-37%
BMBLBumble Inc.	$966M	71%	-14.5%	-6%	—
DOCNDigitalOcean	$901M	60%	-2.6%	-0%	15%
DVDoubleVerify	$748M	83%	12.5%	7%	18%
MGNIMagnite Inc.	$714M	62%	-18.6%	-13%	18%
EVEREverQuote Inc.	$693M	94%	-3.7%	-34%	1%
ZIPZipRecruiter Inc.	$449M	89%	0.3%	10%	14%
GRNDGrindr Inc.	$440M	—	21.4%	22%	26%
Group median	—	77%	-3.2%	-3%	15%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what DoubleVerify has delivered.

DoubleVerify’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, DoubleVerify earns about $134M on its 17.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($134M) Net of stock comp (−$104M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+24%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+43%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $135M on 153M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $157M. The if-converted diluted count is 164M, 7% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh DV against another business →

The owners of DV: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "DoubleVerify (DV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DUOT its page in the Manual DVA →

Industry order: ← DUOT the Software chapter EA →