Owner Scorecard


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GSL, Global Ship Lease Inc New Class A

Marine Shipping capital-intensive Cyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share
GSL · Global Ship Lease Inc New Class A
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$766M
+7.8% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $766M 5-yr avg $649M
Operating margin 56.8% 5-yr avg 53.8%
ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 18%
Owner-earnings margin 68% 5-yr avg 57%
Free cash flow margin 68% 5-yr avg 57%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 43% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −12% and 57% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 46% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$167M$159M$157M$261M$283M$448M$646M$675M$711M$766M$766MRevenueRevenue
($21M)($15M)($10M)$112M$105M$238M$354M$343M$379M$435M$435MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−12.4%−9.6%−6.5%42.7%37.0%53.0%54.9%50.9%53.3%56.8%56.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($65M)($74M)($57M)$40M$42M$171M$293M$305M$354M$416MNet incomeNet inc.
0%0%0%-0%0%0%0%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$72M$67M$48M$93M$104M$248M$327M$375M$430M$528M$528MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$43M$38M$35M$44M$47M$62M$81M$92M$100M$122M$122MDepreciationDeprec.
$94M$103M$70M$10M$16M$15M($47M)($21M)($23M)($10M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$0$0$11M$10M$4M$5M$5M$20M$13M$14M$7MCapexCapex
0.0%0.0%7.3%3.6%1.4%1.0%0.8%2.9%1.8%1.8%0.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$72M$67M$36M$84M$100M$243M$322M$355M$417M$514M$521MOwner earningsOwner earn.
43.0%42.0%23.1%32.1%35.5%54.3%49.9%52.7%58.7%67.1%68.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$72M$67M$36M$84M$100M$243M$322M$355M$417M$514M$521MFree cash flowFCF
43.0%42.0%23.1%32.1%35.5%54.3%49.9%52.7%58.7%67.1%68.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$28M$50M$53M$58M$76M$76MDividends paidDiv. paid
-6%-2%-1%10%9%14%20%18%19%20%16%ROICROIC
-20%-30%-18%10%9%24%30%26%24%23%Return on equityROE
10%9%20%25%21%20%19%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$54M$73M$82M$138M$81M$67M$120M$139M$141M$274M$274MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$29K$72K$2M$2M$3M$3M$4M$5M$13M$50M$50MReceivablesReceiv.
$742K$6M$6M$6M$11M$12M$16M$19M$15M$15MInventoryInvent.
$963K$1M$10M$9M$11M$13M$23M$18M$26M$62M$62MAccounts payablePayables
($934K)($672K)($2M)($1M)($2M)$1M($7M)$3M$5M$3M$3MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$57M$77M$99M$162M$99M$143M$237M$296M$301M$627M$627MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$49M$55M$96M$130M$112M$245M$262M$280M$264M$307M$307MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.4×1.0×1.2×0.9×0.6×0.9×1.1×1.1×2.0×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$776M$676M$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$2.4B$2.9B$2.9BTotal assetsAssets
$399M$877M$897M$769M$1.1B$934M$812M$684M$689M$689MTotal debtDebt
$325M$795M$759M$689M$1.0B$814M$674M$543M$415M$415MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.5×-0.3×-0.2×1.5×1.6×41.2×16.5×7.7×9.3×11.2×169.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$329M$252M$316M$406M$465M$713M$966M$1.2B$1.5B$1.8B$1.8BShareholders’ equityEquity

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

ROIC
20%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.8×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$514Mowner earningsvs.$416Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $416M of profit into $514M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$416M
Owner earnings$514M · 67% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$416M$354M$305M$293M$171M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$122M+$100M+$92M+$81M+$62M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$10M−$23M−$21M−$47M+$15M
Cash from operations$528M$430M$375M$327M$248M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$14M−$13M−$20M−$5M−$5M
Owner earnings$514M$417M$355M$322M$243M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue67%59%53%50%54%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $435M ÷ interest expense $3M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $415M · 1.0× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $274M − debt $689M
    What this means

    Netting $274M of cash and short-term investments against $689M of debt leaves $415M owed, about 1.0× a year's operating profit (1.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -6%–20%; 20% latest = NOPAT $435M ÷ invested capital $2.2B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 23%–67%; latest $521M = operating cash $528M − maintenance capex $7M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 68% of revenue this year, a 43% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $528M ÷ net income $416M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $76M ÷ Owner Earnings $521M
    What this means

    Of $521M Owner Earnings, $76M (15%) went back to shareholders, $76M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.06×
    Harvesting
    Capex $7M ÷ depreciation $122M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $766M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.04×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $689M vs $320M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $9.97/share (latest year $11.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $50.15/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −10% → 54% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −10% early to 54% lately, median 43% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 37%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +24%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 24% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −12.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$627M
  • Cash & short-term investments$274M
  • Receivables$50M
  • Inventory$15M
  • Other current assets$289M
Current liabilities$307M
  • Debt due within a year$148M
  • Accounts payable$62M
  • Other current liabilities$97M
Current ratio2.04×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.00×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.89×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$320Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$148M due · $274M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($433M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$689Mno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$49Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$82M · 4%
  • Dividends$266M · 12%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.9B · 85%
  • Returned to owners$266M

    12% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $266M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count

    No continuous share count across the span.

  • Dividend recordPays

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained32%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $371M, so each retained $1 added about 0.32 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Global Ship Lease Inc New Class A is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?0% → 7% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $29K to $50M while revenue grew 359%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (0% of revenue then, 7% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KEXKirby$3.4B7.7%4%10%
MATXMatson$3.3B96%11.4%11%12%
TDWTidewater Inc.$1.4B-12.5%-6%3%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock$843M12.3%3%33%
GSLGlobal Ship Lease Inc New Class A$766M46.8%12%46%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.$632M7.7%10%10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.$482M35.2%7%38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited$342M-1.1%-0%31%
Group median9.6%5%21%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Global Ship Lease Inc New Class A's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Global Ship Lease Inc New Class A has delivered.

Global Ship Lease Inc New Class A’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Global Ship Lease Inc New Class A earns about $356M on its 46.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 68.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+13%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+24%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $521M on 36M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $415M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Global Ship Lease Inc New Class A (GSL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GSL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GSK its page in the Manual GSM →

Industry order: ← GNK the Marine Shipping chapter HMR →