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GSM, Ferroglobe PLC
Revenue is led by Silicon Metal Product Line (32%) and Manganese Alloys Product Line (27%), with 4 more lines behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 34% and operating margin about 1.8% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −24% and 25% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −7 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 2 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Silicon Metal Product Line at 32%.
- Silicon Metal Product Line32%$430M
- Manganese Alloys Product Line27%$358M
- Ferrosilicon Product Line21%$283M
- Other Product Lines9%$121M
- Other Silicon Based Alloys Product Line9%$116M
- Silica Fume Product Line2%$28M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $1.6B | $1.1B | $1.8B | $2.6B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 34% | 40% | 35% | 25% | 27% | — | — | — | — | — | 37% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($373M) | $41M | $99M | ($356M) | ($184M) | $31M | $661M | $197M | $38M | ($133M) | ($133M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −23.7% | 2.4% | 4.4% | −22.0% | −16.1% | 1.8% | 25.4% | 11.9% | 2.3% | −10.0% | −10.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($338M) | ($678K) | $44M | ($281M) | ($246M) | ($111M) | $440M | $83M | $24M | ($171M) | ($171M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 32% | — | — | — | 25% | 41% | 41% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $121M | $150M | $117M | ($31M) | $154M | ($1M) | $405M | $178M | $243M | $51M | $51M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $106M | $90M | $105M | $113M | $101M | $97M | $82M | $74M | $75M | $85M | $85M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $354M | $61M | ($31M) | $137M | $300M | $12M | ($117M) | $22M | $144M | $137M | $137M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $71M | $75M | $106M | $32M | $30M | $28M | $52M | $84M | $76M | $62M | $62M | CapexCapex |
| 4.5% | 4.3% | 4.7% | 2.0% | 2.6% | 1.6% | 2.0% | 5.1% | 4.6% | 4.6% | 4.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $50M | $76M | $11M | ($64M) | $124M | ($29M) | $353M | $95M | $167M | ($10M) | ($10M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 3.2% | 4.3% | 0.5% | −3.9% | 10.8% | −1.6% | 13.6% | 5.7% | 10.2% | −0.8% | −0.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $50M | $76M | $11M | ($64M) | $124M | ($29M) | $353M | $95M | $167M | ($10M) | ($10M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.2% | 4.3% | 0.5% | −3.9% | 10.8% | −1.6% | 13.6% | 5.7% | 10.2% | −0.8% | −0.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $55M | — | $21M | $97K | — | $6M | $3M | $0 | $10M | $10M | $10M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | $20M | — | — | — | — | — | $2M | $5M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | — | — | -39% | — | 121% | 18% | 4% | -17% | -17% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 100% | — | -67% | -35% | 68% | 11% | 3% | -29% | -29% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 53% | — | — | −36% | 67% | 11% | 2% | −30% | −30% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $201M | $187M | $219M | $100M | $104M | $114M | $318M | $136M | $139M | $134M | $134M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $209M | $111M | $156M | $309M | $242M | $381M | $425M | $310M | $189M | $192M | $310M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | $500M | $384M | $347M | $306M | $306M | InventoryInvent. |
| $158M | $193M | $257M | $189M | $149M | $206M | $220M | $183M | $158M | $145M | $145M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $52M | ($81M) | ($101M) | $120M | $93M | $175M | $706M | $511M | $378M | $353M | $472M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $862M | $691M | $883M | $818M | $657M | $804M | $1.3B | $1.0B | $818M | $734M | $734M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $627M | $450M | $499M | $397M | $433M | $654M | $678M | $494M | $449M | $441M | $441M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.4× | 1.5× | 1.8× | 2.1× | 1.5× | 1.2× | 1.9× | 2.1× | 1.8× | 1.7× | 1.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $230M | $205M | $203M | $30M | $30M | $30M | $30M | $30M | $14M | $12M | $12M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $421M | $1M | $141M | $159M | $108M | $99M | $78M | $47M | $57M | $140M | $140M | Total debtDebt |
| $220M | ($186M) | ($78M) | $59M | $4M | ($16M) | ($240M) | ($90M) | ($81M) | $6M | $6M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -12.3× | 0.7× | 1.7× | -5.6× | -2.8× | 0.2× | 10.8× | 5.1× | 1.7× | -6.4× | -6.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($338M) | ($678K) | $44M | ($281M) | $366M | $320M | $650M | $748M | $721M | $596M | $596M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 172M | 172M | 171M | 169M | 169M | 177M | 188M | 188M | 188M | 188M | 187M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.17 | $10.13 | $13.08 | $9.55 | $6.76 | $10.08 | $13.83 | $8.78 | $8.74 | $7.09 | $7.12 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.97 | $-0.00 | $0.25 | $-1.66 | $-1.46 | $-0.63 | $2.34 | $0.44 | $0.13 | $-0.91 | $-0.91 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.29 | $0.44 | $0.06 | $-0.38 | $0.73 | $-0.16 | $1.88 | $0.50 | $0.89 | $-0.05 | $-0.05 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.29 | $0.44 | $0.06 | $-0.38 | $0.73 | $-0.16 | $1.88 | $0.50 | $0.89 | $-0.05 | $-0.05 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.32 | — | $0.12 | $0.00 | — | $0.03 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.06 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.41 | $0.43 | $0.62 | $0.19 | $0.18 | $0.16 | $0.28 | $0.45 | $0.40 | $0.33 | $0.33 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-1.97 | $-0.00 | $0.25 | $-1.66 | $2.16 | $1.81 | $3.46 | $3.98 | $3.83 | $3.16 | $3.18 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −2.8%/yr | +0.9%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −17.7%/yr | +13.6%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −2.6%/yr | +12.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +7.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $171M loss into ($10M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($171M) | $24M | $83M | $440M | ($111M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$85M | +$75M | +$74M | +$82M | +$97M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$137M | +$144M | +$22M | −$117M | +$12M |
| Cash from operations | $51M | $243M | $178M | $405M | ($1M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$62M | −$76M | −$84M | −$52M | −$28M |
| Owner earnings | ($10M) | $167M | $95M | $353M | ($29M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -1% | 10% | 6% | 14% | -2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -6.4×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($133M) ÷ interest expense $21M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $123M + ST investments $11M − debt $140M
What this means
Netting $134M of cash and short-term investments against $140M of debt leaves $6M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 85 + DIO 134 − DPO 63 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -39%–121%; -17% latest = NOPAT ($105M) ÷ invested capital $613MIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -4%–14%; latest ($10M) = operating cash $51M − maintenance capex $62MIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($171M) · cash from operations $51M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.73×HarvestingCapex $62M ÷ depreciation $85M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.66×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $140M vs $292M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 7 of 8 tagged yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design. 2 years of this record are untagged in the data, with the dividend paid on both sides; a lone missing tag is treated as unknown, not a suspension, so the streak is judged on the tagged years.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.12/share (latest year $-0.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −6% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to 1% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 27%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · −23.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +1.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 7 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$134M
- Receivables$310M
- Inventory$306M
- Debt due within a year$80M
- Accounts payable$145M
- Other current liabilities$217M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.
- Reinvested$616M · 44%
- Dividends$105M · 8%
- Buybacks$27M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)$640M · 46%
- Returned to owners$132M
17% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $105M as dividends and $27M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $281M and cash and short-term investments fell $67M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $27M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count9.1%
The diluted count rose from 172M to 187M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.06/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 22% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Ferroglobe PLC is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?9.1%
Diluted shares grew 9.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $27M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?13% → 23% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $209M to $310M while revenue grew −15%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (13% of revenue then, 23% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Metals & Mining
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FCXFreeport-McMoRan Inc. | $25.2B | 29% | 25.5% | 15% | 13% |
| CLFCleveland-Cliffs | $18.6B | 14% | 8.4% | 16% | 9% |
| SCCOSouthern Copper Corporation | $13.4B | 52% | 41.5% | 18% | 24% |
| CDECoeur Mining Inc. | $2.1B | 79% | 4.3% | 2% | 2% |
| GSMFerroglobe PLC | $1.3B | 34% | 2.0% | 4% | 4% |
| MPMP Materials | $224M | — | -10.4% | -4% | -3% |
| MUXMcEwen Inc. | $198M | 77% | -43.0% | -9% | -7% |
| IAUXi-80 Gold Corp. | $95M | — | -177.0% | -15% | -157% |
| Group median | — | 43% | 3.2% | 3% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Ferroglobe PLC reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ferroglobe PLC has delivered.
Ferroglobe PLC’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Ferroglobe PLC earns about $50M on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($10M) on 187M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $6M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← GSL its page in the Manual HAFN →
Industry order: ← GAU the Metals & Mining chapter HBM →