Owner Scorecard


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HQY, HealthEquity

Commercial Services & Supplies asset-light Cyclical

We are a leader and an innovator in providing technology-enabled services that empower consumers to make healthcare saving, spending, and investing decisions.

As part of our services, we provide consumers with payment processing services, personalized benefit information, access to healthcare solutions through our marketplace, and investment advice to grow their tax-advantaged healthcare savings.

As of January 31, 2026, our platforms were integrated with more than 200 Network Partners.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
HQY · HealthEquity
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$1.3B
+9.5% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $1.0B
Gross margin 71% 5-yr avg 62%
Operating margin 25.6% 5-yr avg 9.5%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin 36% 5-yr avg 24%
Free cash flow margin 36% 5-yr avg 24%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Custodial (48%), Services (37%) and Interchange (15%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 60% and operating margin about 14% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.2% to 27% — on a steadier 60% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 7.0% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 24% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Custodial at 48%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • Custodial48%$637M
  • Services37%$485M
  • Interchange15%$192M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$178M$230M$287M$532M$734M$757M$862M$1000M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3BRevenueRevenue
60%59%63%61%57%56%57%62%65%70%71%Gross marginGross mgn
11%11%12%11%12%11%11%10%11%9%9%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
13%12%12%15%17%21%22%22%20%20%20%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$41M$54M$78M$77M$34M($24M)$9M$118M$162M$322M$342MOperating incomeOp. inc.
23.1%23.7%27.0%14.5%4.6%−3.2%1.1%11.8%13.5%24.6%25.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$26M$47M$74M$40M$9M($44M)($26M)$56M$97M$215M$231MNet incomeNet inc.
34%9%3%8%26%17%22%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$46M$82M$113M$105M$182M$141M$151M$243M$340M$457M$490MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$13M$16M$18M$55M$116M$137M$161M$153M$162M$155M$154MDepreciationDeprec.
($2M)$4M$281K($30M)$14M($5M)($47M)($43M)($16M)$14M$27MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4M$5M$4M$7M$13M$9M$3M$2M$2M$2M$2MCapexCapex
2.0%2.4%1.3%1.4%1.8%1.2%0.4%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$42M$76M$110M$98M$169M$132M$147M$241M$338M$455M$488MOwner earningsOwner earn.
23.5%33.2%38.1%18.4%23.0%17.5%17.1%24.1%28.2%34.7%36.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$42M$76M$110M$98M$169M$132M$147M$241M$338M$455M$488MFree cash flowFCF
23.5%33.2%38.1%18.4%23.0%17.5%17.1%24.1%28.2%34.7%36.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$3M$0$1.6B$0$505M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$121M$299MBuybacksBuybacks
22%34%65%3%2%-1%3%5%9%10%ROICROIC
10%14%15%4%1%-2%-1%3%5%10%11%Return on equityROE
10%14%15%4%1%−2%−1%3%5%10%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$140M$199M$361M$192M$329M$225M$254M$404M$296M$319M$265MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$17M$22M$26M$71M$73M$87M$97M$105M$118M$124M$122MReceivablesReceiv.
$592K$215K$164KInventoryInvent.
$3M$2M$4M$4M$2M$28M$14M$12M$14M$12M$14MAccounts payablePayables
$14M$19M$22M$67M$71M$60M$83M$93M$104M$112M$108MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$201M$265M$395M$297M$460M$351M$383M$557M$478M$512M$467MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$16M$20M$29M$152M$205M$153M$131M$117M$156M$157M$136MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
12.8×13.0×13.6×2.0×2.2×2.3×2.9×4.8×3.1×3.3×3.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5M$5M$5M$1.3B$1.3B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6BGoodwillGoodwill
$279M$369M$510M$2.6B$2.7B$3.1B$3.1B$3.2B$3.4B$3.4B$3.3BTotal assetsAssets
$0$1.2B$987M$931M$925M$875M$1.1B$957M$943MTotal debtDebt
($361M)$1.0B$658M$705M$671M$471M$760M$638M$677MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
198.6×287.7×3.1×1.0×-0.7×0.2×2.1×2.7×5.6×6.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$262M$346M$477M$1.0B$1.4B$1.9B$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1B$2.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
4.7%6.2%7.3%7.5%5.8%7.0%7.3%7.7%8.0%5.6%5.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
59.9M61.9M63.4M68.5M75.7M83.1M84.4M87.0M88.8M87.5M85.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.98$3.71$4.53$7.77$9.69$9.10$10.21$11.50$13.51$15.02$15.73Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.44$0.77$1.17$0.58$0.12$-0.53$-0.31$0.64$1.09$2.46$2.71EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.70$1.23$1.73$1.43$2.23$1.59$1.74$2.77$3.80$5.20$5.74Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.70$1.23$1.73$1.43$2.23$1.59$1.74$2.77$3.80$5.20$5.74Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.06$0.09$0.06$0.11$0.17$0.11$0.04$0.02$0.02$0.02$0.03Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.37$5.60$7.53$15.05$18.22$22.28$22.45$23.40$23.81$24.09$24.09Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+19.7%/yr+9.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+25.0%/yr+18.5%/yr
EPS+21.1%/yr+84.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−10.5%/yr−33.5%/yr
Book value / share+20.9%/yr+5.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+9.5%
    “Total revenue increased by $113.7 million, or 9%, from the fiscal year ended January 31, 2025 to the fiscal year ended January 31, 2026, due to the increases in custodial, interchange, and service revenues, described above.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
87Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
9%low FY2022
Gross margin
70%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.4×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$455Mowner earningsvs.$215Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $215M of profit into $455M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$215M
Owner earnings$455M · 35% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$215M$97M$56M($26M)($44M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$155M+$162M+$153M+$161M+$137M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$73M+$96M+$77M+$63M+$53M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$14M−$16M−$43M−$47M−$5M
Cash from operations$457M$340M$243M$151M$141M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$2M−$2M−$2M−$3M−$9M
Owner earnings$455M$338M$241M$147M$132M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue35%28%24%17%17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $73M), owner earnings is nearer $382M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $322M ÷ interest expense $57M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $638M · 2.0× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $319M − debt $957M
    What this means

    Netting $319M of cash and short-term investments against $957M of debt leaves $638M owed, about 2.0× a year's operating profit (3.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 34 + DIO 0 − DPO 11 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -1%–65%; 9% latest = NOPAT $250M ÷ invested capital $2.7B
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 17%–38%; latest $455M = operating cash $457M − maintenance capex $2M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 35% of revenue this year, a 24% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $73M of SBC) leaves $382M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $457M ÷ net income $215M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $299M ÷ Owner Earnings $455M
    What this means

    Of $455M Owner Earnings, $299M (66%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $299M buybacks. Net of $73M stock comp, the real buyback was about $226M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.01×
    Harvesting
    Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $155M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $957M vs $355M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +149%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.47/share (latest year $2.57), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $25.21/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 25% → 17% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    The recent-years average (17%) sits below the early years (25%), but the latest year (25%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 14% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +24%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 24% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −3.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Among other things, we also increasingly use AI tools and technologies to improve customer service, lower costs, and increase efficiencies.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$467M
  • Cash & short-term investments$265M
  • Receivables$122M
  • Inventory$164K
  • Other current assets$79M
Current liabilities$136M
  • Accounts payable$14M
  • Other current liabilities$122M
Current ratio3.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.44×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.95×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$331Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.1× → 3.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($674M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($792M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$985M$42M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$51M · 3%
  • Buybacks$421M · 23%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.4B · 75%
  • Returned to owners$421M

    23% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $421M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$91.17

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $421M, about $91.17 each.

  • Net change in share count41.9%

    The diluted count rose from 60M to 85M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid no dividend over the span; it returns cash through buybacks or retains it.

  • Return on what it retained370%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($73M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $269M, so each retained $1 added about 3.70 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.7B81% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity78%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $51M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Jon Kessler$13.4M$14.4M$147M
2023Jon Kessler$13.4M$14.4M$147M
2024Jon Kessler$13.4M$22.9M$241M
2024Jon Kessler$13.4M$22.9M$241M
2025Jon Kessler$12.6M$36.8M$338M
2025Scott Cutler$8.3M$9.3M$338M
2026Scott Cutler$13.6M$10.4M$455M
2026Scott Cutler$13.6M$10.4M$455M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio174:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$73M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 23% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why HealthEquity is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?41.9%

    Diluted shares grew 41.9% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $421M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ETSYEtsy Inc.$2.9B70%10.5%24%26%
ZZillow Group Inc. Class C Capital Stock$2.6B78%-8.9%-3%10%
EXLSExlService$2.1B86%12.5%14%12%
FICOFair Isaac$2.0B73%30.6%35%29%
HQYHealthEquity$1.3B60%14.0%5%24%
GETYGetty Images Holdings Inc.$981M73%19.2%10%
PRTHPriority Technology Holdings Inc.$953M30%8.0%16%6%
NUTXNutex Health Inc.$875M39%-12.8%-182%10%
Group median72%11.5%14%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what HealthEquity has delivered.

HealthEquity’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, HealthEquity earns about $313M on its 23.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 34.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+30%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+24%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $488M on 84M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-20; net debt $677M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2M) runs well above depreciation ($154M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $488M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "HealthEquity (HQY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HQY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HPQ its page in the Manual HR →

Industry order: ← HNI the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter HRB →