Owner Scorecard


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EXLS, ExlService

We deliver business outcomes for our clients at speed and scale, by reinventing their business models through advanced analytics and AI powered digital operations to help them achieve superior customer experience, higher productivity, cost efficiency and business growth.

EXL harnesses the power of data, AI, and deep industry knowledge to transform businesses, including the world's leading corporations in industries including insurance, healthcare and life sciences, banking and capital markets, retail, communications and media, and energy and infrastructure, among others.

Our IMUs focus on managing customer relationships and delivering the "One EXL" value proposition to clients, maintaining a unified go-to-market approach and being integrally responsible for growth, profitability and client satisfaction.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
EXLS · ExlService
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.1B
+13.6% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.2B 5-yr avg $1.6B
Operating margin 15.2% 5-yr avg 14.3%
ROIC 24% 5-yr avg 19%
Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Insurance (40%), Banking, Capital Markets and Diversified Industries (35%) and Healthcare and Life Sciences (26%).
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Insurance at 40%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Insurance40%$830M
  • Banking, Capital Markets and Diversified Industries35%$724M
  • Healthcare and Life Sciences26%$534M
By geographyNorth America83%United Kingdom & Europe15%Rest of World3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$686M$762M$883M$991M$958M$1.1B$1.4B$1.6B$1.8B$2.1B$2.2BRevenueRevenue
13%13%13%13%12%13%12%12%12%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$64M$73M$50M$76M$110M$156M$192M$239M$264M$314M$327MOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.4%9.5%5.6%7.7%11.5%13.9%13.6%14.6%14.3%15.0%15.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$62M$49M$57M$68M$89M$115M$143M$185M$198M$251M$252MNet incomeNet inc.
26%43%6%18%22%22%25%22%24%20%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$102M$113M$92M$168M$203M$184M$166M$211M$269M$351M$349MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$35M$39M$49M$52M$51M$50M$56M$50M$55M$59M$60MDepreciationDeprec.
($14M)$2M($37M)$22M$35M($19M)($82M)($82M)($58M)($39M)($44M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$26M$35M$41M$41M$42M$37M$45M$53M$46M$53M$53MCapexCapex
3.8%4.6%4.6%4.1%4.4%3.3%3.2%3.2%2.5%2.5%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$77M$78M$52M$128M$161M$147M$121M$158M$222M$298M$297MOwner earningsOwner earn.
11.2%10.2%5.8%12.9%16.8%13.1%8.6%9.7%12.1%14.3%13.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$77M$78M$52M$128M$161M$147M$121M$158M$222M$298M$297MFree cash flowFCF
11.2%10.2%5.8%12.9%16.8%13.1%8.6%9.7%12.1%14.3%13.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$29M$23M$232M$0$0$77M$4M$0$24M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$18M$43M$43M$41M$80M$118M$73M$132M$208M$328MBuybacksBuybacks
13%7%6%8%12%15%16%19%19%23%24%ROICROIC
12%8%9%10%12%17%19%21%21%28%32%Return on equityROE
12%8%9%10%12%17%19%21%21%28%32%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$227M$265M$280M$321M$403M$315M$298M$291M$341M$328M$254MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$113M$136M$165M$172M$148M$194M$259M$308M$304M$343M$389MReceivablesReceiv.
$3M$6M$6M$7M$7M$6M$8M$5M$6M$5M$11MAccounts payablePayables
$110M$130M$159M$165M$141M$189M$251M$303M$298M$338M$377MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$379M$453M$500M$541M$609M$578M$613M$680M$795M$830M$797MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$124M$144M$155M$229M$221M$496M$278M$326M$290M$324M$300MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×3.1×3.2×2.4×2.8×1.2×2.2×2.1×2.7×2.6×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$187M$204M$350M$350M$349M$404M$406M$406M$420M$420M$419MGoodwillGoodwill
$707M$825M$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7BTotal assetsAssets
$45M$61M$285M$235M$227M$260M$250M$200M$288M$299M$417MTotal debtDebt
($182M)($205M)$4M($86M)($176M)($55M)($48M)($91M)($52M)($30M)$164MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
48.0×38.5×6.9×5.6×9.8×20.6×23.3×18.1×13.7×17.8×18.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$532M$600M$618M$670M$719M$693M$758M$889M$930M$913M$779MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.9%3.0%2.7%2.6%2.9%3.4%3.5%3.6%4.0%3.8%3.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
173M176M175M174M173M171M169M168M164M162M157MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.97$4.34$5.04$5.71$5.55$6.55$8.35$9.70$11.19$12.85$13.75Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.36$0.28$0.32$0.39$0.52$0.67$0.85$1.10$1.21$1.54$1.60EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.44$0.44$0.29$0.74$0.93$0.86$0.72$0.94$1.35$1.83$1.89Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.44$0.44$0.29$0.74$0.93$0.86$0.72$0.94$1.35$1.83$1.89Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.15$0.20$0.23$0.23$0.24$0.22$0.27$0.31$0.28$0.32$0.34Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.08$3.42$3.53$3.86$4.16$4.05$4.48$5.29$5.66$5.62$4.96Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+13.9%/yr+18.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+17.1%/yr+14.5%/yr
EPS+17.7%/yr+24.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.0%/yr+5.8%/yr
Book value / share+6.9%/yr+6.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
162Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
23%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.1×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$298Mowner earningsvs.$251Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $251M of profit into $298M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$251M
Owner earnings$298M · 14% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$251M$198M$185M$143M$115M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$59M+$55M+$50M+$56M+$50M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$79M+$73M+$58M+$49M+$39M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$39M−$58M−$82M−$82M−$19M
Cash from operations$351M$269M$211M$166M$184M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$53M−$46M−$53M−$45M−$37M
Owner earnings$298M$222M$158M$121M$147M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue14%12%10%9%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $79M), owner earnings is nearer $219M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $314M ÷ interest expense $18M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $146M + ST investments $182M − debt $299M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $30M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 60 + DIO 0 − DPO 6 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 6%–23%; 23% latest = NOPAT $250M ÷ invested capital $1.1B
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 23% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 6%–17%; latest $298M = operating cash $351M − maintenance capex $53M
    Industry peers: median 24%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $79M of SBC) leaves $219M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $351M ÷ net income $251M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $328M ÷ Owner Earnings $298M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $298M of Owner Earnings, $328M (110%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $328M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $79M stock comp, the real buyback was about $249M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.89×
    Maintaining
    Capex $53M ÷ depreciation $59M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.56×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $299M vs $506M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +279%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.38/share (latest year $1.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 8% early to 15% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 37%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · 5.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If our clients use AI that is provided by us in a manner that does not comply with the use restrictions in our agreements or if they modify such AI without our authorization, those actions could further subject us to competitive, brand or reputational harm and legal liability.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$797M
  • Cash & short-term investments$254M
  • Receivables$389M
  • Other current assets$155M
Current liabilities$300M
  • Debt due within a year$5M
  • Accounts payable$11M
  • Other current liabilities$283M
Current ratio2.66×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.85×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$498Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $254M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$327Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($100M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$519M$101M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$50Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$418M · 22%
  • Buybacks$1.1B · 58%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$357M · 19%
  • Returned to owners$1.1B

    75% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $372M and cash and short-term investments rose $27M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$28.19

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 36M shares were bought for $1.0B, about $28.19 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $12.78 (2018) to $55.35 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($328M).

  • Net change in share count−9.2%

    The diluted count fell from 173M to 157M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained120%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($131M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $158M, so each retained $1 added about 1.20 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$456M27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity46%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$389Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $418M of capital spent building

$14M written down across 1 year (2018): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Rohit Kapoor$10.0M$19.1M$147M
2022Rohit Kapoor$11.0M$16.1M$121M
2023Rohit Kapoor$12.3M$8.7M$158M
2024Rohit Kapoor$14.2M$28.7M$222M
2025Rohit Kapoor$16.2M$14.0M$298M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio2,459:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$79M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 25% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why ExlService is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$45M → $417M

    Debt rose from $45M to $417M while owner earnings went from about $69M to $226M — about 0.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FOURShift4 Payments$4.2B23%1.9%-1%9%
CARTMaplebear Inc.$3.7B74%2.4%21%18%
MSCIMSCI Inc.$3.1B80%52.3%38%46%
ETSYEtsy Inc.$2.9B70%10.5%24%26%
ZZillow Group Inc. Class C Capital Stock$2.6B78%-8.9%-3%10%
EXLSExlService$2.1B86%12.5%14%12%
FICOFair Isaac$2.0B73%30.6%35%29%
HQYHealthEquity$1.3B60%14.0%5%24%
Group median74%11.5%18%21%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ExlService has delivered.

ExlService’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, ExlService earns about $243M on its 11.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $297M on 153M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $164M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ExlService (EXLS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EXLS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EXEL its page in the Manual EXP →

Industry order: ← ETSY the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter FI →