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HVT, Haverty Furniture Companies Inc.
Havertys is a specialty retailer of residential furniture and accessories.
Haverty began the business in 1885 in Atlanta, Georgia with one store and made deliveries using horse-drawn wagons.
Havertys has grown to 129 stores in 17 states i n the Southern and Midwest regions of the U.S.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Upholstery (44%) and Bedroom Furniture (15%), with 5 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 56% and operating margin about 5.6% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 3.6% to 12% — on a steadier 56% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 12% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Upholstery at 44%.
- Upholstery44%$338M
- Bedroom Furniture15%$113M
- Accessories and Other14%$108M
- Dining Room Furniture10%$78M
- Mattresses9%$67M
- Occasional7%$55M
- Shipping and Handling4%$30M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $822M | $820M | $818M | $802M | $748M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $862M | $723M | $759M | $766M | RevenueRevenue |
| 54% | 54% | 55% | 54% | 56% | 57% | 58% | 61% | 61% | 61% | 61% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 49% | 49% | 50% | 51% | 50% | 45% | 46% | 53% | 58% | 58% | 58% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $48M | $46M | $43M | $29M | $77M | $119M | $120M | $73M | $26M | $27M | $28M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.9% | 5.6% | 5.2% | 3.6% | 10.3% | 11.7% | 11.4% | 8.5% | 3.6% | 3.6% | 3.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $28M | $21M | $30M | $22M | $59M | $91M | $89M | $56M | $20M | $20M | $20M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 38% | 51% | 25% | 24% | 23% | 23% | 25% | 23% | 24% | 26% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $60M | $52M | $70M | $63M | $130M | $97M | $51M | $97M | $59M | $53M | $44M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $29M | $31M | $30M | $21M | $18M | $16M | $17M | $19M | $22M | $24M | $24M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($1M) | ($3M) | $6M | $18M | $48M | ($18M) | ($62M) | $14M | $11M | $2M | ($8M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $30M | $24M | $21M | $17M | $11M | $34M | $28M | $53M | $32M | $20M | $20M | CapexCapex |
| 3.6% | 3.0% | 2.6% | 2.1% | 1.5% | 3.4% | 2.7% | 6.2% | 4.4% | 2.6% | 2.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $30M | $28M | $49M | $47M | $119M | $63M | $23M | $44M | $27M | $33M | $23M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 3.7% | 3.4% | 6.0% | 5.8% | 15.9% | 6.2% | 2.2% | 5.1% | 3.7% | 4.3% | 3.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $30M | $28M | $49M | $47M | $119M | $63M | $23M | $44M | $27M | $33M | $23M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.7% | 3.4% | 6.0% | 5.8% | 15.9% | 6.2% | 2.2% | 5.1% | 3.7% | 4.3% | 3.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $30M | $11M | $35M | $15M | $51M | $52M | $34M | $35M | $20M | $21M | $21M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $21M | $0 | $19M | $30M | $20M | $42M | $30M | $7M | $5M | $5M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 11% | 8% | 13% | 12% | 112% | 101% | 54% | 30% | 11% | 11% | 10% | ROICROIC |
| 10% | 7% | 11% | 8% | 23% | 35% | 31% | 18% | 6% | 6% | 7% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | 3% | −2% | 3% | 3% | 15% | 19% | 7% | −0% | −0% | −0% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $63M | $79M | $72M | $76M | $200M | $166M | $123M | $121M | $120M | $125M | $107M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $4M | $2M | $2M | $2M | — | — | — | — | — | — | $2M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $102M | $103M | $106M | $105M | $90M | $112M | $118M | $94M | $83M | $96M | $107M | InventoryInvent. |
| $26M | $21M | $20M | $28M | $31M | $31M | $23M | $19M | $15M | $15M | $19M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $81M | $85M | $88M | $79M | $58M | $81M | $95M | $75M | $69M | $81M | $89M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $194M | $211M | $202M | $205M | $316M | $309M | $276M | $252M | $239M | $249M | $241M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $96M | $90M | $88M | $127M | $204M | $210M | $154M | $138M | $132M | $133M | $131M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.0× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.5× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.9× | 1.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $455M | $461M | $440M | $560M | $680M | $686M | $649M | $654M | $649M | $649M | $647M | Total assetsAssets |
| $55M | $55M | $51M | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| ($8M) | ($25M) | ($21M) | ($76M) | — | — | — | — | — | — | ($107M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 18.8× | 18.2× | 17.5× | 190.0× | 197.2× | 780.8× | 777.0× | 449.8× | 161.4× | 166.6× | 170.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $282M | $294M | $275M | $261M | $253M | $256M | $289M | $308M | $308M | $308M | $307M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $20M of profit into $33M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $20M | $20M | $56M | $89M | $91M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$24M | +$22M | +$19M | +$17M | +$16M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$7M | +$7M | +$8M | +$7M | +$8M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$2M | +$11M | +$14M | −$62M | −$18M |
| Cash from operations | $53M | $59M | $97M | $51M | $97M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$20M | −$32M | −$53M | −$28M | −$34M |
| Owner earnings | $33M | $27M | $44M | $23M | $63M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | 4% | 5% | 2% | 6% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $26M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 166.6×ComfortableOperating income $27M ÷ interest expense $162K
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $125M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $125M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 1 + DIO 118 − DPO 19 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 8%–112%; 11% latest = NOPAT $20M ÷ invested capital $183MIndustry peers: median 44%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 2%–16%; latest $33M = operating cash $53M − maintenance capex $20MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $26M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $53M ÷ net income $20M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $26M ÷ Owner Earnings $33M
What this means
Of $33M Owner Earnings, $26M (78%) went back to shareholders, $21M dividends, $5M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($7M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.83×MaintainingCapex $20M ÷ depreciation $24M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $759M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.87×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $116M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +20%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.44/share (latest year $0.89), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 6% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 6% early, 5% lately, median 6%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 3.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$107M
- Receivables$2M
- Inventory$107M
- Other current assets$25M
- Accounts payable$19M
- Other current liabilities$112M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $734M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$271M · 37%
- Dividends$306M · 42%
- Buybacks$178M · 24%
- Returned to owners$484M
105% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $306M as dividends and $178M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $178M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count—
No continuous share count across the span.
- Dividend recordPays
Paid in 10 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Clarence Smith | $3.2M | $3.8M | $63M |
| 2022 | — | $2.7M | $2.6M | $23M |
| 2023 | — | $2.9M | $3.5M | $44M |
| 2024 | — | $2.6M | $609k | $27M |
| 2025 | Steve Burdette | $2.6M | $2.8M | $33M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.
- Stock-based compensation$7M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 27% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Haverty Furniture Companies Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Specialty Retail
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BBYBest Buy Co. Inc. | $41.7B | 23% | 4.4% | 44% | 4% |
| WSMWilliams-Sonoma | $7.8B | 46% | 14.7% | 88% | 12% |
| GMEGameStop Corp. | $3.6B | 28% | -2.7% | -59% | 2% |
| RHRH | $3.4B | 44% | 11.7% | 29% | 9% |
| ARHSArhaus Inc. | $1.4B | 39% | 6.4% | 45% | 8% |
| HVTHaverty Furniture Companies Inc. | $759M | 56% | 5.7% | 12% | 5% |
| Group median | — | 42% | 6.1% | 36% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Haverty Furniture Companies Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Haverty Furniture Companies Inc. earns about $36M on its 4.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $23M on 22M diluted shares; net cash $107M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← HUT its page in the Manual HWC →
Industry order: ← HTLM the Specialty Retail chapter JD →