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HTT, High Templar Tech Limited
Revenue is Delivery service Income (59%) and Sales Income (41%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 285% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 81% and operating margin about 23% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −973% and 56% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 48% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Delivery service Income at 59%.
- Delivery service Income59%CN¥24M
- Sales Income41%CN¥17M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| CN¥1.4B | CN¥4.8B | CN¥7.7B | CN¥8.8B | CN¥3.7B | CN¥1.7B | CN¥577M | CN¥126M | CN¥216M | CN¥41M | CN¥41M | RevenueRevenue |
| 81% | — | 74% | — | 83% | — | 43% | 78% | — | 81% | 81% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| CN¥713M | CN¥2.4B | CN¥2.7B | CN¥3.8B | CN¥866M | CN¥923M | (CN¥330M) | (CN¥331M) | (CN¥308M) | (CN¥398M) | (CN¥398M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 49.4% | 50.7% | 35.0% | 43.5% | 23.5% | 55.8% | −57.1% | −262.0% | −142.4% | −972.6% | −972.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| CN¥577M | CN¥2.2B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥3.3B | CN¥959M | CN¥586M | (CN¥362M) | CN¥39M | CN¥92M | CN¥709M | CN¥709M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 18% | 11% | 6% | 16% | 21% | 31% | — | — | 42% | 4% | 4% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| CN¥794M | CN¥2.8B | CN¥3.3B | CN¥5.5B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥922M | CN¥261M | CN¥352M | (CN¥111M) | CN¥687M | CN¥687M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥2M | CN¥6M | CN¥12M | CN¥17M | CN¥10M | CN¥22M | CN¥8M | CN¥14M | CN¥23M | CN¥51M | CN¥51M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| CN¥216M | CN¥628M | CN¥829M | CN¥2.2B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥315M | CN¥615M | CN¥299M | (CN¥225M) | (CN¥72M) | (CN¥72M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥5M | CN¥11M | CN¥140M | CN¥76M | CN¥222M | CN¥478M | CN¥274M | CN¥565M | CN¥318M | CN¥117M | CN¥117M | CapexCapex |
| 0.3% | 0.2% | 1.8% | 0.9% | 6.0% | 28.9% | 47.4% | 447.2% | 146.9% | 284.7% | 284.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| CN¥789M | CN¥2.8B | CN¥3.2B | CN¥5.4B | CN¥2.2B | CN¥444M | (CN¥13M) | (CN¥213M) | (CN¥429M) | CN¥570M | CN¥570M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 54.7% | 58.4% | 41.5% | 61.4% | 61.0% | 26.8% | −2.2% | −168.6% | −198.2% | n/m | n/m | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| CN¥789M | CN¥2.8B | CN¥3.2B | CN¥5.4B | CN¥2.2B | CN¥444M | (CN¥13M) | (CN¥213M) | (CN¥429M) | CN¥570M | CN¥570M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 54.7% | 58.4% | 41.5% | 61.4% | 61.0% | 26.8% | −2.2% | −168.6% | −198.2% | n/m | n/m | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | CN¥421M | CN¥1.4B | CN¥2.1B | CN¥16M | — | CN¥146M | CN¥421M | CN¥533M | CN¥301M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 67% | 29% | 36% | 7% | 6% | -3% | -4% | -3% | -6% | -6% | ROICROIC |
| — | 23% | 23% | 27% | 8% | 5% | -3% | 0% | 1% | 6% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| — | 23% | 23% | 27% | 8% | 5% | −3% | 0% | 1% | 6% | 6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| CN¥1.2B | CN¥7.1B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥2.9B | CN¥6.6B | CN¥8.0B | CN¥7.7B | CN¥7.9B | CN¥5.4B | CN¥6.4B | CN¥6.4B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | CN¥81M | CN¥190M | CN¥111M | CN¥205M | CN¥0 | CN¥26M | CN¥34M | CN¥5M | CN¥5M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | CN¥128M | CN¥9M | CN¥92M | CN¥15M | CN¥117M | CN¥10M | — | CN¥55M | CN¥55M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | CN¥209M | CN¥199M | CN¥203M | CN¥220M | CN¥117M | CN¥36M | CN¥34M | CN¥60M | CN¥60M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| CN¥6.9B | CN¥19.2B | CN¥14.5B | CN¥17.0B | CN¥11.7B | CN¥12.2B | CN¥11.1B | CN¥10.2B | CN¥10.1B | CN¥11.4B | CN¥11.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| CN¥4.5B | CN¥9.3B | CN¥5.0B | CN¥3.9B | CN¥473M | CN¥494M | CN¥585M | CN¥754M | CN¥1.1B | CN¥2.0B | CN¥2.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.5× | 2.1× | 2.9× | 4.4× | 24.7× | 24.8× | 18.9× | 13.5× | 9.0× | 5.8× | 5.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| CN¥7.1B | CN¥19.4B | CN¥16.3B | CN¥18.4B | CN¥13.4B | CN¥14.1B | CN¥12.7B | CN¥12.5B | CN¥12.5B | CN¥13.6B | CN¥13.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| CN¥76M | CN¥510M | CN¥413M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥413M | Total debtDebt |
| (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥6.6B) | (CN¥2.1B) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | (CN¥6.0B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| (CN¥3.4B) | CN¥9.5B | CN¥10.8B | CN¥11.9B | CN¥11.9B | CN¥12.5B | CN¥12.0B | CN¥11.7B | CN¥11.3B | CN¥11.6B | CN¥11.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The diluted share count moved ×1/3.83 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported CN¥709M of profit but CN¥570M of owner earnings: CN¥138M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | CN¥709M | CN¥92M | CN¥39M | (CN¥362M) | CN¥586M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥51M | +CN¥23M | +CN¥14M | +CN¥8M | +CN¥22M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −CN¥72M | −CN¥225M | +CN¥299M | +CN¥615M | +CN¥315M |
| Cash from operations | CN¥687M | (CN¥111M) | CN¥352M | CN¥261M | CN¥922M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −CN¥117M | −CN¥318M | −CN¥565M | −CN¥274M | −CN¥478M |
| Owner earnings | CN¥570M | (CN¥429M) | (CN¥213M) | (CN¥13M) | CN¥444M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1393% | -198% | -169% | -2% | 27% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“In response to the identified material weakness at December 31, 2024, our management, with oversight from our Audit Committee, made the following changes in its financial reporting processes in 2025: We conducted a comprehensive review of user access across…”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +CN¥6.0BNet cashCash CN¥5.5B + ST investments CN¥879M − debt CN¥413M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥6.0B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -6%–67%; -6% latest = NOPAT (CN¥382M) ÷ invested capital CN¥6.5BIndustry peers: median -8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -198%–1393%; latest CN¥570M = operating cash CN¥687M − maintenance capex CN¥117MIndustry peers: median -64%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1393% of revenue this year, a 41% median across 10 years.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops CN¥687M ÷ net income CN¥709M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks CN¥301M ÷ Owner Earnings CN¥570M
What this means
Of CN¥570M Owner Earnings, CN¥301M (53%) went back to shareholders, CN¥0 dividends, CN¥301M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.30×ExpandingCapex CN¥117M ÷ depreciation CN¥51M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥41M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 5.75×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · CN¥413M vs CN¥9.4B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −84%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥1.79/share (latest year CN¥4.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥74.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 45% → −459% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 45% early to −459% lately, median 23% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −30%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 30% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −972.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“The Outbound Investment Rule took effect on January 2, 2025 and restricts U.S. persons' certain direct and indirect investment into companies with specified connections to China that engage in specified "covered activities" within three areas of technology: semiconductors and mic…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥6.4B
- ReceivablesCN¥5M
- InventoryCN¥55M
- Other current assetsCN¥4.9B
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥2.0B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated CN¥17.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- ReinvestedCN¥2.2B · 13%
- BuybacksCN¥5.3B · 31%
- Retained (debt / cash)CN¥9.5B · 56%
- Returned to ownersCN¥5.3B
36% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥0 as dividends and CN¥5.3B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose CN¥337M and cash and short-term investments rose CN¥5.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran CN¥5.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−73.9%
The diluted count fell from 304M to 79M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−44%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (CN¥5.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell CN¥2.3B, so each retained CN¥1 gave back about 0.44 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why High Templar Tech Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?28.5% vs 51.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 51.5% early in the record and 28.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?CN¥76M → CN¥413M
Debt rose from CN¥76M to CN¥413M while owner earnings went from about CN¥2.3B to (CN¥24M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CORZCore Scientific Inc. | $319M | 20% | -19.2% | 5% | -19% |
| HUTHut 8 Corp. | $235M | 54% | -55.2% | -8% | -73% |
| CIFRCipher Digital Inc. | $224M | 62% | -108.6% | -7% | -154% |
| BTBTBit Digital Inc. | $114M | — | -58.9% | -10% | -64% |
| WYFIWhiteFiber Inc. | $79M | — | -33.9% | -6% | 28% |
| HTTHigh Templar Tech Limited | CN¥41M | 80% | 29.2% | 6% | 48% |
| DGXXDigi Power X Inc. | $34M | — | — | — | -95% |
| SLNHPSoluna Holdings, Inc. | $30M | 23% | -113.3% | -33% | -55% |
| Group median | — | 54% | -55.2% | -7% | -59% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares , each representing one Class”; High Templar Tech Limited reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what High Templar Tech Limited has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $84M on 157M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net cash $885M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← HTLM its page in the Manual HUHU →
Industry order: ← HOOD the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter HUT →