Owner Scorecard


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HUYA, HUYA Inc.

Software asset-light Unprofitable

Revenue is Live Streaming (71%) and Game Related Services, Advertising and Others (29%).

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in CNY · 1 ADS = 1 ordinary share
HUYA · HUYA Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
CN¥6.5B
+7.0% YoY · −10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥6.5B 5-yr avg CN¥8.0B
Gross margin 13% 5-yr avg 12%
Operating margin −2.5% 5-yr avg −4.0%
ROIC −3% 5-yr avg −3%
Owner-earnings margin −3% 5-yr avg −1%
Free cash flow margin −5% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −3.1% through the cycle on a 13% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Live Streaming is 71% of revenue, with Game Related Services, Advertising And Others the other meaningful line at 29%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Live Streaming71%CN¥4.6B
  • Game Related Services, Advertising And Others29%CN¥1.9B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
CN¥797MCN¥2.2BCN¥4.7BCN¥8.4BCN¥10.9BCN¥11.4BCN¥9.3BCN¥7.0BCN¥6.1BCN¥6.5BCN¥6.5BRevenueRevenue
−37%12%16%18%21%14%7%12%13%13%13%Gross marginGross mgn
(CN¥626M)(CN¥95M)CN¥27MCN¥261MCN¥725M(CN¥30M)(CN¥736M)(CN¥444M)(CN¥190M)(CN¥163M)(CN¥163M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−78.6%−4.3%0.6%3.1%6.6%−0.3%−7.9%−6.3%−3.1%−2.5%−2.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
(CN¥626M)(CN¥81M)(CN¥1.9B)CN¥468MCN¥884MCN¥583M(CN¥548M)(CN¥205M)(CN¥48M)(CN¥113M)(CN¥113M)Net incomeNet inc.
17%17%9%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
(CN¥420M)CN¥242MCN¥717MCN¥1.9BCN¥1.2BCN¥327M(CN¥400M)(CN¥32M)CN¥94M(CN¥176M)(CN¥176M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
CN¥4MCN¥7MCN¥27MCN¥45MCN¥58MCN¥50MCN¥43MCN¥47MCN¥40MCN¥35MCN¥35MDepreciationDeprec.
CN¥201MCN¥317MCN¥2.6BCN¥1.4BCN¥297M(CN¥306M)CN¥104MCN¥126MCN¥102M(CN¥99M)(CN¥99M)Working capital & otherWC & other
CN¥3KCN¥37MCN¥75MCN¥61MCN¥54MCN¥39MCN¥156MCN¥123MCN¥186MCN¥168MCN¥168MCapexCapex
0.0%1.7%1.6%0.7%0.5%0.3%1.7%1.8%3.1%2.6%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
(CN¥420M)CN¥236MCN¥691MCN¥1.9BCN¥1.2BCN¥288M(CN¥444M)(CN¥79M)CN¥54M(CN¥212M)(CN¥212M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−52.8%10.8%14.8%22.7%10.9%2.5%−4.8%−1.1%0.9%−3.3%−3.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
(CN¥420M)CN¥205MCN¥643MCN¥1.9BCN¥1.2BCN¥288M(CN¥557M)(CN¥155M)(CN¥92M)(CN¥344M)(CN¥344M)Free cash flowFCF
−52.8%9.4%13.8%22.5%10.9%2.5%−6.0%−2.2%−1.5%−5.3%−5.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
CN¥0CN¥0CN¥2.9BCN¥2.4BCN¥2.4BDividends paidDiv. paid
CN¥0CN¥0CN¥202MCN¥248MCN¥90MBuybacksBuybacks
0%3%9%-0%-5%-3%-2%-3%-3%ROICROIC
-135%-34%5%9%6%-5%-2%-1%-2%-2%Return on equityROE
−5%−2%−38%−51%−51%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
CN¥443MCN¥1.0BCN¥3.3BCN¥4.5BCN¥2.6BCN¥697MCN¥512MCN¥1.2BCN¥693MCN¥693MCash & investmentsCash+inv
CN¥30MCN¥44MCN¥62MCN¥71MCN¥88MCN¥84MCN¥64MCN¥76MCN¥239MCN¥239MReceivablesReceiv.
CN¥6MCN¥9MCN¥4MCN¥10MCN¥13MCN¥23MCN¥15MCN¥67MCN¥238MCN¥238MAccounts payablePayables
CN¥24MCN¥35MCN¥58MCN¥61MCN¥75MCN¥62MCN¥49MCN¥9MCN¥666KCN¥666KOperating working capitalOper. WC
CN¥1.3BCN¥6.6BCN¥10.6BCN¥11.3BCN¥11.9BCN¥10.5BCN¥8.2BCN¥6.1BCN¥4.9BCN¥4.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
CN¥686MCN¥1.4BCN¥2.4BCN¥2.4BCN¥2.6BCN¥2.3BCN¥2.2BCN¥1.9BCN¥1.7BCN¥1.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×4.8×4.3×4.7×4.6×4.7×3.8×3.1×2.8×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
CN¥449MCN¥457MCN¥464MCN¥453MCN¥453MGoodwillGoodwill
CN¥1.3BCN¥7.1BCN¥11.4BCN¥12.4BCN¥13.3BCN¥13.8BCN¥12.9BCN¥9.6BCN¥6.7BCN¥6.7BTotal assetsAssets
(CN¥443M)(CN¥1.0B)(CN¥3.3B)(CN¥4.5B)(CN¥2.6B)(CN¥697M)(CN¥512M)(CN¥1.2B)(CN¥693M)(CN¥693M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
(CN¥164M)CN¥60MCN¥5.6BCN¥8.7BCN¥9.8BCN¥10.5BCN¥11.4BCN¥10.6BCN¥7.6BCN¥4.9BCN¥4.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
100M100M167M232M239M242M241M243M232M229M229MShares out (diluted)Shares
CN¥7.97CN¥21.85CN¥27.95CN¥36.09CN¥45.74CN¥46.95CN¥38.37CN¥28.78CN¥26.26CN¥28.41CN¥28.41Revenue / shareRev/sh
CN¥-6.26CN¥-0.81CN¥-11.61CN¥2.02CN¥3.71CN¥2.41CN¥-2.27CN¥-0.84CN¥-0.21CN¥-0.49CN¥-0.49EPS (diluted)EPS
CN¥-4.20CN¥2.36CN¥4.14CN¥8.19CN¥4.97CN¥1.19CN¥-1.84CN¥-0.32CN¥0.23CN¥-0.92CN¥-0.92Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
CN¥-4.20CN¥2.05CN¥3.85CN¥8.12CN¥4.97CN¥1.19CN¥-2.31CN¥-0.64CN¥-0.40CN¥-1.50CN¥-1.50Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
CN¥0.00CN¥0.00CN¥12.34CN¥10.52CN¥10.52Dividends / shareDiv/sh
CN¥0.00CN¥0.37CN¥0.45CN¥0.26CN¥0.23CN¥0.16CN¥0.65CN¥0.51CN¥0.80CN¥0.73CN¥0.73Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
CN¥-1.64CN¥0.60CN¥33.84CN¥37.43CN¥40.97CN¥43.47CN¥47.26CN¥43.72CN¥32.61CN¥21.50CN¥21.50Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.67 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+15.2%/yr−9.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+207.3%/yr+26.3%/yr
Book value / share−12.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
229Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
−3%low FY2022
Gross margin
13%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

(CN¥212M)owner earningsvs.(CN¥113M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned (CN¥212M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥35M it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥132M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (CN¥344M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income(CN¥113M)(CN¥48M)(CN¥205M)(CN¥548M)CN¥583M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+CN¥35M+CN¥40M+CN¥47M+CN¥43M+CN¥50M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−CN¥99M+CN¥102M+CN¥126M+CN¥104M−CN¥306M
Cash from operations(CN¥176M)CN¥94M(CN¥32M)(CN¥400M)CN¥327M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−CN¥35M−CN¥40M−CN¥47M−CN¥43M−CN¥39M
Owner earnings(CN¥212M)CN¥54M(CN¥79M)(CN¥444M)CN¥288M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−CN¥132M−CN¥146M−CN¥76M−CN¥113M
Free cash flow(CN¥344M)(CN¥92M)(CN¥155M)(CN¥557M)CN¥288M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-3%1%-1%-5%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥35M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥132M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash CN¥693M − debt CN¥0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥693M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 13 + DIO 0 − DPO 15 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -53%–23%; latest (CN¥212M) = operating cash (CN¥176M) − maintenance capex CN¥35M
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. It chose to put CN¥132M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (CN¥344M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income (CN¥113M) · cash from operations (CN¥176M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 4.73×
    Expanding
    Capex CN¥168M ÷ depreciation CN¥35M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥6.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.84×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥-0.54/share (latest year CN¥-0.50), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥21.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −27% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −27% early to −4% lately, median −3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Worst year 2016 · −78.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsCN¥4.9B
  • Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥693M
  • ReceivablesCN¥239M
  • Other current assetsCN¥4.0B
Current liabilitiesCN¥1.7B
  • Accounts payableCN¥238M
  • Other current liabilitiesCN¥1.5B
Current ratio2.84×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.84×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.40×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalCN¥3.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway2.0 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥4.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueCN¥3.1BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥19MCN¥19M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥228Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated CN¥3.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • ReinvestedCN¥901M · 25%
  • DividendsCN¥5.3B · 149%
  • BuybacksCN¥541M · 15%
  • Returned to ownersCN¥5.8B

    181% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥5.3B as dividends and CN¥541M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−CN¥3.2B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran CN¥3.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran CN¥541M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count128.8%

    The diluted count rose from 100M to 229M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend recordCN¥10.52/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TTWOTake-Two Interactive$6.7B50%6.3%18%14%
HUYAHUYA Inc.CN¥6.5B13%-2.8%-1%2%
SNAPSnap Inc.$5.9B55%-32.4%-24%-4%
APPAppLovin$5.5B70%19.6%10%17%
ZMZoom$4.9B76%11.6%8%33%
PINSPinterest Inc.$4.2B76%-4.1%-5%16%
NIQNIQ Global Intelligence plc$4.2B-2.5%-2%1%
MTCHMatch Group Inc.$3.5B73%26.1%17%27%
Group median70%1.9%3%15%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares , each representing one Class”; HUYA Inc. reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what HUYA Inc. has delivered.

HUYA Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, HUYA Inc. earns about $16M on its 1.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −3.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($51M) on 225M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2024-12-31; net cash $102M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($25M) runs well above depreciation ($5M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($31M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "HUYA Inc. (HUYA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HUYA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HUHU its page in the Manual HYFT →

Industry order: ← HUBS the Software chapter IAC →