Owner Scorecard


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INFY, Infosys Limited

A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
INFY · Infosys Limited
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$19.3B
+3.9% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $19.3B 5-yr avg $17.2B
Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 32%
Operating margin 21.1% 5-yr avg 22.1%
ROIC 35% 5-yr avg 35%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 33% and operating margin about 23% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (21%–25% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 33%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest North America at 58%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • North America58%$11.2B
  • Europe30%$5.7B
  • Rest Of World9%$1.8B
  • India3%$593M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2025
Income statement
$9.5B$10.2B$10.9B$11.8B$12.8B$13.6B$16.3B$18.2B$18.6B$19.3B$19.3BRevenueRevenue
37%37%36%35%33%35%33%30%30%30%30%Gross marginGross mgn
$2.4B$2.5B$2.7B$2.7B$2.7B$3.3B$3.8B$3.8B$3.8B$4.1B$4.1BOperating incomeOp. inc.
25.0%24.7%24.3%22.8%21.3%24.5%23.0%21.0%20.7%21.1%21.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.1B$2.1B$2.5B$2.2B$2.3B$2.6B$3.0B$3.0B$3.2B$3.2B$3.2BNet incomeNet inc.
28%28%21%27%25%27%26%28%27%29%29%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.9B$2.1B$2.3B$2.3B$2.6B$3.3B$3.3B$2.9B$3.1B$4.4B$4.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$222M$254M$289M$287M$407M$441M$466M$524M$565M$569M$569MDepreciationDeprec.
($412M)($295M)($518M)($224M)($127M)$204M($84M)($652M)($584M)$624M$624MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$413M$411M$310M$349M$465M$465MCapexCapex
4.3%4.0%2.8%3.0%3.6%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.6B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$2.1B$3.9BOwner earningsOwner earn.
17.3%18.1%17.8%16.2%16.8%20.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.4B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9B$2.1B$3.9BFree cash flowFCF
15.3%16.5%17.8%16.2%16.8%20.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.1B$1.0B$1.2B$2.0B$1.4B$1.2B$1.7B$1.7B$1.8B$2.4B$2.4BDividends paidDiv. paid
$2.0B$118M$1.1B$1.5B$1.4BBuybacksBuybacks
18%25%30%30%33%34%36%36%32%35%35%ROICROIC
22%20%25%23%27%25%30%33%30%28%28%Return on equityROE
11%10%13%3%11%13%13%14%13%7%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5.0B$4.0B$3.8B$3.1B$3.7B$3.2B$2.3B$3.3B$4.3B$4.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$2.4B$2.6B$3.0B$3.1B$3.6B$3.6B$3.6BReceivablesReceiv.
$362M$545M$470M$474M$487M$487MAccounts payablePayables
$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$2.4B$2.3B$2.5B$2.6B$3.1B$3.2B$3.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$8.3B$7.7B$7.6B$7.2B$8.3B$8.9B$8.6B$10.7B$11.4B$11.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.2B$2.2B$2.7B$2.8B$3.3B$4.4B$4.8B$4.7B$5.0B$5.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.8×3.5×2.8×2.6×2.5×2.0×1.8×2.3×2.3×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$568M$563M$339M$512M$699M$832M$817M$882M$875M$1.2B$1.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$12.9B$12.3B$12.3B$12.3B$14.8B$15.6B$15.3B$16.5B$17.4B$17.4BTotal assetsAssets
($5.0B)($4.0B)($3.8B)($3.1B)($3.7B)($3.2B)($2.3B)($3.3B)($4.3B)($4.3B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
113.5×127.9×139.1×109.3×68.5×83.1×83.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$9.3B$10.6B$10.0B$9.4B$8.6B$10.4B$9.9B$9.2B$10.6B$11.2B$11.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
4.57B4.57B4.51B4.35B4.26B4.24B4.21B4.18B4.14B4.14B4.14BShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.08$2.23$2.43$2.71$3.00$3.20$3.87$4.36$4.49$4.65$4.65Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.45$0.47$0.55$0.51$0.55$0.62$0.70$0.71$0.77$0.76$0.76EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.36$0.40$0.43$0.44$0.50$0.94Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.32$0.37$0.43$0.44$0.50$0.94Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.23$0.23$0.26$0.45$0.32$0.29$0.40$0.41$0.43$0.58$0.58Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.09$0.09$0.07$0.08$0.11$0.11Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.04$2.33$2.21$2.16$2.03$2.46$2.36$2.19$2.55$2.71$2.70Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2017 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.4%/yr+9.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.9%/yr (4-yr)+8.9%/yr (4-yr)
EPS+6.1%/yr+6.9%/yr
Dividends / share+10.8%/yr+12.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.9%/yr (4-yr)+4.9%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share+3.2%/yr+5.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
4.1Bpeak FY2017
ROIC
35%low FY2016
Gross margin
30%low FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.1Bowner earningsvs.$2.3Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2020 the business reported $2.3B of profit but $2.1B of owner earnings: $185M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$2.3B
Owner earnings$2.1B · 17% of revenue
FY2020FY2019FY2018FY2017FY2016
Reported net income$2.3B$2.2B$2.5B$2.1B$2.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$407M+$287M+$289M+$254M+$222M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$127M−$224M−$518M−$295M−$412M
Cash from operations$2.6B$2.3B$2.3B$2.1B$1.9B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$465M−$349M−$310M−$254M−$222M
Owner earnings$2.1B$1.9B$1.9B$1.8B$1.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$157M−$191M
Free cash flow$2.1B$1.9B$1.9B$1.7B$1.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue17%16%18%18%17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $4.1B ÷ interest expense $49M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $2.9B + ST investments $1.5B − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $4.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 69 + DIO 0 − DPO 13 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • High through the cycle
    5-yr median margin, range 16%–18%; latest $3.9B = operating cash $4.4B − maintenance capex $465M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 5 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $4.4B ÷ net income $3.2B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $2.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.9B
    What this means

    Of $3.9B Owner Earnings, $2.4B (62%) went back to shareholders, $2.4B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.82×
    Maintaining
    Capex $465M ÷ depreciation $569M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $19.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +39%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.76/share (latest year $0.78), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.76/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 25% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 25% early to 21% lately, median 23% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 20.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.

“AI is increasingly being applied to fine tune domain specific capabilities and industry focused use cases.”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$11.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$4.3B
  • Receivables$3.6B
  • Other current assets$3.4B
Current liabilities$5.0B
  • Accounts payable$487M
  • Other current liabilities$4.5B
Current ratio2.27×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.27×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.86×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$6.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$9.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$5.2BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$962M$962M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$994Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2020

Over the record, the business generated $11.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$1.9B · 18%
  • Dividends$6.6B · 59%
  • Buybacks$3.2B · 29%
  • Returned to owners$9.8B

    103% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $6.6B as dividends and $3.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$649M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $649M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $3.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−9.4%

    The diluted count fell from 4571M to 4144M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.32/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained14%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $191M, so each retained $1 added about 0.14 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Infosys Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
XYZBlock Inc.$24.2B34%-0.7%-1%4%
ADBEAdobe Inc.$23.8B87%32.2%33%39%
CTSHCognizant$21.1B15.3%18%12%
ADPAutomatic Data Processing Inc.$20.6B43%21.3%46%19%
INFYInfosys Limited$19.3B34%22.9%33%17%
INTUIntuit Inc.$18.8B99%26.0%35%32%
LDOSLeidos Holdings Inc.$17.1B14%7.5%10%7%
FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc$16.4B48%-0.4%-0%8%
Group median43%18.3%25%15%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Infosys Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Infosys Limited has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Infosys Limited earns about $3.4B on its 17.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’20+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $3.9B on 4056M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2026-03-31; net cash $4.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Infosys Limited (INFY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/INFY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← INCR its page in the Manual ING →

Industry order: ← IBM the IT Services & Consulting chapter INOD →