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INNV, InnovAge Holding Corp.
We Are InnovAge is the leading healthcare delivery platform by number of participants focused on providing all-inclusive, capitated care to high-cost, seniors, many of whom are dual-eligible.
PACE is a fully-capitated managed care program, which serves the frail elderly, and predominantly dual-eligible, population in a community-based service model.
We deliver our participant-centered care through the InnovAge Platform (as defined herein), which is designed to bring high-touch, comprehensive, value-based care.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −3.0% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 1 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $567M | $638M | $699M | $688M | $764M | $854M | $949M | RevenueRevenue |
| 10% | 21% | 15% | 17% | 15% | 14% | 17% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $51M | ($12M) | ($4M) | ($49M) | ($23M) | ($30M) | ($10M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 9.0% | −1.9% | −0.6% | −7.2% | −3.0% | −3.5% | −1.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $26M | ($44M) | ($7M) | ($41M) | ($21M) | ($30M) | ($12M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $44M | ($8M) | $27M | $20M | ($37M) | $33M | $52M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $11M | $12M | $14M | $15M | $19M | $20M | $18M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $6M | $22M | $16M | $41M | ($41M) | $36M | $39M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $12M | $18M | $38M | $23M | $8M | $6M | $10M | CapexCapex |
| 2.1% | 2.8% | 5.5% | 3.4% | 1.0% | 0.7% | 1.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $32M | ($20M) | $13M | $5M | ($45M) | $27M | $43M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.6% | −3.1% | 1.9% | 0.7% | −5.9% | 3.1% | 4.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $32M | ($25M) | ($11M) | ($3M) | ($45M) | $27M | $43M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 5.6% | −3.9% | −1.6% | −0.5% | −5.9% | 3.1% | 4.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $24M | $5M | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| 18% | -5% | -2% | -16% | -7% | -10% | -4% | ROICROIC |
| 26% | -13% | -2% | -14% | -8% | -13% | -5% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $113M | $201M | $184M | $173M | $103M | $106M | $139M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $46M | $33M | $36M | $24M | $48M | $36M | $29M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $29M | $32M | $51M | $55M | $55M | $77M | $106M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $17M | $221K | ($15M) | ($31M) | ($7M) | ($40M) | ($77M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $167M | $251M | $241M | $215M | $173M | $176M | $203M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $77M | $79M | $105M | $148M | $139M | $165M | $196M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.2× | 3.2× | 2.3× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $116M | $124M | $124M | $124M | $140M | $142M | $142M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $410M | $532M | $556M | $567M | $548M | $527M | $547M | Total assetsAssets |
| $212M | $75M | $72M | $69M | $65M | $60M | $58M | Total debtDebt |
| $99M | ($126M) | ($112M) | ($105M) | ($38M) | ($46M) | ($81M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.5× | -0.7× | -1.7× | — | — | — | -3.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $101M | $335M | $332M | $296M | $269M | $235M | $229M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 135M | 124M | 136M | 136M | 136M | 135M | 136M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.19 | $5.16 | $5.16 | $5.07 | $5.62 | $6.31 | $7.00 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.19 | $-0.36 | $-0.05 | $-0.30 | $-0.16 | $-0.22 | $-0.09 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.24 | $-0.16 | $0.10 | $0.04 | $-0.33 | $0.20 | $0.31 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.24 | $-0.20 | $-0.08 | $-0.02 | $-0.33 | $0.20 | $0.31 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.09 | $0.14 | $0.28 | $0.17 | $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.07 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.75 | $2.71 | $2.45 | $2.19 | $1.98 | $1.74 | $1.69 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.5%/yr | +8.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −3.6%/yr | −3.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −12.0%/yr | −12.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +18.4%/yr | +18.4%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Capitation revenue+11.8%
“Capitation revenue was $852.4 million for the year ended June 30, 2025, an increase of $89.8 million, or 11.8%, compared to $762.6 million for the year ended June 30, 2024. This increase was driven by a $78.2 million, or 10.3% increase in member months (as defined below under “Key Business Metrics and non-GAAP Measures – Total member months”) coupled with an $11.6 million, or 1.4%, increase in capitation rates.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $30M loss into $27M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($30M) | ($21M) | ($41M) | ($7M) | ($44M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$20M | +$19M | +$15M | +$14M | +$12M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$8M | +$7M | +$5M | +$4M | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$36M | −$41M | +$41M | +$16M | +$22M |
| Cash from operations | $33M | ($37M) | $20M | $27M | ($8M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$6M | −$8M | −$15M | −$14M | −$12M |
| Owner earnings | $27M | ($45M) | $5M | $13M | ($20M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$8M | −$24M | −$5M |
| Free cash flow | $27M | ($45M) | ($3M) | ($11M) | ($25M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | -6% | 1% | 2% | -3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer $19M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -11.8×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($30M) ÷ interest expense $3M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $64M + ST investments $42M − debt $60M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $46M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -16%–18%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($24M) ÷ invested capital $231MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -6%–6%; latest $27M = operating cash $33M − maintenance capex $6MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $19M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($30M) · cash from operations $33M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $87M ÷ Owner Earnings $27M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $27M of Owner Earnings, $87M (327%) went back to shareholders, $10M dividends, $78M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $8M stock comp, the real buyback was about $70M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.32×HarvestingCapex $6M ÷ depreciation $20M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $854M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $60M vs $11M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 6 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.23/share (latest year $-0.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 2% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 2% early to −5% lately, median −3% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2023 · −7.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$139M
- Receivables$29M
- Other current assets$35M
- Debt due within a year$3M
- Accounts payable$106M
- Other current liabilities$88M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2020–2025
Over the record, the business generated $80M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$105M · 132%
- Dividends$10M · 12%
- Buybacks$78M · 97%
- Returned to owners$87M
718% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $10M as dividends and $78M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$112M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $112M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $78M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count0.3%
The diluted count barely moved (135M to 136M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.08/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why InnovAge Holding Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Health Care Providers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIMSHims & Hers Health | $2.3B | 75% | -10.2% | -9% | 9% |
| RDNTRadNet | $2.0B | 13% | 4.9% | 4% | 5% |
| NHCNational HealthCare Corporation | $1.5B | — | 5.3% | 6% | 7% |
| SHCSotera Health | $1.2B | 55% | 25.2% | 7% | 13% |
| INNVInnovAge Holding Corp. | $854M | — | -2.5% | -6% | 1% |
| SNDASonida Senior Living Inc. | $381M | — | -0.8% | -4% | -3% |
| CSTLCastle Biosciences Inc. | $344M | 81% | -14.6% | -18% | -0% |
| VMDViemed Healthcare Inc. | $270M | 61% | 9.2% | 12% | 10% |
| Group median | — | — | 2.0% | -0% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what InnovAge Holding Corp. has delivered.
InnovAge Holding Corp.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, InnovAge Holding Corp. earns about $11M on its 1.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $43M on 136M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $81M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10M) runs well above depreciation ($18M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $46M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← INN its page in the Manual INOD →
Industry order: ← HIMS the Health Care Providers & Services chapter LFMDP →