← All companies ← SHBI Manual SHEN → ← SGRY Health Care Providers & Services SNDA →
SHC, Sotera Health
We provide end-to-end sterilization as well as microbiological and analytical lab testing and advisory services to help ensure that medical, pharmaceutical and food products are safe for healthcare practitioners, patients and consumers in the United States and around the world.
We are a leading global provider of mission-critical end-to-end sterilization solutions, lab testing and advisory services for the healthcare industry.
In 2025, our customers included over 40 of the top 50 medical device companies and nine of the top ten global pharmaceutical companies (based on revenue).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Sterigenics (65%), Nelson Labs (19%) and Nordion (16%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 55% and operating margin about 25% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Capital spending runs about 12% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Sterigenics is 65% of revenue, with Nelson Labs the other meaningful segment at 19%.
- Sterigenics65%$756M
- Nelson Labs19%$220M
- Nordion16%$188M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $778M | $818M | $931M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 51% | 54% | 56% | 55% | 55% | 55% | 55% | 55% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 19% | 22% | 21% | 24% | 23% | 22% | 22% | 22% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $184M | $206M | $257M | $248M | $277M | $298M | $148M | $298M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 23.6% | 25.2% | 27.6% | 24.7% | 26.4% | 27.0% | 12.7% | 25.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($21M) | ($39M) | $117M | ($234M) | $51M | $44M | $78M | $118M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 33% | — | 52% | — | 47% | 43% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $149M | $121M | $282M | $278M | ($148M) | $224M | $287M | $261M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $67M | $63M | $64M | $64M | $77M | $84M | $95M | $98M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $96M | $85M | $87M | $426M | ($308M) | $59M | $83M | $7M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $57M | $54M | $102M | $182M | $215M | $179M | $138M | $164M | CapexCapex |
| 7.4% | 6.5% | 11.0% | 18.2% | 20.5% | 16.3% | 11.9% | 13.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $92M | $67M | $217M | $214M | ($224M) | $140M | $192M | $163M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 11.8% | 8.2% | 23.3% | 21.3% | −21.4% | 12.7% | 16.5% | 13.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $92M | $67M | $179M | $96M | ($363M) | $45M | $149M | $97M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 11.8% | 8.2% | 19.3% | 9.5% | −34.6% | 4.1% | 12.8% | 8.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $14M | $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $691M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $34M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 7% | 8% | 10% | 6% | 6% | 3% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| — | -9% | 20% | -67% | 12% | 11% | 13% | 19% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −9% | 20% | — | — | — | — | 19% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $63M | $102M | $107M | $395M | $296M | $277M | $345M | $314M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $92M | $108M | $118M | $148M | $140M | $139M | $137M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $34M | $54M | $37M | $48M | $49M | $54M | $57M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $52M | $73M | $74M | $71M | $55M | $78M | $77M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $73M | $90M | $81M | $125M | $134M | $116M | $118M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $315M | $346M | $645M | $557M | $526M | $613M | $586M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $141M | $161M | $792M | $231M | $191M | $250M | $208M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.2× | 2.1× | 0.8× | 2.4× | 2.8× | 2.5× | 2.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $2.8B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.1B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($641M) | $452M | $586M | $350M | $444M | $405M | $606M | $623M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.9% | 1.3% | 1.5% | 2.1% | 3.1% | 3.3% | 2.7% | 3.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 232M | 238M | 279M | 280M | 283M | 285M | 286M | 288M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $3.35 | $3.44 | $3.33 | $3.58 | $3.70 | $3.86 | $4.06 | $4.13 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.09 | $-0.16 | $0.42 | $-0.83 | $0.18 | $0.16 | $0.27 | $0.41 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.39 | $0.28 | $0.78 | $0.76 | $-0.79 | $0.49 | $0.67 | $0.57 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.39 | $0.28 | $0.64 | $0.34 | $-1.28 | $0.16 | $0.52 | $0.34 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $2.97 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.25 | $0.23 | $0.37 | $0.65 | $0.76 | $0.63 | $0.48 | $0.57 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-2.76 | $1.90 | $2.10 | $1.25 | $1.57 | $1.42 | $2.12 | $2.16 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.3%/yr | +3.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +9.2%/yr | +18.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +11.8%/yr | +16.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +2.1%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Nordion+8.2%
“Nordion net revenues were $187.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, an increase of $14.3 million, or 8.2%, as compared to the prior year. The increase was driven by growth from volume/mix and pricing of 6.2% and 2.9%, respectively, partially offset by unfavorable changes in foreign currency exchange rates of 0.9%.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $192M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $95M it takes just to hold its position. It put $43M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $149M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $78M | $44M | $51M | ($234M) | $117M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$95M | +$84M | +$77M | +$64M | +$64M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$31M | +$37M | +$32M | +$21M | +$14M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$83M | +$59M | −$308M | +$426M | +$87M |
| Cash from operations | $287M | $224M | ($148M) | $278M | $282M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$95M | −$84M | −$77M | −$64M | −$64M |
| Owner earnings | $192M | $140M | ($224M) | $214M | $217M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$43M | −$95M | −$138M | −$118M | −$38M |
| Free cash flow | $149M | $45M | ($363M) | $96M | $179M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 17% | 13% | -21% | 21% | 23% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $95M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $43M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $31M), owner earnings is nearer $161M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.8B · 6.0× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $345M − debt $2.1B
What this means
Netting $345M of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $1.8B owed, about 6.0× a year's operating profit (7.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 44 + DIO 38 − DPO 55 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range 3%–10%; 7% latest = NOPAT $157M ÷ invested capital $2.4BIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -21%–23%; latest $192M = operating cash $287M − maintenance capex $95MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 7 years. It chose to put $43M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $149M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $31M of SBC) leaves $161M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $287M ÷ net income $78M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $192M
What this means
Of $192M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.45×ExpandingCapex $138M ÷ depreciation $95M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.46×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs $364M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +203%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.20/share (latest year $0.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.13/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 25% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 25% early to 22% lately, median 25% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +13%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 12.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +3.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$314M
- Receivables$137M
- Inventory$57M
- Other current assets$77M
- Debt due within a year$14M
- Accounts payable$77M
- Other current liabilities$117M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$927M · 78%
- Dividends$691M · 58%
- Buybacks$34M · 3%
- Returned to owners$725M
104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $691M as dividends and $34M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$460M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $460M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $34M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count23.8%
The diluted count rose from 232M to 288M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Michael B. Petras, Jr | $2.2M | −$2.4M | $217M |
| 2022 | Michael B. Petras, Jr | $16.7M | $5.9M | $214M |
| 2023 | Michael B. Petras, Jr | $9.7M | $31.2M | ($224M) |
| 2024 | Michael B. Petras, Jr | $10.4M | $5.1M | $140M |
| 2025 | Michael B. Petras, Jr | $10.7M | $16.7M | $192M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership15.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$31M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Sotera Health is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?23.8%
Diluted shares grew 23.8% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $34M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Health Care Providers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACHCAcadia Healthcare Company Inc. | $3.3B | — | 13.1% | 5% | 11% |
| AHCOAdaptHealth Corp. | $3.2B | 18% | 6.6% | 4% | 7% |
| HIMSHims & Hers Health | $2.3B | 75% | -10.2% | -9% | 9% |
| RDNTRadNet | $2.0B | 13% | 4.9% | 4% | 5% |
| NHCNational HealthCare Corporation | $1.5B | — | 5.3% | 6% | 7% |
| SHCSotera Health | $1.2B | 55% | 25.2% | 7% | 13% |
| INNVInnovAge Holding Corp. | $854M | — | -2.5% | -6% | 1% |
| VMDViemed Healthcare Inc. | $270M | 61% | 9.2% | 12% | 10% |
| Group median | — | 55% | 6.0% | 5% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sotera Health has delivered.
Sotera Health’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Sotera Health earns about $148M on its 12.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $97M on 285M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $1.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($164M) runs well above depreciation ($98M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $166M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SHBI its page in the Manual SHEN →
Industry order: ← SGRY the Health Care Providers & Services chapter SNDA →