Share count
436Mpeak FY2021
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INTR, Inter & Co. Inc. Class A
Banks financial
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
R$3.6B
+20.7% YoY · 41% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2024, with 5-yr average
Revenue R$3.6B 5-yr avg R$2.2B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 1%, above 12% in only 0 of 6 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, charted
FY2019–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
R$3.6Blow FY2019
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 10%AdequateNet income R$907M ÷ equity R$8.9BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ModestNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill R$0 − intangibles R$0)Industry peers: median 14%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 49%Cost-income, not comparable to the US gradesNoninterest expense R$1.8B ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 62%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs. A 20-F/IFRS filer structures its income statement differently from a US bank, so this figure is not comparable to the US thresholds and is shown without a lean/bloated grade — read it against the bank's own history, not across the pool.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 11.6%Well capitalizedEquity R$8.9B ÷ assets R$76.5B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 56%Mostly deposit-fundedDeposits R$42.8B ÷ assets R$76.5B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) -113%Net reserve releaseProvision for credit losses (R$2.1B) ÷ net interest income R$1.8B
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“As engagement grows, we generate additional data that allows us to further refine and personalize the client experience, including through the usage of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FHNFirst Horizon | $3.4B | 10% | 14% | 63% | 2.9% |
| ZIONZions Bancorporation N.A. | $3.4B | 12% | 14% | 62% | 2.9% |
| BPOPPopular Inc. | $3.2B | 11% | 13% | 61% | 3.3% |
| EWBCEast West Bancorp | $2.9B | 15% | 16% | 44% | 3.2% |
| WBSWebster Financial | $2.9B | 10% | 14% | 59% | 3.0% |
| WTFCWintrust Financial | $2.7B | 10% | 12% | 63% | 2.9% |
| SSBSouthState | $2.7B | 9% | 14% | 63% | 3.1% |
| INTRInter & Co. Inc. Class A | R$3.6B | 1% | 1% | 61% | 2.4% |
| Group median | — | 10% | 14% | 62% | 2.9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Inter & Co. Inc. Class A reports in BRL, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that BRL, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in BRL. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Inter & Co. Inc. Class A’s record justifies.
R$
The assumptions
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity1%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book R$8.9B on 436M shares, a 1% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Inter & Co. Inc. Class A (INTR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/INTR, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← INMD its page in the Manual INVZ →
Industry order: ← ING the Banks chapter ISTR →