Owner Scorecard


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JG, Aurora Mobile Limited

Software asset-light Distress / turnaround

Revenue is Subscription (60%), Vertical Applications (29%) and Value Added Services (11%).

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in CNY · 1 ADS = 13.333333 ordinary shares
JG · Aurora Mobile Limited
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
CN¥375M
+18.6% YoY · −4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥375M 5-yr avg CN¥333M
Gross margin 67% 5-yr avg 69%
Operating margin 0.2% 5-yr avg −17.2%
ROIC 1% 5-yr avg −388%
Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg −4%
Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −31% through the cycle on a 44% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −27 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −78%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Subscription is 60% of revenue, with Vertical Applications the other meaningful line at 29%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Subscription60%CN¥226M
  • Vertical Applications29%CN¥108M
  • Value Added Services11%CN¥41M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
CN¥70MCN¥285MCN¥714MCN¥906MCN¥472MCN¥357MCN¥329MCN¥290MCN¥316MCN¥375MCN¥375MRevenueRevenue
32%25%28%28%44%74%69%69%66%67%67%Gross marginGross mgn
(CN¥58M)(CN¥92M)(CN¥93M)(CN¥147M)(CN¥190M)(CN¥138M)(CN¥101M)(CN¥41M)(CN¥10M)CN¥706KCN¥706KOperating incomeOp. inc.
−82.0%−32.5%−13.0%−16.2%−40.3%−38.7%−30.7%−14.0%−3.1%0.2%0.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
(CN¥61M)(CN¥90M)(CN¥66M)(CN¥110M)(CN¥225M)(CN¥141M)(CN¥108M)(CN¥63M)(CN¥7M)CN¥3MCN¥3MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
(CN¥42M)(CN¥76M)(CN¥98M)(CN¥26M)CN¥76M(CN¥77M)(CN¥17M)(CN¥18M)CN¥9MCN¥65MCN¥65MOperating cash flowOp. cash
CN¥3MCN¥9MCN¥18MCN¥30MCN¥38MCN¥27MCN¥24MCN¥5MCN¥1MCN¥931KCN¥931KDepreciationDeprec.
CN¥16MCN¥6M(CN¥50M)CN¥54MCN¥263MCN¥37MCN¥67MCN¥39MCN¥14MCN¥61MCN¥61MWorking capital & otherWC & other
CN¥19MCN¥28MCN¥58MCN¥39MCN¥20MCN¥16MCN¥632KCN¥306KCN¥5MCN¥252KCN¥252KCapexCapex
26.9%10.0%8.1%4.4%4.2%4.6%0.2%0.1%1.4%0.1%0.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
(CN¥61M)(CN¥104M)(CN¥156M)(CN¥65M)CN¥56M(CN¥93M)(CN¥18M)(CN¥18M)CN¥4MCN¥65MCN¥65MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−86.8%−36.5%−21.8%−7.2%11.9%−26.0%−5.5%−6.3%1.3%17.2%17.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
(CN¥61M)(CN¥104M)(CN¥156M)(CN¥65M)CN¥56M(CN¥93M)(CN¥18M)(CN¥18M)CN¥4MCN¥65MCN¥65MFree cash flowFCF
−86.8%−36.5%−21.8%−7.2%11.9%−26.0%−5.5%−6.3%1.3%17.2%17.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
CN¥3MCN¥38MCN¥2MCN¥4MCN¥3MCN¥8MBuybacksBuybacks
-28%-36%-78%-87%-689%1%ROICROIC
-11%-22%-70%-65%-85%-85%-10%4%4%Return on equityROE
−11%−22%−70%−65%−85%−85%−10%4%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
CN¥103MCN¥208MCN¥577MCN¥431MCN¥436MCN¥121MCN¥116MCN¥115MCN¥119MCN¥173MCN¥173MCash & investmentsCash+inv
CN¥50MCN¥142MCN¥135MCN¥45MCN¥44MCN¥30MCN¥34MCN¥51MCN¥43MCN¥43MReceivablesReceiv.
CN¥8MCN¥19MCN¥20MCN¥17MCN¥18MCN¥18MCN¥21MCN¥33MCN¥39MCN¥39MAccounts payablePayables
CN¥41MCN¥123MCN¥115MCN¥28MCN¥26MCN¥12MCN¥13MCN¥18MCN¥4MCN¥4MOperating working capitalOper. WC
CN¥293MCN¥804MCN¥654MCN¥530MCN¥381MCN¥177MCN¥170MCN¥185MCN¥232MCN¥232MCurrent assetsCur. assets
CN¥117MCN¥164MCN¥194MCN¥460MCN¥374MCN¥255MCN¥241MCN¥262MCN¥303MCN¥303MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×4.9×3.4×1.2×1.0×0.7×0.7×0.7×0.8×0.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
CN¥0CN¥38MCN¥38MCN¥38MCN¥38MCN¥38MGoodwillGoodwill
CN¥359MCN¥992MCN¥940MCN¥787MCN¥596MCN¥433MCN¥350MCN¥378MCN¥416MCN¥416MTotal assetsAssets
CN¥240MCN¥244MCN¥228MCN¥228MTotal debtDebt
(CN¥336M)(CN¥187M)(CN¥208M)CN¥55MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-757.5×-13.2×-13.2×-16.2×-15.7×-32.2×-50.1×-75.0×9.3×0.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
(CN¥108M)(CN¥224M)CN¥602MCN¥508MCN¥321MCN¥215MCN¥128MCN¥74MCN¥68MCN¥66MCN¥66MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
42.7M42.7M42.7M42.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
CN¥1.65CN¥6.67CN¥16.74CN¥8.79Revenue / shareRev/sh
CN¥-1.44CN¥-2.12CN¥-1.55CN¥0.06EPS (diluted)EPS
CN¥-1.43CN¥-2.44CN¥-3.65CN¥1.51Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
CN¥-1.43CN¥-2.44CN¥-3.65CN¥1.51Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
CN¥0.44CN¥0.67CN¥1.36CN¥0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
CN¥-2.54CN¥-5.26CN¥14.10CN¥1.54Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+218.7%/yr (2-yr)+218.7%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share+75.1%/yr (2-yr)+75.1%/yr (2-yr)

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
43Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
−689%low FY2022
Gross margin
67%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

CN¥65Mowner earningsvs.CN¥3Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2020FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned CN¥3M of profit into CN¥65M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net incomeCN¥3M
Owner earningsCN¥65M · 17% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net incomeCN¥3M(CN¥7M)(CN¥63M)(CN¥108M)(CN¥141M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+CN¥931K+CN¥1M+CN¥5M+CN¥24M+CN¥27M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+CN¥61M+CN¥14M+CN¥39M+CN¥67M+CN¥37M
Cash from operationsCN¥65MCN¥9M(CN¥18M)(CN¥17M)(CN¥77M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−CN¥252K−CN¥5M−CN¥306K−CN¥632K−CN¥16M
Owner earningsCN¥65MCN¥4M(CN¥18M)(CN¥18M)(CN¥93M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue17%1%-6%-6%-26%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income CN¥706K ÷ interest expense CN¥808K
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? CN¥55M · 78.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash CN¥168M + ST investments CN¥5M − debt CN¥228M
    What this means

    Netting CN¥173M of cash and short-term investments against CN¥228M of debt leaves CN¥55M owed, about 78.4× a year's operating profit (323.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 42 + DIO 0 − DPO 117 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -689%–-28%; 1% latest = NOPAT CN¥687K ÷ invested capital CN¥126M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest CN¥65M = operating cash CN¥65M − maintenance capex CN¥252K (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -7%)
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a -7% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops CN¥65M ÷ net income CN¥3M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks CN¥8M ÷ Owner Earnings CN¥65M
    What this means

    Of CN¥65M Owner Earnings, CN¥8M (12%) went back to shareholders, CN¥0 dividends, CN¥8M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.27×
    Harvesting
    Capex CN¥252K ÷ depreciation CN¥931K
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥375M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.77×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · CN¥228M vs (CN¥71M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥-0.52/share (latest year CN¥0.06), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥1.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −42% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −42% early to −6% lately, median −31% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2016 · −82.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsCN¥232M
  • Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥173M
  • ReceivablesCN¥43M
  • Other current assetsCN¥16M
Current liabilitiesCN¥303M
  • Accounts payableCN¥39M
  • Other current liabilitiesCN¥264M
Current ratio0.77×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.77×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.57×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(CN¥71M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥28Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(CN¥85M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥232MCN¥4M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥122Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EVEREverQuote Inc.$693M94%-3.7%-34%1%
ZIPZipRecruiter Inc.$449M89%0.3%10%14%
GRNDGrindr Inc.$440M21.4%22%26%
JGAurora Mobile LimitedCN¥375M55%-23.5%-78%-7%
DSPViant Technology Inc.$344M46%1.2%-8%13%
HSTMHealthStream Inc.$304M86%5.8%4%18%
PUBMPubMatic Inc.$283M68%7.5%8%25%
NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc.$258M83%-55.8%-24%-28%
Group median83%0.7%-2%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, every 3 of which represent 40 Class”; Aurora Mobile Limited reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Aurora Mobile Limited has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+1502%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $10M on 3M diluted shares; net debt $8M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Aurora Mobile Limited (JG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/JG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← JFU its page in the Manual JKS →

Industry order: ← IOT the Software chapter JKHY →