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JG, Aurora Mobile Limited
Revenue is Subscription (60%), Vertical Applications (29%) and Value Added Services (11%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −31% through the cycle on a 44% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −27 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −78%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Subscription is 60% of revenue, with Vertical Applications the other meaningful line at 29%.
- Subscription60%CN¥226M
- Vertical Applications29%CN¥108M
- Value Added Services11%CN¥41M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| CN¥70M | CN¥285M | CN¥714M | CN¥906M | CN¥472M | CN¥357M | CN¥329M | CN¥290M | CN¥316M | CN¥375M | CN¥375M | RevenueRevenue |
| 32% | 25% | 28% | 28% | 44% | 74% | 69% | 69% | 66% | 67% | 67% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (CN¥58M) | (CN¥92M) | (CN¥93M) | (CN¥147M) | (CN¥190M) | (CN¥138M) | (CN¥101M) | (CN¥41M) | (CN¥10M) | CN¥706K | CN¥706K | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −82.0% | −32.5% | −13.0% | −16.2% | −40.3% | −38.7% | −30.7% | −14.0% | −3.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (CN¥61M) | (CN¥90M) | (CN¥66M) | (CN¥110M) | (CN¥225M) | (CN¥141M) | (CN¥108M) | (CN¥63M) | (CN¥7M) | CN¥3M | CN¥3M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| (CN¥42M) | (CN¥76M) | (CN¥98M) | (CN¥26M) | CN¥76M | (CN¥77M) | (CN¥17M) | (CN¥18M) | CN¥9M | CN¥65M | CN¥65M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥3M | CN¥9M | CN¥18M | CN¥30M | CN¥38M | CN¥27M | CN¥24M | CN¥5M | CN¥1M | CN¥931K | CN¥931K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| CN¥16M | CN¥6M | (CN¥50M) | CN¥54M | CN¥263M | CN¥37M | CN¥67M | CN¥39M | CN¥14M | CN¥61M | CN¥61M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥19M | CN¥28M | CN¥58M | CN¥39M | CN¥20M | CN¥16M | CN¥632K | CN¥306K | CN¥5M | CN¥252K | CN¥252K | CapexCapex |
| 26.9% | 10.0% | 8.1% | 4.4% | 4.2% | 4.6% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 1.4% | 0.1% | 0.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (CN¥61M) | (CN¥104M) | (CN¥156M) | (CN¥65M) | CN¥56M | (CN¥93M) | (CN¥18M) | (CN¥18M) | CN¥4M | CN¥65M | CN¥65M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −86.8% | −36.5% | −21.8% | −7.2% | 11.9% | −26.0% | −5.5% | −6.3% | 1.3% | 17.2% | 17.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (CN¥61M) | (CN¥104M) | (CN¥156M) | (CN¥65M) | CN¥56M | (CN¥93M) | (CN¥18M) | (CN¥18M) | CN¥4M | CN¥65M | CN¥65M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −86.8% | −36.5% | −21.8% | −7.2% | 11.9% | −26.0% | −5.5% | −6.3% | 1.3% | 17.2% | 17.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | CN¥3M | CN¥38M | — | — | CN¥2M | CN¥4M | CN¥3M | CN¥8M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | -28% | -36% | -78% | -87% | -689% | — | — | — | 1% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -11% | -22% | -70% | -65% | -85% | -85% | -10% | 4% | 4% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −11% | −22% | −70% | −65% | −85% | −85% | −10% | 4% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| CN¥103M | CN¥208M | CN¥577M | CN¥431M | CN¥436M | CN¥121M | CN¥116M | CN¥115M | CN¥119M | CN¥173M | CN¥173M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | CN¥50M | CN¥142M | CN¥135M | CN¥45M | CN¥44M | CN¥30M | CN¥34M | CN¥51M | CN¥43M | CN¥43M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | CN¥8M | CN¥19M | CN¥20M | CN¥17M | CN¥18M | CN¥18M | CN¥21M | CN¥33M | CN¥39M | CN¥39M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | CN¥41M | CN¥123M | CN¥115M | CN¥28M | CN¥26M | CN¥12M | CN¥13M | CN¥18M | CN¥4M | CN¥4M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | CN¥293M | CN¥804M | CN¥654M | CN¥530M | CN¥381M | CN¥177M | CN¥170M | CN¥185M | CN¥232M | CN¥232M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | CN¥117M | CN¥164M | CN¥194M | CN¥460M | CN¥374M | CN¥255M | CN¥241M | CN¥262M | CN¥303M | CN¥303M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.5× | 4.9× | 3.4× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | — | — | CN¥0 | CN¥38M | CN¥38M | CN¥38M | CN¥38M | CN¥38M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | CN¥359M | CN¥992M | CN¥940M | CN¥787M | CN¥596M | CN¥433M | CN¥350M | CN¥378M | CN¥416M | CN¥416M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | CN¥240M | CN¥244M | CN¥228M | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥228M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | (CN¥336M) | (CN¥187M) | (CN¥208M) | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥55M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | -757.5× | -13.2× | -13.2× | -16.2× | -15.7× | -32.2× | -50.1× | -75.0× | 9.3× | 0.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| (CN¥108M) | (CN¥224M) | CN¥602M | CN¥508M | CN¥321M | CN¥215M | CN¥128M | CN¥74M | CN¥68M | CN¥66M | CN¥66M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 42.7M | 42.7M | 42.7M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 42.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥1.65 | CN¥6.67 | CN¥16.74 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥8.79 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| CN¥-1.44 | CN¥-2.12 | CN¥-1.55 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥0.06 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| CN¥-1.43 | CN¥-2.44 | CN¥-3.65 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥1.51 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| CN¥-1.43 | CN¥-2.44 | CN¥-3.65 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥1.51 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| CN¥0.44 | CN¥0.67 | CN¥1.36 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| CN¥-2.54 | CN¥-5.26 | CN¥14.10 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥1.54 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +218.7%/yr (2-yr) | +218.7%/yr (2-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +75.1%/yr (2-yr) | +75.1%/yr (2-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned CN¥3M of profit into CN¥65M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | CN¥3M | (CN¥7M) | (CN¥63M) | (CN¥108M) | (CN¥141M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥931K | +CN¥1M | +CN¥5M | +CN¥24M | +CN¥27M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +CN¥61M | +CN¥14M | +CN¥39M | +CN¥67M | +CN¥37M |
| Cash from operations | CN¥65M | CN¥9M | (CN¥18M) | (CN¥17M) | (CN¥77M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −CN¥252K | −CN¥5M | −CN¥306K | −CN¥632K | −CN¥16M |
| Owner earnings | CN¥65M | CN¥4M | (CN¥18M) | (CN¥18M) | (CN¥93M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 17% | 1% | -6% | -6% | -26% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income CN¥706K ÷ interest expense CN¥808K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? CN¥55M · 78.4× operating profitHeavy net debtCash CN¥168M + ST investments CN¥5M − debt CN¥228M
What this means
Netting CN¥173M of cash and short-term investments against CN¥228M of debt leaves CN¥55M owed, about 78.4× a year's operating profit (323.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 42 + DIO 0 − DPO 117 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -689%–-28%; 1% latest = NOPAT CN¥687K ÷ invested capital CN¥126MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest CN¥65M = operating cash CN¥65M − maintenance capex CN¥252K (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -7%)Industry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a -7% median across 10 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 25.21×Cash-backedCash from ops CN¥65M ÷ net income CN¥3M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks CN¥8M ÷ Owner Earnings CN¥65M
What this means
Of CN¥65M Owner Earnings, CN¥8M (12%) went back to shareholders, CN¥0 dividends, CN¥8M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.27×HarvestingCapex CN¥252K ÷ depreciation CN¥931K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥375M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.77×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · CN¥228M vs (CN¥71M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥-0.52/share (latest year CN¥0.06), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥1.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −42% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −42% early to −6% lately, median −31% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2016 · −82.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥173M
- ReceivablesCN¥43M
- Other current assetsCN¥16M
- Accounts payableCN¥39M
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥264M
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EVEREverQuote Inc. | $693M | 94% | -3.7% | -34% | 1% |
| ZIPZipRecruiter Inc. | $449M | 89% | 0.3% | 10% | 14% |
| GRNDGrindr Inc. | $440M | — | 21.4% | 22% | 26% |
| JGAurora Mobile Limited | CN¥375M | 55% | -23.5% | -78% | -7% |
| DSPViant Technology Inc. | $344M | 46% | 1.2% | -8% | 13% |
| HSTMHealthStream Inc. | $304M | 86% | 5.8% | 4% | 18% |
| PUBMPubMatic Inc. | $283M | 68% | 7.5% | 8% | 25% |
| NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc. | $258M | 83% | -55.8% | -24% | -28% |
| Group median | — | 83% | 0.7% | -2% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, every 3 of which represent 40 Class”; Aurora Mobile Limited reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Aurora Mobile Limited has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $10M on 3M diluted shares; net debt $8M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
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