Share count
31Mpeak FY2019
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KARO, Karooooo Ltd.
Software asset-light
Revenue is Cartrack (91%) and Karooooo Logistics (9%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
R 4.6B
+8.6% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue R 4.6B 5-yr avg R 3.5B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 70% and operating margin about 29% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (25%–32% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −57 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 41%, above 15% in 7 of 7 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →The biggest segment, Cartrack, is also where the profit is made: 91% of revenue and 97% of segment operating profit.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit same segments
- Cartrack91%R 4.1B97% of profit
- Karooooo Logistics9%R 420M3% of profit
By geographySouth Africa74%Asia-Pacific, Middle East and USA14%Europe9%Africa3%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMFeb 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| R 1.7B | R 1.9B | R 2.3B | R 2.7B | R 3.5B | R 4.2B | R 4.6B | R 4.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 71% | 70% | 71% | 66% | 65% | 64% | 70% | 70% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| R 500M | R 631M | R 727M | R 699M | R 882M | R 1.0B | R 1.3B | R 1.3B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 29.5% | 32.5% | 31.7% | 25.5% | 25.1% | 24.8% | 28.7% | 28.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| R 237M | R 290M | R 318M | R 450M | R 597M | R 738M | R 921M | R 921M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 32% | 37% | 38% | 31% | 32% | 30% | 25% | 25% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| R 472M | R 901M | R 938M | R 932M | R 1.1B | R 955M | R 1.9B | R 1.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| R 237M | R 283M | R 373M | R 497M | R 545M | R 648M | R 663M | R 663M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (R 1M) | R 328M | R 247M | (R 16M) | (R 15M) | (R 431M) | R 350M | R 350M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| R 422M | R 389M | R 478M | R 553M | R 580M | R 876M | R 1.0B | R 1.0B | CapexCapex |
| 24.9% | 20.0% | 20.9% | 20.1% | 16.5% | 20.8% | 22.4% | 22.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| R 236M | R 618M | R 565M | R 379M | R 547M | R 307M | R 1.3B | R 1.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 13.9% | 31.8% | 24.7% | 13.8% | 15.6% | 7.3% | 27.8% | 27.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| R 50M | R 513M | R 460M | R 379M | R 547M | R 79M | R 911M | R 911M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.0% | 26.4% | 20.1% | 13.8% | 15.6% | 1.9% | 19.9% | 19.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| R 149M | R 92M | R 418M | R 7M | R 331M | R 500M | R 612M | R 612M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 41% | 45% | 57% | 33% | 35% | 29% | 45% | 45% | ROICROIC |
| 28% | 33% | 37% | 21% | 22% | 25% | 29% | 29% | Return on equityROE |
| 11% | 23% | −12% | 21% | 10% | 8% | 10% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| — | R 145M | R 959M | R 733M | R 966M | R 460M | R 1.0B | R 1.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | R 252M | R 324M | R 334M | R 409M | R 985M | R 597M | R 596M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | R 152M | — | R 25M | R 79M | R 7M | R 4M | R 4M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | R 171M | R 282M | R 282M | R 374M | R 446M | R 470M | R 470M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | R 232M | R 42M | R 77M | R 114M | R 546M | R 131M | R 130M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | R 567M | R 1.3B | R 1.1B | R 1.5B | R 1.5B | R 1.7B | R 1.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | R 407M | R 1.4B | R 624M | R 789M | R 940M | R 1.5B | R 1.5B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.4× | 0.9× | 1.8× | 1.9× | 1.6× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | R 132M | R 124M | R 186M | R 212M | R 227M | R 175M | R 175M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | R 1.8B | R 2.9B | R 3.1B | R 3.8B | R 4.3B | R 5.1B | R 5.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | — | R 42M | R 32M | R 32M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | — | (R 418M) | (R 1.0B) | (R 1.0B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 15.9× | 37.5× | 78.1× | 56.7× | 87.4× | 65.9× | 25.8× | 25.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| R 838M | R 878M | R 855M | R 2.2B | R 2.7B | R 3.0B | R 3.2B | R 3.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 20.33B | 20.33B | 20.33B | 29.5M | 31.0M | 30.9M | 30.9M | 19K | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| R 0.08 | R 0.10 | R 0.11 | R 93.00 | R 113.31 | R 135.89 | R 147.84 | R 236778.59 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| R 0.01 | R 0.01 | R 0.02 | R 15.24 | R 19.29 | R 23.85 | R 29.81 | R 47746.55 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| R 0.01 | R 0.03 | R 0.03 | R 12.84 | R 17.67 | R 9.92 | R 41.13 | R 65875.38 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| R 0.00 | R 0.03 | R 0.02 | R 12.84 | R 17.67 | R 2.54 | R 29.48 | R 47222.60 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| R 0.01 | R 0.00 | R 0.02 | R 0.23 | R 10.70 | R 16.14 | R 19.82 | R 31748.16 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| R 0.02 | R 0.02 | R 0.02 | R 18.72 | R 18.73 | R 28.32 | R 33.09 | R 53000.05 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| R 0.04 | R 0.04 | R 0.04 | R 72.86 | R 85.97 | R 95.69 | R 103.66 | R 166017.00 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/688.6 into 2022 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/1601.6 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +248.0%/yr | +334.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +290.5%/yr | +322.9%/yr |
| EPS | +269.8%/yr | +361.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +273.5%/yr | +434.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +241.8%/yr | +344.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +268.8%/yr | +374.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
45%low FY2024
Gross margin
70%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
R 1.3Bowner earningsvs.R 921Mnet incomelow FY2019
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned R 1.3B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the R 663M it takes just to hold its position. It put R 360M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was R 911M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | R 921M | R 738M | R 597M | R 450M | R 318M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +R 663M | +R 648M | +R 545M | +R 497M | +R 373M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +R 350M | −R 431M | −R 15M | −R 16M | +R 247M |
| Cash from operations | R 1.9B | R 955M | R 1.1B | R 932M | R 938M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −R 663M | −R 648M | −R 580M | −R 553M | −R 373M |
| Owner earnings | R 1.3B | R 307M | R 547M | R 379M | R 565M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −R 360M | −R 228M | — | — | −R 105M |
| Free cash flow | R 911M | R 79M | R 547M | R 379M | R 460M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 28% | 7% | 16% | 14% | 25% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about R 663M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other R 360M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 25.8×ComfortableOperating income R 1.3B ÷ interest expense R 51M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash R 1.0B + ST investments R 15M − debt R 32M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by R 1.0B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 48 + DIO 1 − DPO 126 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle7-yr median, range 29%–57%; 45% latest = NOPAT R 982M ÷ invested capital R 2.2BIndustry peers: median 0%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 45% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 7%–32%; latest R 1.3B = operating cash R 1.9B − maintenance capex R 663MIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 28% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 7 years. It chose to put R 360M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was R 911M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops R 1.9B ÷ net income R 921M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks R 612M ÷ Owner Earnings R 1.3B
What this means
Of R 1.3B Owner Earnings, R 612M (48%) went back to shareholders, R 612M dividends, R 0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.54×ExpandingCapex R 1.0B ÷ depreciation R 663M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · R 4.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.14×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · R 32M vs R 205M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (7)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +167%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are R 24.35/share (latest year R 29.81), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is R 103.66/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 7
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 31% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
The recent-years average (26%) sits below the early years (31%), but the latest year (29%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 29% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +11%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 24.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Feb 28, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsR 1.7B
- Cash & short-term investmentsR 1.1B
- ReceivablesR 596M
- InventoryR 4M
Current liabilitiesR 1.5B
- Accounts payableR 470M
- Other current liabilitiesR 982M
Current ratio1.14×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.14×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.73×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalR 205Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueR 2.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(R 177M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesR 236MR 205M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated R 7.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- ReinvestedR 4.3B · 60%
- DividendsR 2.1B · 29%
- Retained (debt / cash)R 830M · 11%
- Returned to ownersR 2.1B
54% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, R 2.1B as dividends and R 0 as buybacks.
- Net change in share count−100.0%
The diluted count fell from 20333M to 0M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend recordR 19.82/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 273% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained16%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (R 1.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew R 235M, so each retained R 1 added about 0.16 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Karooooo Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CDNSCadence Design Systems Inc. | $5.3B | 99% | 24.1% | 28% | 28% |
| TWLOTwilio Inc. | $5.1B | 52% | -19.4% | -7% | -1% |
| GENGen Digital | $5.0B | 82% | 32.2% | 11% | 31% |
| RBLXRoblox Corporation | $4.9B | 76% | -28.8% | -247% | 18% |
| CRWDCrowdStrike Holdings Inc. | $4.8B | 74% | -9.8% | — | 31% |
| SNOWSnowflake Inc. | $4.7B | 64% | -49.7% | -20% | 16% |
| KAROKarooooo Ltd. | R 4.6B | 70% | 28.7% | 41% | 16% |
| PLTRPalantir Technologies Inc. | $4.5B | 78% | -17.6% | 7% | 16% |
| Group median | — | 75% | -13.7% | 7% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Karooooo Ltd. reports in ZAR, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ZAR, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in ZAR. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Karooooo Ltd. has delivered.
Karooooo Ltd.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
R
Through the cycle, Karooooo Ltd. earns about R 712M on its 15.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 27.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow R 911M on 31M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2026-02-28; net cash R 1.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (R 1.0B) runs well above depreciation (R 663M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about R 1.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Karooooo Ltd. (KARO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KARO, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← JXG its page in the Manual KAZR →
Industry order: ← JKHY the Software chapter KC →