← All companies ← KBSX Manual KEN → ← KARO Software KD →
KC, Kingsoft Cloud Holdings Limited
Revenue is Public cloud services (69%) and Enterprise Cloud Services (31%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −28% through the cycle on a 5.3% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −22%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital, a structural edge the ratio does not show. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Public cloud services is 69% of revenue, with Enterprise Cloud Services the other meaningful line at 31%.
- Public cloud services69%CN¥6.6B
- Enterprise Cloud Services31%CN¥2.9B
- Others0%CN¥0
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| CN¥2.2B | CN¥4.0B | CN¥6.6B | CN¥9.1B | CN¥8.2B | CN¥7.0B | CN¥7.8B | CN¥9.6B | CN¥9.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| −9% | 0% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 12% | 17% | 16% | 16% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (CN¥979M) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥1.8B) | (CN¥2.3B) | (CN¥2.1B) | (CN¥1.7B) | (CN¥773M) | (CN¥773M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −44.2% | −28.9% | −18.4% | −20.0% | −27.5% | −29.9% | −22.3% | −8.1% | −8.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (CN¥1.0B) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥962M) | (CN¥1.6B) | (CN¥2.7B) | (CN¥2.2B) | (CN¥2.0B) | (CN¥944M) | (CN¥944M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| (CN¥383M) | (CN¥439M) | (CN¥290M) | (CN¥709M) | CN¥189M | (CN¥169M) | CN¥628M | CN¥3.8B | CN¥3.8B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥412M | CN¥605M | CN¥758M | CN¥856M | CN¥1.2B | CN¥940M | CN¥1.3B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥2.5B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| CN¥211M | CN¥67M | (CN¥86M) | CN¥27M | CN¥1.7B | CN¥1.1B | CN¥1.3B | CN¥2.3B | CN¥2.3B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | — | — | CN¥208M | CN¥0 | CN¥0 | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | -20% | -22% | -25% | — | -33% | -10% | -10% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -12% | -15% | -31% | -32% | -38% | -10% | -10% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −12% | −15% | −31% | −32% | −38% | −10% | −10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| CN¥1.5B | CN¥2.2B | CN¥6.1B | CN¥6.7B | CN¥4.7B | CN¥2.3B | CN¥2.7B | CN¥6.0B | CN¥6.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | CN¥1.3B | CN¥2.3B | CN¥3.6B | CN¥2.4B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.7B | CN¥1.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | CN¥1.3B | CN¥2.1B | CN¥2.9B | CN¥2.3B | CN¥1.8B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥2.0B | CN¥2.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | CN¥93M | CN¥278M | CN¥632M | CN¥100M | (CN¥275M) | (CN¥408M) | (CN¥274M) | (CN¥274M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | CN¥4.1B | CN¥9.5B | CN¥12.4B | CN¥9.0B | CN¥6.1B | CN¥6.8B | CN¥11.0B | CN¥11.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | CN¥2.4B | CN¥3.5B | CN¥7.5B | CN¥6.7B | CN¥6.8B | CN¥9.2B | CN¥9.4B | CN¥9.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.7× | 2.8× | 1.7× | 1.4× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | CN¥0 | CN¥4.6B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥4.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | CN¥6.0B | CN¥11.9B | CN¥21.1B | CN¥17.3B | CN¥15.1B | CN¥17.6B | CN¥26.7B | CN¥26.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | CN¥174M | CN¥74M | CN¥0 | CN¥1.7B | CN¥100M | CN¥1.7B | CN¥3.0B | CN¥3.0B | Total debtDebt |
| — | (CN¥2.1B) | (CN¥6.0B) | (CN¥6.7B) | (CN¥2.9B) | (CN¥2.2B) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥3.0B) | (CN¥3.0B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -25.2× | -232.2× | -127.7× | -34.8× | -16.3× | -14.4× | -7.6× | -1.6× | -5.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | (CN¥4.2B) | CN¥8.2B | CN¥10.6B | CN¥8.8B | CN¥6.9B | CN¥5.2B | CN¥9.3B | CN¥9.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 793M | 890M | 2.40B | 3.44B | 3.62B | 3.56B | 3.66B | 4.11B | 3.69B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥2.80 | CN¥4.45 | CN¥2.74 | CN¥2.63 | CN¥2.26 | CN¥1.98 | CN¥2.13 | CN¥2.33 | CN¥2.59 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| CN¥-1.27 | CN¥-1.25 | CN¥-0.40 | CN¥-0.46 | CN¥-0.74 | CN¥-0.61 | CN¥-0.54 | CN¥-0.23 | CN¥-0.26 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | CN¥-4.72 | CN¥3.43 | CN¥3.08 | CN¥2.43 | CN¥1.94 | CN¥1.41 | CN¥2.27 | CN¥2.53 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.7 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.43 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −2.6%/yr | −3.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | −7.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -5.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income (CN¥773M) ÷ interest expense CN¥146M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +CN¥3.0BNet cashCash CN¥6.0B − debt CN¥3.0B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥3.0B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 66 + DIO 0 − DPO 91 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -33%–-10%; -10% latest = NOPAT (CN¥611M) ÷ invested capital CN¥6.3BIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 25%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Are earnings backed by cash? CN¥3.8BLoss, but cash-generativeNet income (CN¥944M) · cash from operations CN¥3.8B
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥9.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.17×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · CN¥3.0B vs CN¥1.6B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥-0.38/share (latest year CN¥-0.21), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥2.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −30% → −20% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −30% early to −20% lately, median −28% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2018 · −44.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥6.0B
- ReceivablesCN¥1.7B
- Other current assetsCN¥3.3B
- Accounts payableCN¥2.0B
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥7.4B
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NOWServiceNow Inc. | $13.3B | 77% | 4.4% | 6% | 30% |
| SHOPShopify Inc. | $11.6B | 49% | -1.3% | -0% | 15% |
| KCKingsoft Cloud Holdings Limited | CN¥9.6B | 5% | -24.9% | -22% | — |
| EAElectronic Arts | $7.5B | 75% | 20.1% | 19% | 29% |
| ADSKAutodesk Inc. | $7.2B | 90% | 15.3% | 33% | 29% |
| SNPSSynopsys Inc. | $7.1B | 78% | 16.2% | 15% | 21% |
| TTWOTake-Two Interactive | $6.7B | 50% | 6.3% | 18% | 14% |
| SSNCSS&C Technologies | $6.3B | 47% | 21.8% | 7% | 25% |
| Group median | — | 63% | 10.8% | 11% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, each ADS represents 15 ordinary”; Kingsoft Cloud Holdings Limited reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered4%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← KBSX its page in the Manual KEN →
Industry order: ← KARO the Software chapter KD →