Owner Scorecard


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KEN, Kenon Holdings Ltd.

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Kenon's market capitalization was $4 billion, as compared to our initial market capitalization at the time of our listing of $1.0 billion.

We initially listed OPC on the TASE in August 2017 with an initial pre-money market capitalization of $350 million, which has grown to approximately $11 billion as of March 30, 2026.

In 2015, we distributed substantially all of our interest in Tower, with a then-market value of $245 million.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
KEN · Kenon Holdings Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$872M
+16.1% YoY · 18% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $872M 5-yr avg $675M
Gross margin 25% 5-yr avg 28%
Operating margin 7.2% 5-yr avg 4.9%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 2%
Owner-earnings margin 25% 5-yr avg 48%
Free cash flow margin 19% 5-yr avg 17%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Opc Member (77%) and CPV Group (23%).
Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 27% and operating margin about 6.2% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −22% and 15% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 45% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 27% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Opc Member is 77% of revenue, with CPV Group the other meaningful segment at 23%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Opc Member77%$675M
  • CPV Group23%$197M
  • Other0%$0
By geographyIsrael77%United States23%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$324M$366M$364M$373M$386M$488M$574M$692M$751M$872M$872MRevenueRevenue
22%27%29%31%27%31%27%29%31%25%25%Gross marginGross mgn
($71M)$42M$42M$56M$23M$23M$3M$43M$48M$62M$62MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−21.9%11.6%11.6%15.0%6.0%4.6%0.5%6.2%6.3%7.2%7.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($412M)$237M$434M($13M)$507M$930M$313M($236M)$598M$66M$66MNet incomeNet inc.
24%3%1%0%11%6%30%30%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$162M$392M$52M$85M$92M$241M$771M$277M$265M$284M$284MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$27M$30M$30M$31M$33M$53M$57M$78M$86M$67M$67MDepreciationDeprec.
$548M$125M($412M)$68M($448M)($743M)$402M$435M($418M)$150M$150MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$281M$228M$69M$34M$74M$240M$281M$332M$341M$116M$116MCapexCapex
86.6%62.2%19.0%9.1%19.3%49.1%49.0%48.0%45.3%13.4%13.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$136M$362M$23M$51M$59M$187M$715M$199M$179M$217M$217MOwner earningsOwner earn.
41.8%98.9%6.2%13.7%15.3%38.4%124.5%28.7%23.9%24.8%24.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($119M)$164M($17M)$51M$18M$866K$490M($55M)($76M)$167M$167MFree cash flowFCF
−36.6%44.9%−4.7%13.7%4.6%0.2%85.4%−8.0%−10.1%19.2%19.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$100M$65M$120M$100M$741M$150M$201M$268M$268MDividends paidDiv. paid
-2%7%4%1%1%0%3%2%2%ROICROIC
-60%24%67%-2%48%52%20%-20%37%4%4%Return on equityROE
51%−13%36%46%−27%−32%25%−13%−13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$376M$1.5B$172M$187M$307M$518M$594M$809M$1.0B$1.5B$1.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$285M$44M$36M$39M$48M$63M$74M$68M$80M$137M$137MReceivablesReceiv.
$92M$0$2M$2M$2MInventoryInvent.
$286M$59M$48M$52M$128M$172M$133M$182M$94M$245M$245MAccounts payablePayables
$91M($15M)($12M)($13M)($80M)($107M)($58M)($114M)($14M)($108M)($106M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$854M$1.5B$328M$330M$920M$582M$1.1B$1.1B$1.3B$1.8B$1.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.0B$806M$90M$105M$228M$447M$193M$359M$183M$365M$365MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×1.9×3.6×3.1×4.0×1.3×5.5×3.1×6.9×4.9×4.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$96M$459K$425K$14M$105M$105MGoodwillGoodwill
$5.1B$2.5B$1.5B$1.5B$2.5B$4.0B$3.8B$4.1B$4.2B$5.4B$5.4BTotal assetsAssets
$3.0B$906M$563M$577M$872M$1.2B$1.1B$1.4B$1.2B$1.7B$2.0BTotal debtDebt
$2.7B($547M)$391M$390M$564M$654M$530M$552M$143M$108M$426MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.5×0.6×1.4×1.9×0.4×0.2×0.1×0.6×0.4×0.7×0.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$681M$983M$649M$623M$1.1B$1.8B$1.6B$1.2B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
53.7M53.8M53.8M53.9M53.9M53.9M53.9M53.4M52.7M52.1M53.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$6.04$6.80$6.76$6.93$7.17$9.05$10.65$12.96$14.25$16.72$16.24Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-7.67$4.40$8.07$-0.25$9.41$17.27$5.80$-4.42$11.34$1.27$1.23EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.52$6.73$0.42$0.95$1.10$3.48$13.26$3.72$3.40$4.15$4.03Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.21$3.06$-0.31$0.95$0.33$0.02$9.10$-1.04$-1.43$3.21$3.12Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.86$1.21$2.23$1.86$13.75$2.82$3.80$5.14$4.99Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.23$4.23$1.29$0.63$1.38$4.45$5.22$6.22$6.46$2.23$2.17Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.68$18.29$12.06$11.57$19.80$33.29$29.66$22.55$30.50$30.46$29.59Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.0%/yr+18.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.7%/yr+30.5%/yr
EPS−33.0%/yr
Dividends / share+15.6%/yr (7-yr)+18.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−9.0%/yr+10.1%/yr
Book value / share+10.2%/yr+9.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
52Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
2%low FY2016
Gross margin
25%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.5×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$217Mowner earningsvs.$66Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $217M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $67M it takes just to hold its position. It put $49M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $167M.

Reported net income$66M
Owner earnings$217M · 25% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$66M$598M($236M)$313M$930M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$67M+$86M+$78M+$57M+$53M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$150M−$418M+$435M+$402M−$743M
Cash from operations$284M$265M$277M$771M$241M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$67M−$86M−$78M−$57M−$53M
Owner earnings$217M$179M$199M$715M$187M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$49M−$255M−$254M−$224M−$187M
Free cash flow$167M($76M)($55M)$490M$866K
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue25%24%29%124%38%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $67M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $49M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $62M ÷ interest expense $87M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $426M · 6.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $1.5B + ST investments $65M − debt $2.0B
    What this means

    Netting $1.5B of cash and short-term investments against $2.0B of debt leaves $426M owed, about 6.8× a year's operating profit (31.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 57 + DIO 1 − DPO 136 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -2%–7%; 2% latest = NOPAT $44M ÷ invested capital $2.1B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 6%–124%; latest $217M = operating cash $284M − maintenance capex $67M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 25% of revenue this year, a 25% median across 10 years. It chose to put $49M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $167M — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $284M ÷ net income $66M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $268M ÷ Owner Earnings $217M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $217M of Owner Earnings, $268M (124%) went back to shareholders, $268M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.73×
    Expanding
    Capex $116M ÷ depreciation $67M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $872M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.94×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.0B vs $1.4B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +65%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.74/share (latest year $1.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 0% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 0% early to 7% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −21.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.3%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.5B
  • Receivables$137M
  • Inventory$2M
  • Other current assets$121M
Current liabilities$365M
  • Debt due within a year$318M
  • Accounts payable$245M
Current ratio4.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.93×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio4.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$318M due · $1.5B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($392M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$6M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$2.0B · 76%
  • Dividends$1.7B · 67%
  • Returned to owners$1.7B

    82% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.7B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$1.1B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Net change in share count−0.1%

    The diluted count barely moved (54M to 54M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$5.14/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained4%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($678M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $25M, so each retained $1 added about 0.04 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kenon Holdings Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?25.8% vs 49.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 49.0% early in the record and 25.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HEHawaiian Electric Industries Inc.$3.1B11.9%6%7%
TLNTalen Energy Corporation$2.6B3.5%2%4%
BKHBlack Hills$2.3B23.0%6%17%
CWENClearway Energy Inc.$1.4B67%21.6%2%36%
OTTROtter Tail$1.3B18.8%10%13%
ORAOrmat Technologies Inc.$990M37%25.6%4%11%
KENKenon Holdings Ltd.$872M28%6.2%2%27%
HNRGHallador Energy Company$469M24%2.1%2%3%
Group median33%15.3%3%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Kenon Holdings Ltd. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kenon Holdings Ltd. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Kenon Holdings Ltd. earns about $217M on its 24.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−19%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $167M on 52M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $426M. The if-converted diluted count is 54M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($116M) runs well above depreciation ($67M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $217M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kenon Holdings Ltd. (KEN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KEN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KC its page in the Manual KEP →

Industry order: ← IDA the Electric Utilities chapter KEP →