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IDA, IDACORP

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityCapital build-out

IDACORP's other notable subsidiaries include IFS, an investor in affordable housing and other real estate tax credit investments, and Ida-West, an operator of small PURPA-qualifying hydropower generation projects.

Idaho Power's principal commercial and industrial customers are involved in food processing, electronics and general manufacturing, agriculture, health care, government, education, and information technology.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

IDA · IDACORP

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.8B

−0.7% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.8B 5-yr avg $1.7B

Operating margin 19.5% 5-yr avg 19.5%

ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 13%

Free cash flow margin −32% 5-yr avg −15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 65% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 22% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (18%–23% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. Capital spending runs about 23% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
											Income statement
$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	RevenueRevenue
$284M	$316M	$297M	$298M	$310M	$330M	$327M	$313M	$328M	$354M	$354M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
22.5%	23.4%	21.7%	22.2%	22.9%	22.6%	19.9%	17.7%	17.9%	19.5%	19.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$198M	$212M	$227M	$233M	$237M	$246M	$259M	$261M	$289M	$323M	$323M	Net incomeNet inc.
16%	19%	7%	10%	11%	13%	13%	9%	5%	-4%	-4%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$344M	$435M	$492M	$367M	$388M	$363M	$351M	$267M	$594M	$602M	$602M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$147M	$166M	$169M	$174M	$176M	$179M	$174M	$200M	$228M	$258M	$258M	DepreciationDeprec.
($1M)	$57M	$96M	($40M)	($25M)	($62M)	($81M)	($194M)	$77M	$20M	$20M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$297M	$285M	$278M	$279M	$311M	$300M	$433M	$611M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	CapexCapex
23.5%	21.2%	20.3%	20.7%	23.0%	20.6%	26.3%	34.6%	55.3%	65.0%	65.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$197M	$269M	$323M	$193M	$212M	$184M	$178M	$67M	$366M	$343M	$343M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
15.6%	20.0%	23.5%	14.3%	15.7%	12.6%	10.8%	3.8%	20.1%	18.9%	18.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$47M	$150M	$214M	$88M	$77M	$63M	($81M)	($344M)	($415M)	($577M)	($577M)	Free cash flowFCF
3.7%	11.1%	15.6%	6.5%	5.7%	4.3%	−4.9%	−19.5%	−22.7%	−31.9%	−31.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$105M	$113M	$121M	$130M	$138M	$146M	$154M	$164M	$177M	$188M	$188M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$3M	$3M	$4M	$4M	$5M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$4M	$3M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
6%	7%	7%	7%	6%	6%	6%	5%	5%	5%	5%	ROICROIC
9%	9%	10%	9%	9%	9%	9%	9%	9%	9%	9%	Return on equityROE
4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	3%	3%	4%	4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$61M	$77M	$267M	$217M	$300M	$215M	$178M	$327M	$369M	$216M	$241M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$72M	$75M	$77M	$73M	$73M	$79M	$114M	$107M	$115M	$98M	$98M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$106M	$90M	$111M	$111M	$121M	$146M	$293M	$309M	$307M	$345M	$345M	Accounts payablePayables
($35M)	($15M)	($34M)	($38M)	($48M)	($67M)	($179M)	($201M)	($192M)	($247M)	($247M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$440M	$444M	$598M	$565M	$642M	$596M	$694M	$1.0B	$988M	$833M	$833M	Current assetsCur. assets
$250M	$201M	$259M	$375M	$288M	$326M	$549M	$634M	$701M	$898M	$898M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×	2.2×	2.3×	1.5×	2.2×	1.8×	1.3×	1.6×	1.4×	0.9×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6.3B	$6.0B	$6.4B	$6.6B	$7.1B	$7.2B	$7.5B	$8.5B	$9.2B	$10.2B	$10.2B	Total assetsAssets
$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.8B	$3.1B	$3.4B	$3.4B	Total debtDebt
$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$3.2B	$3.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.5×	3.8×	3.5×	3.4×	3.5×	3.8×	3.7×	2.7×	2.4×	2.1×	2.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$3.3B	$3.6B	$3.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
50.4M	50.4M	50.5M	50.5M	50.6M	50.6M	50.7M	50.8M	52.6M	54.8M	54.8M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$25.05	$26.76	$27.14	$26.64	$26.71	$28.79	$32.43	$34.77	$34.72	$33.08	$33.08	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.94	$4.21	$4.49	$4.61	$4.69	$4.85	$5.11	$5.14	$5.50	$5.90	$5.90	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.91	$5.34	$6.38	$3.82	$4.20	$3.63	$3.51	$1.32	$6.96	$6.27	$6.27	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.94	$2.97	$4.23	$1.74	$1.53	$1.25	$-1.60	$-6.77	$-7.88	$-10.54	$-10.54	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.08	$2.24	$2.40	$2.57	$2.73	$2.89	$3.04	$3.22	$3.36	$3.44	$3.44	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.90	$5.66	$5.50	$5.51	$6.15	$5.92	$8.53	$12.03	$19.18	$21.52	$21.52	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$42.76	$44.65	$46.93	$48.77	$50.62	$52.69	$55.37	$57.23	$63.31	$65.17	$65.17	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.1%/yr	+4.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+5.4%/yr	+8.4%/yr
EPS	+4.6%/yr	+4.7%/yr
Dividends / share	+5.7%/yr	+4.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+15.5%/yr	+28.5%/yr
Book value / share	+4.8%/yr	+5.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

55Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

5%low FY2024

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

9.4×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$343Mowner earningsvs.$323Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $343M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $258M it takes just to hold its position. It put $921M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($577M).

Reported net income$323M

Owner earnings$343M · 19% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$323M	$289M	$261M	$259M	$246M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$258M	+$228M	+$200M	+$174M	+$179M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$20M	+$77M	−$194M	−$81M	−$62M
Cash from operations	$602M	$594M	$267M	$351M	$363M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$258M	−$228M	−$200M	−$174M	−$179M
Owner earnings	$343M	$366M	$67M	$178M	$184M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$921M	−$781M	−$411M	−$259M	−$121M
Free cash flow	($577M)	($415M)	($344M)	($81M)	$63M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	20%	4%	11%	13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $258M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $921M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.1×

Adequate

Operating income $354M ÷ interest expense $168M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.2B · 9.1× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $216M − debt $3.4B

What this means
Netting $216M of cash and short-term investments against $3.4B of debt leaves $3.2B owed, about 9.1× a year's operating profit (9.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range 5%–7%; 5% latest = NOPAT $354M ÷ invested capital $6.8B

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 16%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 4%–24%; latest $343M = operating cash $602M − maintenance capex $258M

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years. It chose to put $921M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($577M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.86×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $602M ÷ net income $323M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 56%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $192M ÷ Owner Earnings $343M

What this means
Of $343M Owner Earnings, $192M (56%) went back to shareholders, $188M dividends, $3M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 4.56×

Expanding

Capex $1.2B ÷ depreciation $258M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.8B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.93×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.4B vs ($64M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +37%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.31/share (latest year $5.89), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $65.06/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 23% → 18% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 23% early to 18% lately, median 22% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +5%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · 17.7% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +0.9%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$833M

Cash & short-term investments$241M
Receivables$98M
Other current assets$495M

Current liabilities$898M

Debt due within a year$116M
Accounts payable$345M
Other current liabilities$437M

Current ratio0.93×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.93×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($64M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$116M due · $241M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$3.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$3.4Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

Deferred revenue$202Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$5.0B · 119%
Dividends$1.4B · 34%
Buybacks$35M · 1%

Returned to owners$1.5B
63% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.4B as dividends and $35M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$2.3B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $2.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.7B to $3.4B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $35M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count8.8%
The diluted count rose from 50M to 55M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$3.44/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained−0%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $4M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.00 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$5.6M	$5.6M	$184M
2022	$4.4M	$4.7M	$178M
2023	$7.4M	$4.5M	$67M
2024	$6.7M	$7.6M	$366M
2025	$7.5M	$10.5M	$343M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership0.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why IDACORP is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.8%
Diluted shares grew 8.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $35M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.7B → $3.4B
Debt rose from $1.7B to $3.4B while owner earnings went from about $263M to $259M — about 6.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 13 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OGEOGE Energy	$3.2B	61%	23.5%	6%	15%
BKHBlack Hills	$2.3B	—	23.0%	6%	17%
PNMPNM Resources	$2.1B	—	18.3%	5%	11%
IDAIDACORP	$1.8B	—	21.9%	6%	16%
CWENClearway Energy Inc.	$1.4B	67%	21.6%	2%	36%
OTTROtter Tail	$1.3B	—	18.8%	10%	13%
XIFRXPLR Infrastructure LP Common	$1.2B	—	18.1%	1%	35%
ORAOrmat Technologies Inc.	$990M	37%	25.6%	4%	11%
Group median	—	—	21.7%	5%	15%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what IDACORP has delivered.

IDACORP’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, IDACORP earns about $284M on its 15.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($284M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($343M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+18%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+5%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($577M) on 55M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-02-13; net debt $3.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.2B) runs well above depreciation ($258M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $343M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh IDA against another business →

The owners of IDA: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "IDACORP (IDA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IDA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ICUI its page in the Manual IDCC →

Industry order: ← HNRG the Electric Utilities chapter KEN →