Owner Scorecard


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KNDI, Kandi Technologies Group Inc.

Auto Components capital-intensive Unprofitable

Kandi Technologies is a holding company in British Virgin Islands and our majority of business is conducted through the operations by Company's subsidiaries in the PRC and the United States.

In recent years, some EV enterprises in China are seizing market share at the cost of huge losses.

Realized that the EV market of China has not reached a healthy and orderly development stage.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
KNDI · Kandi Technologies Group Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$87M
−31.5% YoY · −9% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $87M 4-yr avg $114M
Gross margin 43% 4-yr avg 31%
Operating margin −65.4% 4-yr avg −38.3%
ROIC −19% 4-yr avg −13%
Owner-earnings margin 110% 4-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 110% 4-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −54% through the cycle on a 31% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 40% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, mix and the cost of the platform. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −17%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2022–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$118M$124M$128M$87M$87MRevenueRevenue
17%33%31%43%43%Gross marginGross mgn
($28M)($13M)($69M)($57M)($57M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−23.5%−10.6%−53.9%−65.4%−65.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
($13M)$2M($51M)($96M)($96M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$31M($101M)($18M)$97M$97MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$12M$12M$12M$6M$6MDepreciationDeprec.
$32M($115M)$21M$187M$187MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4M$13M$935K$429K$429KCapexCapex
3.1%10.7%0.7%0.5%0.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$28M($114M)($19M)$96M$96MOwner earningsOwner earn.
23.6%−92.5%−14.7%110.2%110.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$28M($114M)($19M)$96M$96MFree cash flowFCF
23.6%−92.5%−14.7%110.2%110.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$7M$511K$4MBuybacksBuybacks
-2%-17%-19%-19%ROICROIC
0%-15%-35%-35%Return on equityROE
0%−15%−35%−35%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$84M$34M$37M$36M$36MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$19M$26M$22M$22MReceivablesReceiv.
$62M$51M$26M$26MInventoryInvent.
$29M$25M$22M$22MAccounts payablePayables
$52M$52M$27M$27MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$344M$355M$301M$301MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$77M$120M$128M$128MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.5×2.9×2.3×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$33M$31M$22M$22MGoodwillGoodwill
$495M$474M$400M$400MTotal assetsAssets
$8M$6M$6M$6MTotal debtDebt
($25M)($32M)($29M)($30M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-39.1×-9.8×-31.3×-30.3×-30.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$404M$345M$270M$270MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
75.6M79.9M86.3M83.6M82.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.56$1.55$1.48$1.05$1.06Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.17$0.02$-0.59$-1.14$-1.16EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.37$-1.43$-0.22$1.15$1.17Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.37$-1.43$-0.22$1.15$1.17Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05$0.16$0.01$0.01$0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.06$3.99$3.23$3.27Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
3-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−12.5%/yr−12.5%/yr (3-yr)
Owner earnings / share+46.4%/yr+46.4%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share−52.8%/yr−52.8%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share−20.1%/yr (2-yr)−20.1%/yr (2-yr)

The record, charted

FY2022–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
84Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
−19%low FY2025
Gross margin
43%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$96Mowner earningsvs.($96M)net incomelow FY2023

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $96M loss into $96M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($96M)($51M)$2M($13M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$6M+$12M+$12M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$187M+$21M−$115M+$32M
Cash from operations$97M($18M)($101M)$31M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$429K−$935K−$13M−$4M
Owner earnings$96M($19M)($114M)$28M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue110%-15%-93%24%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($57M) ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $36M − debt $6M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $30M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 94 + DIO 192 − DPO 161 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    3-yr median, range -19%–-2%; -19% latest = NOPAT ($45M) ÷ invested capital $240M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran -19% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $96M = operating cash $97M − maintenance capex $429K (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median -15%)
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 110% of revenue this year, a -15% median across 4 years.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($96M) · cash from operations $97M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.08×
    Harvesting
    Capex $429K ÷ depreciation $6M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $87M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.34×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $6M vs $173M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.58/share (latest year $-1.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2022–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 4
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −17% → −60% (2-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −17% early to −60% lately, median −54% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2025 · −65.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$301M
  • Cash & short-term investments$36M
  • Receivables$22M
  • Inventory$26M
  • Other current assets$217M
Current liabilities$128M
  • Accounts payable$22M
  • Other current liabilities$106M
Current ratio2.34×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.14×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.28×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$173Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$247Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$171MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6Mno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2022–2025

Over the record, the business generated $9M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$18M · 196%
  • Buybacks$12M · 128%
  • Returned to owners$12M

    $0 as dividends and $12M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$21M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $21M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $49M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $12M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count9.4%

    The diluted count rose from 76M to 83M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Peers, Auto Components

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HLLYHolley Inc.$614M40%12.5%6%6%
STRTSTRATTEC SECURITY CORPORATION$565M12%3.2%5%2%
RDWRedwire Corporation$335M18%-51.0%-59%-22%
MCFTMasterCraft Boat Holdings Inc.$284M26%14.7%37%10%
FLYFirefly Aerospace Inc.$160M19%-238.8%-30%-178%
KNDIKandi Technologies Group Inc.$87M32%-38.7%-17%4%
PKEPark Aerospace Corp.$73M31%15.1%6%8%
AEVAAeva Technologies Inc.$18M37%-1451.8%-177%-1214%
Group median28%-17.8%-6%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Kandi Technologies Group Inc. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kandi Technologies Group Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $96M on 83M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $30M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kandi Technologies Group Inc. (KNDI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KNDI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KMRK its page in the Manual KNOP →

Industry order: ← INVZ the Auto Components chapter LCII →