← All companies ← KNTK Manual KO → ← JBHT Trucking & Logistics LSTR →

KNX, Knight-swift Transportation Holdings Inc.

Trucking & Logistics capital-intensive CyclicalSerial acquirer

Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc. is one of North America's largest and most diversified freight transportation companies, providing multiple full truckload, LTL, intermodal, and other complementary services.

Our objective is to operate our business with industry-leading margins, continued organic growth and growth through acquisitions while providing safe, high-quality, cost-effective solutions for our customers.

Knight-Swift uses a nationwide network of business units and terminals in the US and Mexico to serve customers throughout North America.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

KNX · Knight-swift Transportation Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$7.5B

+0.8% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $7.5B 5-yr avg $7.1B

Operating margin 2.4% 5-yr avg 8.3%

ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 49% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 8.8% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 2.9% and 16% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 11% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.1B	$2.4B	$5.3B	$4.8B	$4.7B	$6.0B	$7.4B	$7.1B	$7.4B	$7.5B	$7.5B	RevenueRevenue
$148M	$201M	$569M	$427M	$564M	$966M	$1.1B	$338M	$243M	$216M	$178M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
13.3%	8.3%	10.6%	8.8%	12.1%	16.1%	14.7%	4.7%	3.3%	2.9%	2.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$94M	$484M	$419M	$309M	$410M	$743M	$771M	$217M	$118M	$66M	$34M	Net incomeNet inc.
38%	—	24%	25%	27%	24%	24%	20%	22%	31%	36%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$244M	$323M	$882M	$840M	$920M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$799M	$1.3B	$1.3B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$116M	$207M	$430M	$463M	$507M	$578M	$660M	$735M	$793M	$788M	$787M	DepreciationDeprec.
$30M	($375M)	$33M	$67M	$3M	($131M)	$5M	$209M	($111M)	$413M	$472M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$155M	$387M	$756M	$830M	$521M	$534M	$801M	$1.1B	$819M	$795M	$803M	CapexCapex
13.8%	16.0%	14.1%	17.1%	11.1%	8.9%	10.8%	15.0%	11.1%	10.6%	10.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$128M	$115M	$452M	$377M	$399M	$656M	$635M	$427M	($20M)	$471M	$496M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
11.4%	4.8%	8.5%	7.8%	8.5%	10.9%	8.6%	6.0%	−0.3%	6.3%	6.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$89M	($65M)	$126M	$10M	$399M	$656M	$635M	$90M	($20M)	$471M	$496M	Free cash flowFCF
8.0%	−2.7%	2.4%	0.2%	8.5%	10.9%	8.6%	1.3%	−0.3%	6.3%	6.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$102M	$2M	$47M	$1.5B	$31M	$458M	$185M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$20M	$25M	$43M	$41M	$55M	$64M	$78M	$91M	$104M	$117M	$121M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$40M	$0	$179M	$87M	$180M	$57M	$300M	$0	$0	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
12%	4%	8%	5%	7%	9%	11%	3%	2%	2%	1%	ROICROIC
12%	9%	8%	5%	7%	11%	11%	3%	2%	1%	0%	Return on equityROE
9%	9%	7%	5%	6%	10%	10%	2%	0%	−1%	−1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$8M	$77M	$82M	$160M	$157M	$261M	$197M	$169M	$218M	$220M	$223M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$134M	$574M	$601M	$519M	$578M	$911M	$842M	$889M	$804M	$305M	$426M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$18M	$120M	$118M	$99M	$101M	$225M	$221M	$355M	$330M	$201M	$256M	Accounts payablePayables
$116M	$454M	$483M	$419M	$477M	$686M	$621M	$533M	$474M	$104M	$170M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$190M	$923M	$907M	$890M	$923M	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.4B	$888M	$955M	Current assetsCur. assets
$79M	$610M	$615M	$993M	$840M	$1.1B	$894M	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.0B	$1.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.4×	1.5×	1.5×	0.9×	1.1×	1.3×	1.7×	0.9×	0.8×	0.9×	0.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$47M	$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$3.5B	$3.5B	$3.8B	$4.0B	$3.9B	$3.9B	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B	$7.7B	$7.9B	$8.3B	$8.5B	$10.7B	$11.0B	$12.9B	$12.7B	$12.0B	$11.9B	Total assetsAssets
$18M	$365M	$365M	$365M	$509M	$1.5B	$1.1B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$2.1B	Total debtDebt
$10M	$288M	$283M	$205M	$352M	$1.2B	$884M	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.9B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
165.5×	23.1×	18.9×	14.5×	32.6×	45.7×	21.5×	2.7×	1.4×	1.3×	1.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$786M	$5.2B	$5.5B	$5.7B	$5.9B	$6.5B	$6.9B	$7.1B	$7.1B	$7.1B	$7.1B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.3%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
81.2M	112M	178M	172M	171M	167M	163M	162M	162M	163M	163M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$13.76	$21.71	$30.02	$28.14	$27.40	$35.90	$45.52	$44.13	$45.69	$45.94	$45.95	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.16	$4.34	$2.36	$1.80	$2.40	$4.45	$4.73	$1.34	$0.73	$0.41	$0.21	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.57	$1.03	$2.54	$2.19	$2.34	$3.93	$3.89	$2.64	$-0.12	$2.90	$3.04	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.10	$-0.58	$0.71	$0.06	$2.34	$3.93	$3.89	$0.56	$-0.12	$2.90	$3.04	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.24	$0.23	$0.24	$0.24	$0.32	$0.38	$0.48	$0.56	$0.64	$0.72	$0.74	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.90	$3.47	$4.25	$4.82	$3.06	$3.20	$4.91	$6.62	$5.05	$4.89	$4.92	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.68	$46.89	$30.68	$32.92	$34.42	$39.11	$42.55	$43.80	$43.84	$43.55	$43.24	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.59 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+14.3%/yr	+10.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+7.0%/yr	+4.4%/yr
EPS	−11.0%/yr	−29.9%/yr
Dividends / share	+13.0%/yr	+17.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+11.1%/yr	+9.9%/yr
Book value / share	+18.2%/yr	+4.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

163Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

2%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.2×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$471Mowner earningsvs.$66Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $66M of profit into $471M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$66M

Owner earnings$471M · 6% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$66M	$118M	$217M	$771M	$743M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$788M	+$793M	+$735M	+$660M	+$578M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$413M	−$111M	+$209M	+$5M	−$131M
Cash from operations	$1.3B	$799M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$795M	−$819M	−$735M	−$801M	−$534M
Owner earnings	$471M	($20M)	$427M	$635M	$656M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	−$337M	—	—
Free cash flow	$471M	($20M)	$90M	$635M	$656M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	6%	0%	6%	9%	11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.3×

Thin

Operating income $216M ÷ interest expense $162M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 9.8× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $220M − debt $2.3B

What this means
Netting $220M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 9.8× a year's operating profit (10.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range 2%–12%; 2% latest = NOPAT $149M ÷ invested capital $9.2B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -0%–11%; latest $471M = operating cash $1.3B − maintenance capex $795M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $6M of SBC) leaves $465M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 19.21×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $66M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 25%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $117M ÷ Owner Earnings $471M

What this means
Of $471M Owner Earnings, $117M (25%) went back to shareholders, $117M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.01×

Maintaining

Capex $795M ÷ depreciation $788M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs ($144M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −60%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.82/share (latest year $0.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $43.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 11% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 11% early to 4% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth +7%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.
Worst year 2025 · 2.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$955M

Cash & short-term investments$223M
Receivables$426M
Other current assets$307M

Current liabilities$1.4B

Debt due within a year$365M
Accounts payable$256M
Other current liabilities$738M

Current ratio0.70×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.70×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($404M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$365M due · $223M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($3.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.5B$337M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.3B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$270M

'27$234M

'28$211M

'29$176M

'30$84M

later$99M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$270Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$942Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.3B

Lease obligations (present value)$942M

Total fixed claims on the business$3.3B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.3B, of which the leases are 29%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $9.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$6.7B · 74%
Dividends$638M · 7%
Buybacks$843M · 9%
Retained (debt / cash)$910M · 10%

Returned to owners$1.5B
41% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $638M as dividends and $843M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.1B and cash and short-term investments rose $215M.
Average price paid for buybacks$18.95
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 16M shares were bought for $306M, about $18.95 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $5.40 (2016) to $30.43 (2018), and 2018, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($179M).
Net change in share count100.8%
The diluted count rose from 81M to 163M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.72/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained3%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $61M, so each retained $1 added about 0.03 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5.9B49% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity56%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$2.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $6.7B of capital spent building

$27M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Adam Miller	$6.3M	$20.6M	$656M
2022	Adam Miller	$6.4M	$4.8M	$635M
2023	Adam Miller	$4.5M	$5.8M	$427M
2024	Adam Miller	$4.6M	−$4.2M	($20M)
2024	Adam Miller	$4.8M	$3.0M	($20M)
2025	Adam Miller	$5.0M	$6.4M	$471M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$6M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Knight-swift Transportation Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.0% vs 8.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.2% early in the record and 4.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?100.8%
Diluted shares grew 100.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $843M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$18M → $2.1B
Debt rose from $18M to $2.1B while owner earnings went from about $232M to $293M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 7.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $177M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$3.7B · 49% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our top customers drive a substantial portion of our total revenue, as follows: In 2025, our top 25, top 10, and top 5 customers accounted for 49.3%, 34.8%, and 25.6% of our total revenue, respectively.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trucking & Logistics

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
JBHTJ.B. Hunt	$12.0B	—	8.0%	16%	7%
KNXKnight-swift Transportation Holdings Inc.	$7.5B	—	9.7%	6%	8%
SNDRSchneider National	$5.7B	62%	6.3%	12%	5%
ODFLOld Dominion Freight Line Inc.	$5.5B	—	23.7%	24%	18%
LSTRLandstar	$4.7B	—	6.9%	48%	5%
ARCBArcBest	$4.0B	—	3.4%	10%	4%
SAIASaia, Inc.	$3.2B	—	10.4%	14%	10%
WERNWerner Enterprises	$2.9B	—	8.0%	12%	5%
Group median	—	—	8.0%	13%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Knight-swift Transportation Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Knight-swift Transportation Holdings Inc. earns about $606M on its 8.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($606M) Net of stock comp (−$7M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−23%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+38%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $496M on 162M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $1.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh KNX against another business →

The owners of KNX: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Knight-swift Transportation Holdings Inc. (KNX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KNX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KNTK its page in the Manual KO →

Industry order: ← JBHT the Trucking & Logistics chapter LSTR →