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WERN, Werner Enterprises

Trucking & Logistics capital-intensive Cyclical

Werner Logistics provides services throughout North America and generates the majority of our non-trucking revenues through three divisions.

At the end of 2025, our Truckload Transportation Services ("TTS") segment had a fleet of 7,100 trucks, of which 6,785 were company-operated and 315 were owned and operated by independent contractors.

Acquisitions expanded our fleet size, customer base, geographic market presence, and network of operational facilities.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

WERN · Werner Enterprises

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.9B

−1.9% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.0B 5-yr avg $3.0B

Operating margin 0.7% 5-yr avg 5.9%

ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 7%

Owner-earnings margin −1% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is TTS (70%) and Werner Logistics (30%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 6.8% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 0.4% and 11% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 16% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

TTS is 70% of revenue, with Werner Logistics the other meaningful segment at 30%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

TTS70%$2.0B
Werner Logistics30%$857M

By geographyUnited States98%Total foreign countries5%Mexico4%Canada0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$2.4B	$2.7B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.0B	$2.9B	$3.0B	RevenueRevenue
$126M	$144M	$224M	$225M	$227M	$309M	$323M	$176M	$66M	$12M	$21M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
6.3%	6.8%	9.1%	9.2%	9.6%	11.3%	10.0%	5.5%	2.2%	0.4%	0.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$79M	$203M	$168M	$167M	$169M	$259M	$241M	$112M	$34M	($14M)	($9M)	Net incomeNet inc.
38%	—	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	24%	21%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$310M	$283M	$418M	$427M	$446M	$333M	$449M	$474M	$330M	$182M	$236M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$210M	$218M	$230M	$250M	$263M	$266M	$274M	$289M	$280M	$276M	$276M	DepreciationDeprec.
$18M	($142M)	$12M	$2M	$5M	($203M)	($79M)	$61M	$6M	($91M)	($43M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$538M	$316M	$520M	$421M	$413M	$371M	$507M	$599M	$414M	$250M	$280M	CapexCapex
26.8%	14.9%	21.2%	17.1%	17.4%	13.6%	15.8%	18.7%	14.0%	8.6%	9.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$100M	$65M	$188M	$177M	$183M	$67M	$175M	$185M	$49M	($69M)	($44M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.0%	3.1%	7.6%	7.2%	7.7%	2.5%	5.4%	5.8%	1.7%	−2.4%	−1.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($228M)	($34M)	($102M)	$6M	$33M	($38M)	($59M)	($124M)	($84M)	($69M)	($44M)	Free cash flowFCF
−11.4%	−1.6%	−4.1%	0.2%	1.4%	−1.4%	−1.8%	−3.9%	−2.8%	−2.4%	−1.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$0	$0	$202M	$184M	$188K	$0	$0	$185M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$17M	$19M	$23M	$286M	$25M	$29M	$32M	$34M	$35M	$34M	$34M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$0	$72M	$42M	$57M	$104M	$110M	$0	$67M	$56M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
7%	12%	13%	13%	13%	14%	12%	6%	3%	0%	1%	ROICROIC
8%	17%	13%	15%	14%	20%	17%	7%	2%	-1%	-1%	Return on equityROE
6%	16%	11%	−11%	12%	17%	14%	5%	−0%	−4%	−3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$17M	$14M	$34M	$26M	$29M	$54M	$107M	$62M	$41M	$60M	$62M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$261M	$304M	$338M	$323M	$341M	$461M	$519M	$445M	$392M	$395M	$485M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$13M	$12M	$10M	$9M	$12M	$11M	$15M	$18M	$14M	$12M	$14M	InventoryInvent.
$67M	$74M	$98M	$95M	$83M	$94M	$124M	$136M	$112M	$95M	$138M	Accounts payablePayables
$208M	$242M	$250M	$237M	$270M	$378M	$409M	$327M	$293M	$312M	$362M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$373M	$400M	$457M	$466M	$457M	$631M	$763M	$635M	$542M	$613M	$703M	Current assetsCur. assets
$215M	$232M	$310M	$309M	$274M	$269M	$310M	$331M	$356M	$315M	$482M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.7×	1.5×	1.5×	1.7×	2.3×	2.5×	1.9×	1.5×	1.9×	1.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	$0	$75M	$133M	$129M	$129M	$129M	$139M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.8B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$2.9B	$3.3B	Total assetsAssets
$160M	$75M	$50M	$225M	$200M	$428M	$694M	$649M	$650M	$752M	$878M	Total debtDebt
$143M	$61M	$16M	$199M	$171M	$373M	$587M	$587M	$609M	$692M	$817M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
48.9×	64.1×	83.2×	32.9×	54.0×	69.9×	27.3×	5.3×	1.7×	0.3×	0.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$995M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
72.4M	72.6M	72.1M	70.0M	69.4M	67.9M	64.6M	63.7M	62.7M	60.6M	59.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$27.75	$29.17	$34.11	$35.18	$34.17	$40.30	$49.81	$50.28	$47.16	$47.84	$50.01	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.09	$2.80	$2.33	$2.38	$2.44	$3.82	$3.74	$1.76	$0.55	$-0.24	$-0.14	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.38	$0.90	$2.61	$2.53	$2.63	$0.99	$2.71	$2.91	$0.79	$-1.13	$-0.73	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-3.15	$-0.46	$-1.41	$0.08	$0.47	$-0.56	$-0.91	$-1.95	$-1.34	$-1.13	$-0.73	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.24	$0.26	$0.32	$4.09	$0.36	$0.43	$0.50	$0.54	$0.56	$0.56	$0.56	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$7.43	$4.36	$7.21	$6.01	$5.95	$5.47	$7.85	$9.40	$6.60	$4.13	$4.67	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$13.74	$16.33	$17.55	$15.87	$17.21	$19.56	$22.35	$23.99	$23.23	$22.49	$22.58	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.2%/yr	+7.0%/yr
Dividends / share	+10.0%/yr	+9.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	−6.3%/yr	−7.0%/yr
Book value / share	+5.6%/yr	+5.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

61Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

0%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

12.3×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($69M)owner earningsvs.($14M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $14M loss but ($69M) of owner earnings: $54M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($14M)	$34M	$112M	$241M	$259M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$276M	+$280M	+$289M	+$274M	+$266M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$11M	+$9M	+$12M	+$12M	+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$91M	+$6M	+$61M	−$79M	−$203M
Cash from operations	$182M	$330M	$474M	$449M	$333M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$250M	−$280M	−$289M	−$274M	−$266M
Owner earnings	($69M)	$49M	$185M	$175M	$67M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$133M	−$310M	−$233M	−$105M
Free cash flow	($69M)	($84M)	($124M)	($59M)	($38M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-2%	2%	6%	5%	2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer ($79M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.3×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $12M ÷ interest expense $39M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $692M · 59.4× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $60M − debt $752M

What this means
Netting $60M of cash and short-term investments against $752M of debt leaves $692M owed, about 59.4× a year's operating profit (64.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 12%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range 0%–14%; 0% latest = NOPAT $9M ÷ invested capital $2.1B

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -2%–8%; latest ($69M) = operating cash $182M − maintenance capex $250M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves ($79M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $182M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($14M) · cash from operations $182M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.91×

Maintaining

Capex $250M ÷ depreciation $276M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.95×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $752M vs $298M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −71%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.74/share (latest year $-0.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $22.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 7% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 3% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −8%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2025 · 0.4% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −2.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, we take a proactive approach to understand how our data will be used by the artificial intelligence solution to prevent and mitigate competitive concerns.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$703M

Cash & short-term investments$62M
Receivables$485M
Inventory$14M
Other current assets$141M

Current liabilities$482M

Debt due within a year$9M
Accounts payable$138M
Other current liabilities$336M

Current ratio1.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.43×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.13×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$221Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$9M due · $62M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$988M$110M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$4.3B · 119%
Dividends$535M · 15%
Buybacks$508M · 14%

Returned to owners$1.0B
93% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $535M as dividends and $508M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$1.7B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.7B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $160M to $878M.
Average price paid for buybacks$36.93
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $508M, about $36.93 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $26.29 (2025) to $45.45 (2021); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $40.73 ($110M).
Net change in share count−17.2%
The diluted count fell from 72M to 60M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.56/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained−17%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($375M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $62M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.17 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Leathers	$5.3M	$8.8M	$67M
2022	Mr. Leathers	$5.5M	$2.5M	$175M
2023	Mr. Leathers	$5.4M	$3.5M	$185M
2024	Mr. Leathers	$5.8M	$2.6M	$49M
2025	Mr. Leathers	$6.0M	$5.9M	($69M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio113:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$11M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 92% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Werner Enterprises is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.7% vs 5.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.2% early in the record and 1.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$160M → $878M
Debt rose from $160M to $878M while owner earnings went from about $118M to $55M — about 1.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 16 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$330M · 11% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“Our largest customer, Dollar General, accounted for 11% of our total revenues in 2025.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trucking & Logistics

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SNDRSchneider National	$5.7B	62%	6.3%	12%	5%
ODFLOld Dominion Freight Line Inc.	$5.5B	—	23.7%	24%	18%
LSTRLandstar	$4.7B	—	6.9%	48%	5%
ARCBArcBest	$4.0B	—	3.4%	10%	4%
SAIASaia, Inc.	$3.2B	—	10.4%	14%	10%
WERNWerner Enterprises	$2.9B	—	8.0%	12%	5%
ULHUniversal Logistics Holdings Inc.	$1.6B	—	5.8%	10%	3%
CVLGCovenant Logistics Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	4.4%	6%	3%
Group median	—	—	6.6%	12%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Werner Enterprises has delivered.

Werner Enterprises’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Werner Enterprises earns about $151M on its 5.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($151M) Net of stock comp (−$11M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($14M))

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($44M) on 60M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $817M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($280M) runs well above depreciation ($276M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($14M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh WERN against another business →

The owners of WERN: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Werner Enterprises (WERN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WERN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WEN its page in the Manual WES →

Industry order: ← UPS the Trucking & Logistics chapter ZTO →