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KYIVW, Kyivstar Group Ltd.

Kyivstar segment, we operate two related business lines: mobile telecommunications services and digital, which accounted for approximately 89%, and 11% of our revenue for year ended December 31, 2025, respectively and approximately 98% and 2% of our revenue for the year ended December 31, 2024, respectively.

In our telecommunications services business, we provide mobile services, including voice, data, messaging and wireless internet as well as internet services, including corporate internet access, fixed-line telephone, data transmission and fixed-mobile convergence and internet-TV via FTTB network connections.

In our digital services business, we provide (i) digital TV content on the Kyivstar TV platform in partnership with PLUS TV LLC, (ii) digital health services through Helsi, (iii) a suite of self-service options through our self-service app, MyKyivstar, (iv) big data and technology services via our technology company, Kyivstar.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F

KYIVW · Kyivstar Group Ltd.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.2B

+25.9% YoY

Vital signs · TTM, with 3-yr average

Revenue $1.2B 3-yr avg $997M

Operating margin 23.7% 3-yr avg 33.7%

ROIC 15% 3-yr avg 41%

Owner-earnings margin 36% 3-yr avg 35%

Free cash flow margin 27% 3-yr avg 30%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 38% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. Capital spending runs about 18% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 45%, above 15% in 3 of 3 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 35% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2023–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
				Income statement
$915M	$919M	$1.2B	$1.2B	RevenueRevenue
$363M	$348M	$274M	$274M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
39.7%	37.9%	23.7%	23.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$281M	$283M	$124M	$124M	Net incomeNet inc.
19%	18%	37%	37%	Effective tax rateTax rate
				Cash flow & returns
$413M	$430M	$558M	$558M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$127M	$118M	$140M	—	DepreciationDeprec.
$5M	$29M	$294M	$434M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$96M	$162M	$247M	$247M	CapexCapex
10.5%	17.6%	21.3%	21.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$317M	$312M	$418M	$418M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
34.6%	33.9%	36.1%	36.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$317M	$268M	$311M	$311M	Free cash flowFCF
34.6%	29.2%	26.9%	26.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
64%	45%	15%	15%	ROICROIC
32%	26%	10%	10%	Return on equityROE
32%	26%	10%	10%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
				Balance sheet
$425M	$682M	$455M	$455M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$40M	$37M	$37M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$3M	$3M	$3M	InventoryInvent.
—	$103M	$141M	$141M	Accounts payablePayables
—	($60M)	($101M)	($101M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$1.2B	$692M	$692M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$887M	$498M	$498M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.4×	1.4×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$15M	$14M	$128M	$128M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.1B	Total assetsAssets
—	$225M	$275M	$275M	Total debtDebt
—	($457M)	($180M)	($180M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
4.4×	4.2×	3.7×	3.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$887M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
				Per share
207M	207M	216M	216M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.42	$4.44	$5.35	$5.35	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.36	$1.37	$0.57	$0.57	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.53	$1.51	$1.93	$1.93	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.53	$1.30	$1.44	$1.44	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.46	$0.78	$1.14	$1.14	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.29	$5.22	$6.01	$6.01	Book value / shareBVPS

The record, charted

FY2023–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

216Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

15%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$418Mowner earningsvs.$124Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2023FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2023–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $418M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $140M it takes just to hold its position. It put $107M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $311M.

Reported net income$124M

Owner earnings$418M · 36% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023
Reported net income	$124M	$283M	$281M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$140M	+$118M	+$127M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$294M	+$29M	+$5M
Cash from operations	$558M	$430M	$413M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$140M	−$118M	−$96M
Owner earnings	$418M	$312M	$317M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$107M	−$44M	—
Free cash flow	$311M	$268M	$317M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	36%	34%	35%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $140M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $107M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.7×

Adequate

Operating income $274M ÷ interest expense $75M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$180M

Net cash

Cash $455M − debt $275M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $180M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 45%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

3-yr median, range 15%–64%; 15% latest = NOPAT $172M ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median 1%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 35%

High through the cycle

3-yr median margin, range 34%–36%; latest $418M = operating cash $558M − maintenance capex $140M

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 36% of revenue this year, a 35% median across 3 years. It chose to put $107M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $311M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
Are earnings backed by cash? 4.50×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $558M ÷ net income $124M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 1.76×

Expanding

Capex $247M ÷ depreciation $140M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.39×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $275M vs $194M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.99/share (latest year $0.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.63/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Rapid developments in AI and automation, including their application to network optimization, customer engagement and digital services, may require significant investment, specialized expertise and new governance frameworks, and there can be no assurance that such investments will deliver expected returns or be deploye…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$692M

Cash & short-term investments$455M
Receivables$37M
Inventory$3M
Other current assets$197M

Current liabilities$498M

Accounts payable$141M
Other current liabilities$357M

Current ratio1.39×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.38×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.91×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$194Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$808Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$275Mno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

Deferred revenue$30Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$491M23% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity10%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 3 years buying other businesses, against $505M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.

Peers, Telecom Operators

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
UNITUniti Group Inc.	$2.2B	—	32.9%	3%	1%
IDTIDT Corporation	$1.2B	24%	2.8%	75%	2%
KYIVWKyivstar Group Ltd.	$1.2B	—	37.9%	45%	35%
TDSTelephone and Data Systems	$1.1B	—	2.2%	1%	3%
GLIBAGCI Liberty, Inc.	$1.0B	—	-33.2%	-12%	12%
LBRDALiberty Broadband	$1.0B	100%	-54.0%	-0%	-40%
CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc.	$976M	57%	16.1%	17%	14%
ATNIATN International Inc.	$667M	—	2.5%	1%	3%
Group median	—	—	2.7%	2%	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Kyivstar Group Ltd. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kyivstar Group Ltd. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($299M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($418M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $311M on 231M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $180M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($247M) runs well above depreciation (—), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $418M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh KYIVW against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kyivstar Group Ltd. (KYIVW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KYIVW, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KYIV its page in the Manual KZIA →

Industry order: ← KYIV the Telecom Operators chapter LUMN →