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LINC, Lincoln Educational Services Corporation

Education Services capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

Lincoln Educational Services Corporation provide diversified career-oriented postsecondary education to recent high school graduates and working adults.

Lincoln Educational Services Corporation offers programs in skilled trades, automotive, health sciences and information technology.

The schools operate under the brands Lincoln Technical Institute, Lincoln College of Technology and Nashville Auto Diesel College.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LINC · Lincoln Educational Services Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$518M

+17.8% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $545M 5-yr avg $404M

Gross margin 60% 5-yr avg 58%

Operating margin 6.1% 5-yr avg 7.5%

ROIC 14% 5-yr avg 28%

Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin −2% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 17% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 57% and operating margin about 3.4% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −10% and 15% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −11 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$286M	$262M	$263M	$273M	$293M	$335M	$348M	$378M	$440M	$518M	$545M	RevenueRevenue
49%	51%	52%	55%	58%	59%	57%	57%	59%	60%	60%	Gross marginGross mgn
52%	53%	54%	53%	53%	50%	52%	55%	55%	55%	54%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($29M)	($5M)	($4M)	$5M	$15M	$49M	$16M	$33M	$15M	$30M	$33M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−10.1%	−1.8%	−1.5%	1.9%	5.0%	14.7%	4.7%	8.8%	3.4%	5.8%	6.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($28M)	($11M)	($11M)	$2M	$49M	$35M	$13M	$26M	$10M	$20M	$22M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	12%	—	27%	23%	27%	33%	23%	22%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($6M)	($11M)	($2M)	$988K	$23M	$27M	$882K	$26M	$29M	$59M	$72M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$11M	$9M	$8M	$8M	$7M	$7M	$6M	$7M	$11M	$19M	$23M	DepreciationDeprec.
$10M	($10M)	$847K	($10M)	($34M)	($17M)	($21M)	($13M)	$3M	$15M	$21M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M	$5M	$5M	$5M	$6M	$8M	$9M	$41M	$57M	$87M	$81M	CapexCapex
1.3%	1.8%	1.8%	2.0%	1.9%	2.2%	2.6%	10.8%	12.9%	16.7%	14.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($10M)	($16M)	($6M)	($4M)	$18M	$20M	($5M)	$19M	$18M	$40M	$49M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−3.4%	−6.1%	−2.4%	−1.6%	6.1%	5.9%	−1.6%	5.0%	4.1%	7.7%	9.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($10M)	($16M)	($6M)	($4M)	$18M	$20M	($8M)	($15M)	($28M)	($27M)	($9M)	Free cash flowFCF
−3.4%	−6.1%	−2.4%	−1.6%	6.1%	5.9%	−2.3%	−4.0%	−6.3%	−5.3%	−1.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$9M	$891K	$0	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-30%	-4%	-4%	9%	21%	79%	13%	27%	9%	14%	14%	ROICROIC
-52%	-25%	-29%	5%	53%	27%	9%	16%	6%	10%	11%	Return on equityROE
−52%	−25%	−29%	5%	53%	27%	9%	16%	6%	10%	11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$21M	$15M	$18M	$24M	$38M	$83M	$61M	$76M	$59M	$29M	$17M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$15M	$16M	$19M	$21M	$30M	$26M	$37M	$36M	$43M	$37M	$42M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2M	$2M	$1M	$2M	$2M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$4M	$2M	InventoryInvent.
$14M	$11M	$14M	$15M	$16M	$12M	$10M	$18M	$37M	$27M	$28M	Accounts payablePayables
$3M	$7M	$6M	$8M	$17M	$17M	$29M	$20M	$9M	$14M	$16M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$65M	$45M	$57M	$50M	$74M	$122M	$114M	$135M	$111M	$87M	$76M	Current assetsCur. assets
$66M	$47M	$65M	$57M	$67M	$66M	$55M	$73M	$90M	$101M	$92M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	0.9×	0.9×	0.9×	1.1×	1.8×	2.1×	1.8×	1.2×	0.9×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$15M	$15M	$15M	$15M	$15M	$15M	$15M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	GoodwillGoodwill
$163M	$155M	$146M	$195M	$245M	$295M	$292M	$345M	$437M	$493M	$487M	Total assetsAssets
$42M	$53M	$49M	$34M	$17M	$0	—	—	—	—	$5M	Total debtDebt
$21M	$38M	$31M	$10M	($21M)	($83M)	—	—	—	—	($12M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.7×	-0.7×	-1.6×	1.8×	11.6×	24.4×	101.7×	96.1×	5.9×	8.9×	9.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$55M	$46M	$40M	$43M	$91M	$129M	$145M	$167M	$178M	$200M	$199M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%	0.6%	0.9%	0.9%	1.6%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
23.5M	23.9M	23.9M	24.6M	24.7M	25.1M	25.9M	30.5M	30.9M	31.3M	31.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$12.18	$10.95	$11.01	$11.13	$11.84	$13.37	$13.46	$12.38	$14.25	$16.58	$17.38	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.21	$-0.48	$-0.48	$0.08	$1.96	$1.38	$0.49	$0.85	$0.32	$0.64	$0.72	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.41	$-0.67	$-0.27	$-0.18	$0.72	$0.79	$-0.21	$0.62	$0.58	$1.28	$1.57	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.41	$-0.67	$-0.27	$-0.18	$0.72	$0.79	$-0.31	$-0.50	$-0.89	$-0.87	$-0.29	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.15	$0.20	$0.20	$0.22	$0.23	$0.30	$0.35	$1.33	$1.84	$2.77	$2.60	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.34	$1.92	$1.67	$1.76	$3.68	$5.16	$5.60	$5.46	$5.77	$6.39	$6.35	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.5%/yr	+7.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+12.2%/yr
EPS	—	−20.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	+37.9%/yr	+65.2%/yr
Book value / share	+11.8%/yr	+11.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

31Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

14%low FY2016

Gross margin

60%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$40Mowner earningsvs.$20Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $40M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $19M it takes just to hold its position. It put $67M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($27M).

Reported net income$20M

Owner earnings$40M · 8% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$20M	$10M	$26M	$13M	$35M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$19M	+$11M	+$7M	+$6M	+$7M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$5M	+$5M	+$6M	+$3M	+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$15M	+$3M	−$13M	−$21M	−$17M
Cash from operations	$59M	$29M	$26M	$882K	$27M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$19M	−$11M	−$7M	−$6M	−$8M
Owner earnings	$40M	$18M	$19M	($5M)	$20M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$67M	−$46M	−$34M	−$3M	—
Free cash flow	($27M)	($28M)	($15M)	($8M)	$20M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	8%	4%	5%	-2%	6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $19M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $67M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer $35M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 8.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $30M ÷ interest expense $3M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$29M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $29M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $29M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -15d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 26 + DIO 7 − DPO 48 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 9%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -30%–79%; 14% latest = NOPAT $23M ÷ invested capital $171M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $40M = operating cash $59M − maintenance capex $19M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -2%)

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a -2% median across 10 years. It chose to put $67M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($27M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves $35M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.97×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $59M ÷ net income $20M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $40M

What this means
Of $40M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 4.52×

Expanding

Capex $87M ÷ depreciation $19M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $518M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs ($14M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.59/share (latest year $0.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −4% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −4% early to 6% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2016 · −10.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“We aim to improve margins and scalability by centralizing operations, standardizing curricula, and leveraging technology such as artificial intelligence to streamline campus functions.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$76M

Cash & short-term investments$17M
Receivables$42M
Inventory$2M
Other current assets$15M

Current liabilities$92M

Accounts payable$28M
Other current liabilities$64M

Current ratio0.83×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.80×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.18×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($16M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+22.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$188Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($212M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$176M$171M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$57Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $148M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$225M · 152%
Buybacks$10M · 7%

Returned to owners$10M
14% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $10M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$87M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $87M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$5.95
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $10M, about $5.95 each.
Net change in share count33.6%
The diluted count rose from 23M to 31M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid no dividend over the span; it returns cash through buybacks or retains it.
Return on what it retained39%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($92M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $36M, so each retained $1 added about 0.39 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$11M2% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity5%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $225M of capital spent building

$13M written down across 2 years (2016, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Shaw	$1.7M	$2.0M	$20M
2022	Mr. Shaw	$1.7M	$842k	($5M)
2023	Mr. Shaw	$2.5M	$4.0M	$19M
2024	Mr. Shaw	$2.6M	$4.4M	$18M
2025	Mr. Shaw	$4.0M	$6.4M	$40M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership12.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio61:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$5M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 18% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Lincoln Educational Services Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?33.6%
Diluted shares grew 33.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $10M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?6% → 8% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $17M to $44M while revenue grew 91%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (6% of revenue then, 8% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
LAURLaureate Education Inc.	$1.7B	23%	7.9%	6%	12%
SMCSummit Midstream Corporation	$562M	73%	12.9%	4%	8%
METCRamaco Resources Inc.	$537M	21%	6.5%	14%	9%
MGPIMGP Ingredients Inc.	$536M	28%	13.3%	14%	8%
SWBISmith & Wesson Brands Inc.	$524M	32%	9.3%	11%	8%
LINCLincoln Educational Services Corporation	$518M	57%	4.1%	11%	1%
HNRGHallador Energy Company	$469M	24%	2.1%	2%	3%
PRSUPursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.	$452M	91%	6.3%	4%	2%
Group median	—	30%	7.2%	8%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lincoln Educational Services Corporation has delivered.

Lincoln Educational Services Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Lincoln Educational Services Corporation earns about $7M on its 1.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($7M) Net of stock comp (−$6M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($53M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+42%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+46%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($9M) on 32M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-11; net cash $12M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($81M) runs well above depreciation ($23M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $53M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh LINC against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lincoln Educational Services Corporation (LINC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LINC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LIN its page in the Manual LIND →

Industry order: ← LFS the Education Services chapter LOPE →