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PFAI, Pinnacle Food Group Limited Class A
Revenue is led by Recognized at point of time (61%) and Construction services (22%), with 2 more lines behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 51% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 50% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −56%) on a 38% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −50 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Recognized at point of time is 61% of revenue, with Construction services the other meaningful line at 22%.
- Recognized at point of time61%$2M
- Construction services22%$757K
- Consulting Services12%$401K
- FaaS Services6%$189K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $177K | $2M | $3M | $3M | $3M | RevenueRevenue |
| 10% | 61% | 47% | 38% | 38% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($203K) | $1M | $615K | ($2M) | ($2M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −114.7% | 49.9% | 18.7% | −56.3% | −56.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($205K) | $918K | $286K | ($2M) | ($2M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 19% | 41% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($91K) | $62K | $204K | ($4M) | ($4M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3K | $124K | $200K | $165K | $165K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $111K | ($980K) | ($281K) | ($2M) | ($2M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $17K | $3K | $795K | $2M | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 9.7% | 0.1% | 24.2% | 50.6% | 50.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($94K) | $59K | $5K | ($4M) | ($4M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −53.0% | 2.8% | 0.1% | −109.9% | −109.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($108K) | $59K | ($591K) | ($5M) | ($5M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −60.8% | 2.8% | −18.0% | −155.6% | −155.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | -36% | -36% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 61% | -46% | -46% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 61% | −46% | −46% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| — | $121K | $686K | $943K | $943K | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $2M | $3M | $4M | $4M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $64K | $21K | $25K | $25K | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $2M | $2M | $1M | $1M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($416K) | $1M | $3M | $3M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $2M | $4M | $5M | $5M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $3M | $3M | $2M | $2M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.7× | 1.3× | 2.2× | 2.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $4M | $6M | $10M | $10M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $1M | $1M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | $79K | $79K | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($3M) | ($2M) | $467K | $4M | $4M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($4M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $165K it takes just to hold its position. It put $2M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($5M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($2M) | $286K | $918K | ($205K) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$165K | +$200K | +$124K | +$3K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$2M | −$281K | −$980K | +$111K |
| Cash from operations | ($4M) | $204K | $62K | ($91K) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$165K | −$200K | −$3K | −$3K |
| Owner earnings | ($4M) | $5K | $59K | ($94K) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$2M | −$596K | — | −$14K |
| Free cash flow | ($5M) | ($591K) | $59K | ($108K) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -110% | 0% | 3% | -53% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $165K, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“Risks Related to Our Class A Common Shares We have identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $943K − debt $1M
What this means
Netting $943K of cash and short-term investments against $1M of debt leaves $79K owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 444 + DIO 4 − DPO 238 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($2M) ÷ invested capital $4M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -48%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle4-yr median margin, range -110%–3%; latest ($4M) = operating cash ($4M) − maintenance capex $165KIndustry peers: median -670%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -110% of revenue this year, a -53% median across 4 years. It chose to put $2M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($5M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Loss, and burning cashNet income ($2M) · cash from operations ($4M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 10.49×ExpandingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $165K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $3M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.20×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1M vs $3M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. . Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −32% → −19% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −32% early to −19% lately, median −56% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · −114.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$943K
- Receivables$4M
- Inventory$25K
- Other current assets$202K
- Accounts payable$1M
- Other current liabilities$1M
From the company's latest filing.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$1M · 36% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“During the year ended December 31, 2025, the Company's top three customers, accounted for approximately 36 %, 29 % and 18 % of the Company's total revenue.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BMNPBitmine Immersion Technologies, Inc. | $6M | — | -224.0% | -32% | -139% |
| RRRichtech Robotics Inc. | $5M | 65% | -86.5% | -6% | -279% |
| ABATAmerican Battery Technology Company | $4M | — | -979.5% | -46% | -734% |
| PFAIPinnacle Food Group Limited Class A | $3M | 43% | -18.8% | -36% | -26% |
| IEIvanhoe Electric Inc. | $3M | 65% | -3501.0% | -65% | -2787% |
| ABSIAbsci Corporation | $3M | — | -1938.8% | -56% | -1651% |
| ALOYREalloys Inc. | $2M | 45% | -133.6% | -48% | -71% |
| AVXAvax One Technology Ltd. | $2M | 96% | -37998.5% | -55% | -670% |
| Group median | — | 65% | -601.7% | -47% | -474% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Pinnacle Food Group Limited Class A reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
A reverse-DCF needs positive owner earnings, or at least revenue, to anchor to, there's no clean base here. Judge this one on assets or normalized earnings, not a growth model.
Manual order: ← PERI its page in the Manual PHAR →
Industry order: ← LND the Agricultural Products chapter SEB →