Owner Scorecard


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MCS, Marcus Corporation (The)

Entertainment & Studios capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Our movie theatres operate under the Marcus Theatres , Movie Tavern by Marcus , and BistroPlex brands.

We are engaged primarily in two business segments: movie theatres and hotels and resorts.

We will consider additional sites for potential new theatre locations in both new and existing markets in the future.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MCS · Marcus Corporation (The)
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$758M
+3.1% YoY · 26% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $764M 5-yr avg $672M
Operating margin 2.4% 5-yr avg 0.3%
ROIC 3% 5-yr avg 1%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Admission (29%) and Concessions (26%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 2.2% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −75% and 12% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 8.3% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Admission at 29%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Admission29%$220M
  • Concessions26%$198M
  • Rooms15%$115M
  • Other revenues13%$101M
  • Food and beverage11%$84M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$574M$654M$707M$821M$238M$458M$677M$730M$736M$758M$764MRevenueRevenue
11%10%10%9%21%14%11%11%12%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$71M$77M$83M$68M($178M)($41M)$8M$34M$16M$17M$18MOperating incomeOp. inc.
12.4%11.8%11.8%8.3%−75.1%−9.0%1.2%4.7%2.2%2.2%2.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$38M$65M$53M$42M($125M)($43M)($12M)$15M($8M)$13M$14MNet incomeNet inc.
38%5%20%23%32%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$83M$109M$137M$141M($69M)$46M$93M$103M$104M$84M$104MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$42M$52M$61M$72M$75M$72M$67M$67M$68M$70M$70MDepreciationDeprec.
$1M($10M)$20M$24M($23M)$8M$30M$14M$36M($6M)$12MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$84M$115M$59M$64M$21M$17M$37M$39M$79M$83M$67MCapexCapex
14.6%17.6%8.3%7.8%9.0%3.7%5.4%5.3%10.8%11.0%8.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$41M$57M$79M$77M($90M)$29M$56M$64M$25M$989K$37MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.1%8.8%11.1%9.4%−37.8%6.4%8.3%8.8%3.4%0.1%4.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($951K)($6M)$79M$77M($90M)$29M$56M$64M$25M$989K$37MFree cash flowFCF
−0.2%−0.9%11.1%9.4%−37.8%6.4%8.3%8.8%3.4%0.1%4.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$64M$0$0$30M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$12M$14M$16M$19M$5M$0$3M$7M$9M$9M$9MDividends paidDiv. paid
7%10%9%6%-18%-5%4%3%3%ROICROIC
10%15%11%7%-25%-10%-3%3%-2%3%3%Return on equityROE
7%12%8%4%−26%−10%−3%2%−4%1%1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3M$16M$17M$21M$7M$18M$22M$56M$41M$23M$11MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$6M$11M$9M$9M$405K$9M$7M$8M$7M$7M$7MReceivablesReceiv.
$4M$4M$4M$6M$3M$5M$6M$6M$7M$7M$7MInventoryInvent.
$31M$52M$37M$49M$13M$36M$32M$37M$51M$45M$32MAccounts payablePayables
($20M)($36M)($25M)($34M)($9M)($22M)($20M)($24M)($37M)($31M)($18M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$36M$77M$69M$79M$68M$100M$64M$102M$92M$65M$50MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$131M$160M$149M$175M$217M$213M$156M$164M$177M$163M$145MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.3×0.5×0.5×0.5×0.3×0.5×0.4×0.6×0.5×0.4×0.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$44M$43M$43M$75M$75M$75M$75M$75M$75M$75M$75MGoodwillGoodwill
$911M$1.0B$989M$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$992MTotal assetsAssets
$283M$302M$239M$216M$313M$262M$180M$170M$160M$159M$180MTotal debtDebt
$280M$286M$222M$195M$306M$245M$159M$114M$119M$136M$169MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.8×6.4×6.4×5.8×-11.0×-2.2×0.5×2.7×1.5×1.5×1.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$390M$445M$490M$621M$499M$454M$456M$471M$465M$457M$441MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.4%0.4%0.4%1.8%2.0%1.2%0.9%1.1%1.0%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
28.0M28.4M28.7M31.2M31.0M31.4M31.5M41.0M31.9M31.3M30.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$20.54$23.01$24.63$26.35$7.66$14.61$21.51$17.80$23.07$24.25$24.90Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.36$2.29$1.86$1.35$-4.02$-1.38$-0.38$0.36$-0.24$0.41$0.46EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.46$2.02$2.74$2.48$-2.90$0.93$1.79$1.56$0.78$0.03$1.22Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.03$-0.20$2.74$2.48$-2.90$0.93$1.79$1.56$0.78$0.03$1.22Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.43$0.48$0.57$0.62$0.17$0.00$0.10$0.18$0.28$0.29$0.31Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.99$4.04$2.04$2.06$0.69$0.54$1.17$0.95$2.48$2.66$2.18Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$13.95$15.67$17.07$19.95$16.07$14.46$14.48$11.50$14.58$14.62$14.38Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.9%/yr+25.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share−34.7%/yr
EPS−12.5%/yr
Dividends / share−4.2%/yr+12.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.3%/yr+31.1%/yr
Book value / share+0.5%/yr−1.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
31Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
3%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
137.1×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$989Kowner earningsvs.$13Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $13M of profit but $989K of owner earnings: $12M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$13M
Owner earnings$989K · 0% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$13M($8M)$15M($12M)($43M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$70M+$68M+$67M+$67M+$72M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$8M+$8M+$6M+$8M+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$6M+$36M+$14M+$30M+$8M
Cash from operations$84M$104M$103M$93M$46M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$83M−$79M−$39M−$37M−$17M
Owner earnings$989K$25M$64M$56M$29M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue0%3%9%8%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer ($7M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $17M ÷ interest expense $11M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $157M · 9.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $23M − debt $180M
    What this means

    Netting $23M of cash and short-term investments against $180M of debt leaves $157M owed, about 9.2× a year's operating profit (10.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -18%–10%; 3% latest = NOPAT $17M ÷ invested capital $614M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -38%–11%; latest $989K = operating cash $84M − maintenance capex $83M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves ($7M).

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $84M ÷ net income $13M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $10M ÷ Owner Earnings $989K
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $989K of Owner Earnings, $10M (1004%) went back to shareholders, $9M dividends, $773K buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($8M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.19×
    Maintaining
    Capex $83M ÷ depreciation $70M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $758M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.40×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $180M vs ($99M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Near
    Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −87%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.21/share (latest year $0.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.91/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 3% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −75.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +1.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 9 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Additionally, potential labor disputes or intellectual property litigation related to AI usage could disrupt the studio production pipeline, leading to delays in our film supply.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$50M
  • Cash & short-term investments$11M
  • Receivables$7M
  • Inventory$7M
  • Other current assets$25M
Current liabilities$145M
  • Accounts payable$32M
  • Other current liabilities$114M
Current ratio0.35×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.30×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.08×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($95M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$359Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$339M$165M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$33Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $832M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$598M · 72%
  • Dividends$95M · 11%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$140M · 17%
  • Returned to owners$95M

    28% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $95M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count9.7%

    The diluted count rose from 28M to 31M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.29/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 4% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Marcus$3.8M$4.7M$29M
2022Mr. Marcus$3.5M$2.9M$56M
2023Mr. Marcus$4.8M$3.8M$64M
2024Mr. Marcus$7.2M$10.8M$25M
2025Mr. Marcus$4.8M$312k$989K

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio330:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$8M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 44% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Marcus Corporation (The) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.1% vs 9.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 9.0% early in the record and 4.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?9.7%

    Diluted shares grew 9.7% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $47M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Does management own its misses?
    2 plain admissions in this year's filing
    “U.S. box office -1.8 pts -7.2 pts -3.8 pts +7.6 pts -1.3 pts According to the data received from Comscore, our comparable theatres underperformed the industry during fiscal 2025 compared to fiscal 2024 by 1.3 percentage points.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AMCAMC Entertainment Holdings Inc.$4.8B78%-1.0%-3%-7%
CNKCinemark Holdings, Inc.$3.1B9.9%9%5%
FORMFormFactor$785M40%8.4%7%12%
LINDLindblad Expeditions Holdings Inc.$771M45%3.7%6%7%
MCSMarcus Corporation (The)$758M3.4%5%8%
UPWheels Up Experience Inc.$736M7%-27.6%-17%
BATRAAtlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series A$732M-5.6%-3%-10%
ECVTEcovyst Inc.$724M27%11.8%4%12%
Group median3.6%5%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Marcus Corporation (The) has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Marcus Corporation (The) earns about $59M on its 7.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−26%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021−57%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $37M on 31M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $169M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Marcus Corporation (The) (MCS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MCS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MCRI its page in the Manual MCW →

Industry order: ← MANU the Entertainment & Studios chapter NFLX →