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MCW, Mister Car Wash

Auto Dealers & Services capital-intensive Capital build-outSerial acquirer

We serve a diverse mix of customers, including individual retail customers and UWC Members, which are comprised of both retail and corporate customers.

Primarily offering express exterior cleaning services, we provide the highest quality car wash, ensuring our customers a quick and convenient experience, which we call the "Mister Experience."

Through our advanced technology and dedication to exceptional customer experiences, we deliver a clean, dry and shiny car every time.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MCW · Mister Car Wash

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.1B

+5.7% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $922M

Operating margin 19.3% 5-yr avg 15.4%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 17%

Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 24% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 40% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 19% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.6% to 25% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 22% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$630M	$575M	$758M	$877M	$927M	$995M	$1.1B	$1.1B	RevenueRevenue
13%	9%	34%	11%	11%	11%	9%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$75M	$143M	($5M)	$188M	$178M	$179M	$200M	$206M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
11.9%	24.9%	−0.6%	21.4%	19.2%	18.0%	19.0%	19.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$920K	$60M	($22M)	$113M	$80M	$70M	$103M	$110M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	22%	—	23%	22%	32%	27%	27%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$70M	$102M	$173M	$229M	$205M	$249M	$286M	$278M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$39M	$45M	$51M	$62M	$70M	$81M	$88M	$91M	DepreciationDeprec.
$27M	($5M)	($72M)	$32M	$31M	$71M	$68M	$50M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$75M	$59M	$126M	$192M	$328M	$330M	$255M	$247M	CapexCapex
11.8%	10.2%	16.6%	21.9%	35.4%	33.2%	24.3%	23.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$31M	$57M	$123M	$168M	$135M	$167M	$197M	$187M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.9%	9.8%	16.2%	19.1%	14.5%	16.8%	18.8%	17.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($5M)	$43M	$48M	$38M	($123M)	($81M)	$30M	$31M	Free cash flowFCF
−0.7%	7.5%	6.3%	4.3%	−13.3%	−8.2%	2.9%	2.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$82M	$34M	$514M	$87M	$51M	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$195M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$619K	$372K	$308K	$0	$0	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	12%	-0%	9%	8%	7%	8%	8%	ROICROIC
—	363%	-3%	14%	9%	7%	9%	9%	Return on equityROE
—	363%	−3%	—	—	—	—	9%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$7M	$115M	$20M	$65M	$19M	$67M	$28M	$55M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$5M	$1M	$1M	$6M	$791K	$639K	$850K	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$6M	$6M	$9M	$9M	$6M	$5M	$5M	InventoryInvent.
—	$24M	$27M	$26M	$34M	$30M	$28M	$26M	Accounts payablePayables
—	($13M)	($20M)	($15M)	($18M)	($24M)	($22M)	($20M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$135M	$59M	$106M	$61M	$99M	$60M	$89M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$123M	$130M	$154M	$170M	$187M	$185M	$183M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.1×	0.5×	0.7×	0.4×	0.5×	0.3×	0.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$732M	$737M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$1.9B	$2.4B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.2B	Total assetsAssets
—	$1.1B	$896M	$896M	$897M	$916M	$797M	$790M	Total debtDebt
—	$949M	$877M	$831M	$878M	$849M	$768M	$735M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.1×	2.2×	-0.1×	4.5×	2.4×	2.3×	3.4×	3.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($64M)	$17M	$657M	$801M	$915M	$998M	$1.1B	$1.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.3%	28.6%	2.5%	2.6%	2.6%	2.5%	2.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
272M	276M	280M	328M	328M	330M	332M	334M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.31	$2.08	$2.71	$2.68	$2.82	$3.02	$3.17	$3.19	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.00	$0.22	$-0.08	$0.34	$0.24	$0.21	$0.31	$0.33	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.11	$0.20	$0.44	$0.51	$0.41	$0.51	$0.59	$0.56	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.02	$0.16	$0.17	$0.11	$-0.38	$-0.25	$0.09	$0.09	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.71	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.27	$0.21	$0.45	$0.58	$1.00	$1.00	$0.77	$0.74	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.23	$0.06	$2.35	$2.45	$2.79	$3.03	$3.41	$3.52	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+5.4%/yr	+8.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+32.0%/yr	+23.7%/yr
EPS	+112.4%/yr	+7.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	+18.8%/yr	+29.3%/yr
Book value / share	—	+124.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

332Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

8%low FY2021

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.9×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$197Mowner earningsvs.$103Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $197M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $88M it takes just to hold its position. It put $167M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $30M.

Reported net income$103M

Owner earnings$197M · 19% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$103M	$70M	$80M	$113M	($22M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$88M	+$81M	+$70M	+$62M	+$51M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$27M	+$26M	+$24M	+$22M	+$217M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$68M	+$71M	+$31M	+$32M	−$72M
Cash from operations	$286M	$249M	$205M	$229M	$173M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$88M	−$81M	−$70M	−$62M	−$51M
Owner earnings	$197M	$167M	$135M	$168M	$123M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$167M	−$249M	−$258M	−$130M	−$75M
Free cash flow	$30M	($81M)	($123M)	$38M	$48M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	17%	15%	19%	16%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $88M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $167M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $27M), owner earnings is nearer $171M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.4×

Adequate

Operating income $200M ÷ interest expense $59M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $768M · 3.8× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $28M − debt $797M

What this means
Netting $28M of cash and short-term investments against $797M of debt leaves $768M owed, about 3.8× a year's operating profit (4.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -0%–12%; 8% latest = NOPAT $147M ÷ invested capital $1.9B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 16%

High through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range 5%–19%; latest $197M = operating cash $286M − maintenance capex $88M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 7 years. It chose to put $167M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $30M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $27M of SBC) leaves $171M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.77×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $286M ÷ net income $103M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $197M

What this means
Of $197M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.90×

Expanding

Capex $255M ÷ depreciation $88M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.32×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $797M vs ($125M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +545%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.26/share (latest year $0.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 12% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 19% lately, median 19% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 17%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +27%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 27% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −0.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$89M

Cash & short-term investments$55M
Receivables$850K
Inventory$5M
Other current assets$28M

Current liabilities$183M

Accounts payable$26M
Other current liabilities$157M

Current ratio0.49×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.46×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.30×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($94M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.3× → 0.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($83M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.7B$950M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.8B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$38Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$129M

'27$126M

'28$120M

'29$119M

'30$119M

later$1.1B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$129Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.7Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$973Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$797M

Lease obligations (present value)$973M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.8B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.8B, of which the leases are 55%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.4B · 104%
Dividends$195M · 15%
Buybacks$1M · 0%

Returned to owners$196M
22% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $195M as dividends and $1M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$247M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $247M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count22.7%
The diluted count rose from 272M to 334M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained46%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($210M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $96M, so each retained $1 added about 0.46 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.3B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$768Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $1.4B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	John Lai	$14.7M	$62.8M	$123M
2022	John Lai	$2.0M	−$6.6M	$168M
2023	John Lai	$8.2M	$7.2M	$135M
2024	John Lai	$6.7M	$5.3M	$167M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership69%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio206:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$27M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Mister Car Wash is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?22.7%
Diluted shares grew 22.7% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $1M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
RRyder System	$12.7B	77%	8.0%	6%	4%
DRVNDriven Brands Holdings Inc.	$1.9B	—	11.4%	5%	9%
MNROMonro Inc.	$1.2B	—	6.9%	8%	9%
MCWMister Car Wash	$1.1B	—	19.0%	8%	16%
UHALU-Haul Holding	$761M	96%	39.3%	8%	-29%
EVGOEVgo Inc.	$384M	-2%	-184.6%	—	-114%
Group median	—	—	9.7%	8%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Mister Car Wash has delivered.

Mister Car Wash’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Mister Car Wash earns about $170M on its 16.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($170M) Net of stock comp (−$27M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($190M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $31M on 329M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $735M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($247M) runs well above depreciation ($91M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $190M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh MCW against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Mister Car Wash (MCW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MCW, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MCS its page in the Manual MCY →

Industry order: ← LAD the Auto Dealers & Services chapter MNRO →