← All companies ← NFG Manual NGL → ← MCS Entertainment & Studios RSVR →
NFLX, Netflix Inc.
Netflix sells a streaming subscription — TV series, films, games, and live programming, in many genres and languages — to paying members around the world. It pays up front to make and license that content, a large and largely fixed bill, then earns it back across the whole base of members who watch. The more members carry the same content bill, the better the economics of each one.
Our revenues are primarily derived from monthly membership fees for services related to streaming content to our members.
In attempting to win these moments of truth with our members, we seek to continually improve our service, including both our technology and our content offerings.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Content is a largely fixed cost laid down before a single subscriber sees it, so the economics turn on spreading that bill across a large enough base. Watch three levers: members — net additions set against churn; the price the service can charge; and how far content spend stretches across the member base as it scales. The test that matters is pricing power — whether Netflix can raise the price without sending members for the door — set against a crowded field of rival streamers and a content arms race that pressures spend. The bad case is plain: a field that bids up the cost of content while the price will not hold and members leak away, a machine squeezed from both ends. The figures are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $8.8B | $11.7B | $15.8B | $20.2B | $25.0B | $29.7B | $31.6B | $33.7B | $39.0B | $45.2B | $46.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 29% | 31% | 37% | 38% | 39% | 42% | 39% | 42% | 46% | 48% | 49% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 4% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 4% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 9% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 7% | 8% | 9% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 8% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $380M | $839M | $1.6B | $2.6B | $4.6B | $6.2B | $5.6B | $7.0B | $10.4B | $13.3B | $13.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.3% | 7.2% | 10.2% | 12.9% | 18.3% | 20.9% | 17.8% | 20.6% | 26.7% | 29.5% | 29.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $187M | $559M | $1.2B | $1.9B | $2.8B | $5.1B | $4.5B | $5.4B | $8.7B | $11.0B | $13.4B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 28% | — | 1% | 9% | 14% | 12% | 15% | 13% | 13% | 14% | 17% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($1.5B) | ($1.8B) | ($2.7B) | ($2.9B) | $2.4B | $393M | $2.0B | $7.3B | $7.4B | $10.1B | $12.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $58M | $72M | $83M | $104M | $116M | $208M | $337M | $357M | $329M | $333M | $352M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($1.9B) | ($2.6B) | ($4.3B) | ($5.3B) | ($865M) | ($5.3B) | ($3.4B) | $1.2B | ($2.0B) | ($1.5B) | ($1.5B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $108M | $173M | $174M | $253M | $498M | $525M | $408M | $349M | $440M | $688M | $756M | CapexCapex |
| 1.2% | 1.5% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 2.0% | 1.8% | 1.3% | 1.0% | 1.1% | 1.5% | 1.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($1.5B) | ($1.9B) | ($2.8B) | ($3.0B) | $2.3B | $184M | $1.6B | $6.9B | $7.0B | $9.8B | $12.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −17.3% | −15.9% | −17.5% | −14.8% | 9.2% | 0.6% | 5.1% | 20.5% | 18.0% | 21.7% | 26.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($1.6B) | ($2.0B) | ($2.9B) | ($3.1B) | $1.9B | ($132M) | $1.6B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $9.5B | $11.9B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −17.9% | −16.8% | −18.1% | −15.6% | 7.7% | −0.4% | 5.1% | 20.5% | 17.7% | 20.9% | 25.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $788M | $757M | $0 | $0 | $17M | $603M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $600M | $0 | $6.0B | $6.3B | $9.1B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 6% | 12% | 13% | 14% | 21% | 22% | 16% | 22% | 28% | 36% | 35% | ROICROIC |
| 7% | 16% | 23% | 25% | 25% | 32% | 22% | 26% | 35% | 41% | 43% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | 16% | 23% | 25% | 25% | 32% | 22% | 26% | 35% | 41% | 43% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.7B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $5.0B | $8.2B | $6.0B | $6.1B | $7.1B | $9.6B | $9.1B | $12.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $313M | $360M | $563M | $674M | $656M | $837M | $672M | $747M | $900M | $901M | $895M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $5.7B | $7.7B | $9.7B | $6.2B | $9.8B | $8.1B | $9.3B | $9.9B | $13.1B | $13.0B | $17.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $4.6B | $5.5B | $6.5B | $6.9B | $7.8B | $8.5B | $7.9B | $8.9B | $10.8B | $11.0B | $12.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.4× | 1.5× | 0.9× | 1.3× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $13.6B | $19.0B | $26.0B | $34.0B | $39.3B | $44.6B | $48.6B | $48.7B | $53.6B | $55.6B | $61.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| $3.4B | $6.5B | $10.4B | $14.8B | $16.3B | $15.4B | $14.4B | $14.5B | $15.6B | $14.5B | $14.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.6B | $3.7B | $6.6B | $9.7B | $8.1B | $9.4B | $8.3B | $7.4B | $6.0B | $5.4B | $2.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.5× | 3.5× | 3.8× | 4.2× | 6.0× | 8.1× | 8.0× | 9.9× | 14.5× | 17.2× | 16.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $2.7B | $3.6B | $5.2B | $7.6B | $11.1B | $15.8B | $20.8B | $20.6B | $24.7B | $26.6B | $31.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.0% | 1.6% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 1.0% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 4.39B | 4.47B | 4.51B | 4.52B | 4.54B | 4.55B | 4.51B | 4.49B | 4.39B | 4.34B | 4.30B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.01 | $2.62 | $3.50 | $4.46 | $5.50 | $6.52 | $7.01 | $7.50 | $8.88 | $10.40 | $10.91 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.04 | $0.13 | $0.27 | $0.41 | $0.61 | $1.12 | $1.00 | $1.20 | $1.98 | $2.53 | $3.11 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.35 | $-0.42 | $-0.61 | $-0.66 | $0.51 | $0.04 | $0.36 | $1.54 | $1.60 | $2.26 | $2.86 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.36 | $-0.44 | $-0.63 | $-0.70 | $0.42 | $-0.03 | $0.36 | $1.54 | $1.58 | $2.18 | $2.77 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.06 | $0.11 | $0.12 | $0.09 | $0.08 | $0.10 | $0.16 | $0.18 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.61 | $0.80 | $1.16 | $1.68 | $2.44 | $3.48 | $4.60 | $4.58 | $5.63 | $6.13 | $7.24 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +20.0%/yr | +13.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +34.7%/yr |
| EPS | +57.4%/yr | +33.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +23.0%/yr | +7.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +29.2%/yr | +20.3%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net income+26.1%
“Net income for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased $2,270 million as compared to the prior comparative period, primarily due to a $2,909 million increase in operating income, driven by a $6,182 million increase in revenues and partially offset by a $2,237 million increase in cost of revenues primarily due to the increase in content amortization and other cost of revenues.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $9.8B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $333M it takes just to hold its position. It put $355M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $9.5B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $11.0B | $8.7B | $5.4B | $4.5B | $5.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$333M | +$329M | +$357M | +$337M | +$208M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$368M | +$273M | +$339M | +$575M | +$403M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$1.5B | −$2.0B | +$1.2B | −$3.4B | −$5.3B |
| Cash from operations | $10.1B | $7.4B | $7.3B | $2.0B | $393M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$333M | −$329M | −$349M | −$408M | −$208M |
| Owner earnings | $9.8B | $7.0B | $6.9B | $1.6B | $184M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$355M | −$111M | — | — | −$316M |
| Free cash flow | $9.5B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $1.6B | ($132M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 22% | 18% | 21% | 5% | 1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $333M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $355M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $368M), owner earnings is nearer $9.4B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 17.2×ComfortableOperating income $13.3B ÷ interest expense $777M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.4B · 0.4× operating profitModest net debtCash $9.0B + ST investments $29M − debt $14.5B
What this means
Netting $9.1B of cash and short-term investments against $14.5B of debt leaves $5.4B owed, about 0.4× a year's operating profit (1.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 6%–36%; 36% latest = NOPAT $11.5B ÷ invested capital $32.0BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 36% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High, recently turned positivelatest $9.8B = operating cash $10.1B − maintenance capex $333M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)Industry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 22% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $368M of SBC) leaves $9.4B.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $10.1B ÷ net income $11.0B
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 5% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $9.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $9.8B
What this means
Of $9.8B Owner Earnings, $9.1B (93%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $9.1B buybacks. Net of $368M stock comp, the real buyback was about $8.8B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.06×ExpandingCapex $688M ÷ depreciation $333M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $45.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.19×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $14.5B vs $2.0B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +1183%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.99/share (latest year $2.61), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.32/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 26% lately, median 18% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 35%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Worst year 2016 · 4.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$12.3B
- Other current assets$4.8B
- Accounts payable$895M
- Other current liabilities$11.2B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $20.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$3.6B · 17%
- Buybacks$22.0B · 106%
- Returned to owners$22.0B
118% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $22.0B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$4.8B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $4.8B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $3.4B to $14.4B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$64.41
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 342M shares were bought for $22.0B, about $64.41 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $41.65 (2023) to $105.47 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($9.1B).
- Net change in share count−2.0%
The diluted count fell from 4387M to 4298M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained52%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($19.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $10.0B, so each retained $1 added about 0.52 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$368M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Netflix Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.50×
Across the record the business reported $41.3B of net income but generated $20.8B of operating cash, a 0.50-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INGMIngram Micro Holding Corporation | $52.6B | 7% | 1.8% | 10% | 0% |
| UBERUber Technologies Inc. | $52.0B | — | -22.0% | -12% | -4% |
| NFLXNetflix Inc. | $45.2B | 39% | 18.1% | 18% | 3% |
| VVisa Inc. | $40.0B | — | 64.4% | 28% | 53% |
| USFDUS Foods | $39.4B | 17% | 2.7% | 8% | 2% |
| WKCWorld Kinect | $36.9B | 3% | 0.5% | 6% | 0% |
| CHSCOCHS Inc. | $35.5B | 3% | 1.2% | 4% | 2% |
| MAMastercard Incorporated | $32.8B | — | 53.2% | 81% | 42% |
| Group median | — | 7% | 2.3% | 9% | 2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Netflix Inc. has delivered.
Netflix Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Netflix Inc. earns about $1.3B on its 2.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $11.9B on 4213M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $2.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($756M) runs well above depreciation ($352M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $12.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← NFG its page in the Manual NGL →
Industry order: ← MCS the Entertainment & Studios chapter RSVR →