Share count
171Mpeak FY2025
← All companies ← MAAS Manual MATH → ← LYV Entertainment & Studios MCS →
MANU, Manchester
A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
£667M
+0.7% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue £667M 5-yr avg £611M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 14% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −1.7%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 1 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| £515M | £581M | £590M | £627M | £509M | £494M | £583M | £648M | £662M | £667M | £667M | RevenueRevenue |
| £69M | £81M | £44M | £50M | £5M | (£37M) | (£87M) | (£11M) | (£69M) | (£18M) | £18M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 13.4% | 13.9% | 7.4% | 8.0% | 1.0% | −7.5% | −15.0% | −1.7% | −10.5% | −2.8% | 2.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| £36M | £39M | (£38M) | £19M | (£23M) | (£92M) | (£116M) | (£29M) | (£113M) | (£33M) | (£9M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 26% | 31% | — | 31% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| £186M | £228M | £95M | £245M | (£4M) | £113M | £96M | £96M | £86M | £73M | £110M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| £10M | £10M | £11M | £12M | £15M | £15M | £14M | £14M | £17M | £17M | £18M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| £140M | £178M | £122M | £214M | £5M | £190M | £198M | £111M | £182M | £89M | £101M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| £5M | £8M | £13M | £14M | £21M | £6M | £8M | £16M | £18M | £45M | £46M | CapexCapex |
| 1.0% | 1.4% | 2.2% | 2.2% | 4.2% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 6.7% | 6.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| £181M | £219M | £82M | £231M | (£19M) | £107M | £88M | £80M | £68M | £56M | £92M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 35.1% | 37.7% | 13.9% | 36.8% | −3.6% | 21.6% | 15.1% | 12.4% | 10.3% | 8.4% | 13.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| £181M | £219M | £82M | £231M | (£25M) | £107M | £88M | £80M | £68M | £28M | £64M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 35.1% | 37.7% | 13.9% | 36.8% | −4.9% | 21.6% | 15.1% | 12.4% | 10.3% | 4.2% | 9.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| £20M | £23M | £22M | £23M | £23M | £11M | £34M | £0 | £0 | £0 | £34M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 22% | 8% | 3% | 6% | — | -5% | -13% | -2% | -9% | -3% | 2% | ROICROIC |
| 8% | 8% | -9% | 5% | -7% | -34% | -91% | -28% | -78% | -17% | -5% | Return on equityROE |
| 4% | 3% | −14% | −1% | −13% | −38% | −117% | −28% | −78% | −17% | −22% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| £229M | £290M | £242M | £308M | £52M | £111M | £121M | £76M | £74M | £86M | £44M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | £104M | £168M | £24M | £116M | £50M | £49M | £31M | £37M | £134M | £124M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | £2M | £1M | £2M | £2M | £2M | £2M | £3M | £4M | £13M | £19M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | £190M | £268M | £230M | £216M | £193M | £221M | £236M | £249M | £359M | £325M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | (£85M) | (£99M) | (£204M) | (£98M) | (£140M) | (£169M) | (£202M) | (£208M) | (£212M) | (£182M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | £399M | £413M | £388M | £225M | £213M | £237M | £194M | £177M | £284M | £259M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | £411M | £461M | £429M | £398M | £384M | £495M | £527M | £495M | £750M | £804M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.0× | 0.9× | 0.9× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.4× | 0.4× | 0.4× | 0.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | £1.5B | £1.5B | £1.5B | £1.4B | £1.3B | £1.3B | £1.3B | £1.3B | £1.6B | £1.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | £498M | £487M | £506M | £520M | £465M | £530M | £507M | £511M | £472M | £481M | Total debtDebt |
| — | £207M | £245M | £198M | £468M | £354M | £409M | £431M | £437M | £386M | £437M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.4× | 3.2× | 1.8× | 2.0× | 0.2× | -1.0× | -1.0× | -0.2× | -1.1× | -0.3× | 0.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| £460M | £480M | £427M | £415M | £351M | £273M | £128M | £104M | £145M | £194M | £191M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 164M | 164M | 164M | 165M | 164M | 163M | 163M | 163M | 165M | 171M | 172M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| £3.14 | £3.54 | £3.59 | £3.81 | £3.10 | £3.03 | £3.58 | £3.98 | £4.00 | £3.90 | £3.87 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| £0.22 | £0.24 | £-0.23 | £0.11 | £-0.14 | £-0.57 | £-0.71 | £-0.18 | £-0.68 | £-0.19 | £-0.05 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| £1.10 | £1.34 | £0.50 | £1.40 | £-0.11 | £0.66 | £0.54 | £0.49 | £0.41 | £0.33 | £0.53 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| £1.10 | £1.34 | £0.50 | £1.40 | £-0.15 | £0.66 | £0.54 | £0.49 | £0.41 | £0.16 | £0.37 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| £0.12 | £0.14 | £0.13 | £0.14 | £0.14 | £0.07 | £0.21 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.19 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| £0.03 | £0.05 | £0.08 | £0.08 | £0.13 | £0.04 | £0.05 | £0.10 | £0.11 | £0.26 | £0.27 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| £2.81 | £2.93 | £2.60 | £2.52 | £2.14 | £1.67 | £0.78 | £0.64 | £0.88 | £1.13 | £1.11 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.4%/yr | +4.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −12.7%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | +26.7%/yr | +15.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | −9.6%/yr | −11.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−3%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.9×peak FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
£56Mowner earningsvs.(£33M)net incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned £56M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the £17M it takes just to hold its position. It put £28M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was £28M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (£33M) | (£113M) | (£29M) | (£116M) | (£92M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +£17M | +£17M | +£14M | +£14M | +£15M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +£89M | +£182M | +£111M | +£198M | +£190M |
| Cash from operations | £73M | £86M | £96M | £96M | £113M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −£17M | −£18M | −£16M | −£8M | −£6M |
| Owner earnings | £56M | £68M | £80M | £88M | £107M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −£28M | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | £28M | £68M | £80M | £88M | £107M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 10% | 12% | 15% | 22% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about £17M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other £28M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income £18M ÷ interest expense £64M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? £437M · 24.2× operating profitHeavy net debtCash £44M − debt £481M
What this means
Netting £44M of cash and short-term investments against £481M of debt leaves £437M owed, about 24.2× a year's operating profit (26.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -13%–22%; 2% latest = NOPAT £14M ÷ invested capital £628MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -4%–38%; latest £92M = operating cash £110M − maintenance capex £18MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. It chose to put £28M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was £64M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income (£9M) · cash from operations £110M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks £34M ÷ Owner Earnings £92M
What this means
Of £92M Owner Earnings, £34M (37%) went back to shareholders, £34M dividends, £0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.53×ExpandingCapex £46M ÷ depreciation £18M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · £667M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.32×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · £481M vs (£545M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 7 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −561%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are £-0.34/share (latest year £-0.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is £1.11/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to −5% lately, median −2% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −12%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 12% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · −15.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.5%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets£259M
- Cash & short-term investments£44M
- Receivables£124M
- Inventory£19M
- Other current assets£71M
Current liabilities£804M
- Accounts payable£325M
- Other current liabilities£479M
Current ratio0.32×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.30×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(£545M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value£191Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases£485M£3M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue£164Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated £1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested£154M · 13%
- Dividends£156M · 13%
- Buybacks£21M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)£882M · 73%
- Returned to owners£177M
16% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, £156M as dividends and £21M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran £21M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count5.2%
The diluted count rose from 164M to 172M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record£0.00/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Peers, Entertainment & Studios
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WMGWarner Music | $6.7B | 47% | 9.2% | 13% | 9% |
| TKOTKO Group Holdings Inc. | $4.7B | — | 17.6% | — | — |
| STUBStubHub Holdings Inc. | $1.7B | — | 7.8% | -73% | 15% |
| ACELAccel Entertainment Inc. | $1.3B | — | 7.7% | 14% | 7% |
| RSIRush Street Interactive Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | -19.3% | — | -1% |
| OSWOneSpaWorld Holdings Limited | $961M | — | 7.2% | 12% | 6% |
| MANUManchester | £667M | — | -0.3% | -2% | 14% |
| LLYVALiberty Live Holdings, Inc. | $382M | 19% | -13.5% | -1% | — |
| Group median | — | — | 7.5% | 5% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Manchester reports in GBP, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that GBP, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in GBP. London quotes print in pence; 364.30p is £3.643. Enter pounds. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Manchester has delivered.
£
Through the cycle, Manchester earns about £97M on its 14.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−15%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow £64M on 172M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt £437M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (£46M) runs well above depreciation (£18M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about £92M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Manchester (MANU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MANU, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MAAS its page in the Manual MATH →
Industry order: ← LYV the Entertainment & Studios chapter MCS →