Share count
40Mpeak FY2024
← All companies ← MNSO Manual MOB → ← MMS Commercial Services & Supplies MSCI →
MNY, MoneyHero Limited
A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
$80M
−1.4% YoY · 9% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $80M 4-yr avg $73M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −51% through the cycle on a 46% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −177 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −702%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 5 regions, the largest Singapore at 39%.
Revenue by geography, FY2024
- Singapore39%$31M
- Hong Kong SAR China38%$30M
- Philippines16%$13M
- Taiwan6%$5M
- Malaysia0%$197K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMDec 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $62M | $68M | $81M | $80M | $80M | RevenueRevenue |
| 52% | 50% | 46% | 42% | 42% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($29M) | ($41M) | ($30M) | ($40M) | ($40M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −47.2% | −60.1% | −37.2% | −50.5% | −50.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $31M | $49M | $173M | $38M | $38M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| -0% | -1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($14M) | ($15M) | ($17M) | ($25M) | ($25M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $336K | $328K | $218K | $309K | $309K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($46M) | ($64M) | ($190M) | ($63M) | ($63M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $282K | $255K | $117K | $338K | $338K | CapexCapex |
| 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($15M) | ($15M) | ($17M) | ($25M) | ($25M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −23.7% | −21.8% | −21.3% | −31.7% | −31.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($15M) | ($15M) | ($17M) | ($25M) | ($25M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −23.7% | −21.8% | −21.3% | −31.7% | −31.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | -8372% | -287% | -702% | -277% | ROICROIC |
| 382% | 312% | 218% | 78% | 78% | Return on equityROE |
| 382% | 312% | 218% | 78% | 78% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $9M | $24M | $69M | $43M | $43M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $10M | $17M | $14M | $14M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $17M | $33M | $30M | $30M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($7M) | ($16M) | ($17M) | ($17M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $49M | $107M | $78M | $78M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $39M | $36M | $32M | $32M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.2× | 3.0× | 2.4× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $4M | — | — | — | $4M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $9M | — | — | $9M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($15M) | — | — | ($34M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -17.2× | -5.3× | -1.6× | -1577.9× | -1577.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $8M | $16M | $79M | $48M | $48M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 216K | 483K | 9.6M | 40.4M | 43.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $286.52 | $141.15 | $8.37 | $1.97 | $1.82 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $143.21 | $102.43 | $17.92 | $0.94 | $0.87 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-67.91 | $-30.79 | $-1.78 | $-0.62 | $-0.58 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-67.91 | $-30.79 | $-1.78 | $-0.62 | $-0.58 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.30 | $0.53 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $37.51 | $32.78 | $8.21 | $1.19 | $1.11 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.23 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×19.96 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×4.19 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −81.0%/yr | −81.0%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | −81.3%/yr | −81.3%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −81.4%/yr | −81.4%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −68.3%/yr | −68.3%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−702%low FY2022
Gross margin
42%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($25M)owner earningsvs.$38Mnet incomelow FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business reported $38M of profit but ($25M) of owner earnings: $63M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $38M | $173M | $49M | $31M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$309K | +$218K | +$328K | +$336K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$63M | −$190M | −$64M | −$46M |
| Cash from operations | ($25M) | ($17M) | ($15M) | ($14M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$338K | −$117K | −$255K | −$282K |
| Owner earnings | ($25M) | ($17M) | ($15M) | ($15M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -32% | -21% | -22% | -24% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Much of fiscal 2024's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“Internal Control Over Financial Reporting In connection with the audits of our consolidated financial statements included in this annual report, we identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -1577.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($40M) ÷ interest expense $25K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $43M − debt $9M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $34M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 62 + DIO 0 − DPO 239 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle3-yr median, range -8372%–-287%; -277% latest = NOPAT ($40M) ÷ invested capital $14MIndustry peers: median -2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran -277% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle4-yr median margin, range -32%–-21%; latest ($25M) = operating cash ($25M) − maintenance capex $338KIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -32% of revenue this year, a -24% median across 4 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? -0.66×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($25M) ÷ net income $38M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.09×MaintainingCapex $338K ÷ depreciation $309K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $80M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.44×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $9M vs $46M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.99/share (latest year $0.87), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.11/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 4
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin −54% → −44% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −54% early to −44% lately, median −51% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · −60.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2024Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$78M
- Cash & short-term investments$43M
- Receivables$14M
- Other current assets$22M
Current liabilities$32M
- Accounts payable$30M
- Other current liabilities$2M
Current ratio2.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.44×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.32×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$46Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway1.7 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$44Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$9M$736K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLYWFlywire | $623M | — | -6.6% | -9% | 8% |
| IMXIInternational Money Express Inc. | $608M | — | 14.5% | 40% | 6% |
| LQDTLiquidity Services Inc. | $477M | — | 6.4% | 37% | 12% |
| PHRPhreesia Inc. | $468M | — | -17.3% | -36% | -7% |
| SEZLSezzle Inc. | $236M | — | -5.4% | -141% | 14% |
| ASPSAltisource Portfolio Solutions S.A. | $171M | 26% | 2.4% | 5% | -3% |
| CASSCass Information Systems Inc | $108M | — | 35.6% | — | 29% |
| MNYMoneyHero Limited | $80M | 48% | -48.9% | -702% | -23% |
| Group median | — | — | -1.5% | -9% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. MoneyHero Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
MoneyHero Limited is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered10%/yr’21→’24
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−32%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MoneyHero Limited (MNY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MNY, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MNSO its page in the Manual MOB →
Industry order: ← MMS the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter MSCI →