Owner Scorecard


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NCMI, National CineMedia Inc.

Advertising & Marketing asset-light UnprofitableCyclical

CineMedia is the largest cinema advertising platform in the U.S.

With unparalleled reach and scale, NCM connects brands to sought-after young, diverse audiences through the power of movies and pop culture.

A premium video, full-funnel marketing solution for advertisers, NCM enhances advertisers' ability to measure and drive results.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
NCMI · National CineMedia Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$243M
+1.0% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $242M 5-yr avg $203M
Gross margin 94% 5-yr avg 94%
Operating margin −7.0% 5-yr avg −17.5%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −5%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg −18%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg −18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by National advertising revenue (80%) and Local Advertising Revenue (14%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 39% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −5.7%) on a 94% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 25% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

National advertising revenue is 80% of revenue, with Local Advertising Revenue the other meaningful line at 14%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • National advertising revenue80%$195M
  • Local Advertising Revenue14%$35M
  • ESA advertising revenue from beverage concessionaire agreements6%$14M
  • Barter Transaction Revenue1%$3M
  • Management Fee Reimbursement0%$0

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$448M$426M$441M$445M$90M$115M$249M$165M$241M$243M$242MRevenueRevenue
94%94%95%94%Gross marginGross mgn
10%9%11%10%34%31%18%35%21%19%19%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%0%1%2%1%2%2%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$173M$154M$154M$161M($61M)($69M)$7M($27M)($20M)($14M)($17M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
38.7%36.1%35.0%36.3%−67.5%−59.9%2.8%−16.5%−8.1%−5.7%−7.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$33M$58M$30M$36M($65M)($49M)($29M)$705M($22M)($11M)($9M)Net incomeNet inc.
30%44%26%0%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$134M$139M$150M$144M$55M($95M)($47M)($7M)$60M$8M$21MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$36M$11M$13M$14M$13M$11M$7M$7MDepreciationDeprec.
$47M$58M$100M$88M$105M($66M)($32M)($716M)$70M$10M$14MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$13M$12M$14M$14M$8M$6M$3M$3M$6M$6M$5MCapexCapex
2.9%2.7%3.2%3.1%8.8%5.0%1.2%2.0%2.4%2.3%2.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$121M$127M$136M$130M$47M($101M)($50M)($10M)$55M$3M$15MOwner earningsOwner earn.
26.9%29.9%30.8%29.1%52.3%−88.0%−20.1%−6.1%22.6%1.2%6.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$121M$127M$136M$130M$47M($101M)($50M)($10M)$55M$3M$15MFree cash flowFCF
26.9%29.9%30.8%29.1%52.3%−88.0%−20.1%−6.1%22.6%1.2%6.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$200K$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$55M$59M$54M$54M$32M$17M$10M$500K$300K$11M$11MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$13M$22MBuybacksBuybacks
22%15%17%24%-8%-12%1%-7%-4%-3%-4%ROICROIC
162%-5%-3%-2%Return on equityROE
162%−5%−6%−6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$69M$60M$76M$81M$182M$103M$63M$35M$75M$35M$49MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$161M$161M$150M$171M$16M$53M$92M$97M$85M$97M$70MReceivablesReceiv.
$17M$19M$18M$21M$14M$16M$25M$22M$23M$26M$26MAccounts payablePayables
$143M$141M$132M$150M$3M$37M$67M$75M$62M$70M$44MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$221M$213M$231M$254M$200M$158M$164M$144M$178M$138M$126MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$121M$110M$111M$120M$50M$70M$1.2B$58M$74M$62M$69MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.9×2.1×2.1×4.0×2.3×0.1×2.5×2.4×2.2×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$500K$500KGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$886M$817M$792M$568M$569M$491M$469MTotal assetsAssets
$924M$923M$924M$927M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$10M$10M$12M$12MTotal debtDebt
$856M$864M$848M$846M$871M$995M$1.1B($25M)($65M)($23M)($37M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($358M)($363M)($368M)($380M)($473M)($527M)($515M)$435M$411M$375M$345MShareholders’ equityEquity
4.1%2.6%1.8%1.2%2.4%7.1%2.8%2.7%5.1%3.8%3.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
3.0M7.6M7.9M7.8M7.8M8.0M8.2M48.6M95.9M94.2M93.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$147.71$56.41$56.09$57.19$11.60$14.35$30.40$3.40$2.51$2.58$2.60Revenue / shareRev/sh
$10.86$7.72$3.79$4.64$-8.39$-6.10$-3.50$14.52$-0.23$-0.11$-0.09EPS (diluted)EPS
$39.80$16.85$17.29$16.66$6.07$-12.63$-6.12$-0.21$0.57$0.03$0.16Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$39.80$16.85$17.29$16.66$6.07$-12.63$-6.12$-0.21$0.57$0.03$0.16Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$18.02$7.77$6.91$6.89$4.10$2.12$1.16$0.01$0.00$0.12$0.12Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.26$1.54$1.80$1.80$1.03$0.71$0.35$0.07$0.06$0.06$0.06Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-118.21$-47.99$-46.76$-48.79$-60.69$-65.95$-62.87$8.95$4.29$3.99$3.70Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.49 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×1/2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before 2022 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×5.93 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.97 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
10-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−33.3%/yr−29.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−51.3%/yr
Dividends / share−39.4%/yr−43.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−34.8%/yr−39.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
94Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
−3%low FY2021
Gross margin
95%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3Mowner earningsvs.($11M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $11M loss into $3M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($11M)($22M)$705M($29M)($49M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$7M+$11M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$9M+$12M+$5M+$7M+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$10M+$70M−$716M−$32M−$66M
Cash from operations$8M$60M($7M)($47M)($95M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$6M−$6M−$3M−$3M−$6M
Owner earnings$3M$55M($10M)($50M)($101M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%23%-6%-20%-88%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer ($7M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $35M + ST investments $100K − debt $12M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $23M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $300K in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $23M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 145 + DIO 0 − DPO 733 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -12%–24%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($11M) ÷ invested capital $353M
    Industry peers: median 0%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -88%–52%; latest $3M = operating cash $8M − maintenance capex $6M
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 23% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves ($7M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($11M) · cash from operations $8M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $33M ÷ Owner Earnings $3M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $3M of Owner Earnings, $33M (1193%) went back to shareholders, $11M dividends, $22M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $9M stock comp, the real buyback was about $13M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.86×
    Maintaining
    Capex $6M ÷ depreciation $7M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $243M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.22×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $12M vs $76M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +456%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.39/share (latest year $-0.11), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 37% → −10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 37% early to −10% lately, median −6% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −67.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$126M
  • Cash & short-term investments$49M
  • Receivables$70M
  • Other current assets$7M
Current liabilities$69M
  • Accounts payable$26M
  • Other current liabilities$43M
Current ratio1.82×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.82×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$57Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 1.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$44Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$2MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$22M$10M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$26Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$0
'28$12M
'29$0
'30$0

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$12Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$12Mthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $12M of debt in all

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Jan 1, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2026

Over the record, the business generated $541M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$84M · 16%
  • Dividends$292M · 54%
  • Buybacks$35M · 6%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$130M · 24%
  • Returned to owners$327M

    72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $292M as dividends and $35M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $912M and cash and short-term investments fell $500K.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$5.32

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $35M, about $5.32 each.

  • Net change in share count2975.9%

    The diluted count rose from 3M to 93M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.12/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 43% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−31%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($360M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $112M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.31 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$309M63% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$200Kover 10 years buying other businesses, against $84M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$2.7M$1.4M($101M)
2022$2.6M$706k($50M)
2023$4.6M$4.9M($10M)
2024$9.7M$11.2M$55M
2025$2.7M−$3.5M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$9M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why National CineMedia Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2026.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.9% vs 29.2%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 29.2% early in the record and 5.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?2975.9%

    Diluted shares grew 2975.9% over 2016–2026, even as the company spent $35M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.79×

    Across the record the business reported $687M of net income but generated $541M of operating cash, a 0.79-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Advertising & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GRPNGroupon Inc.$498M49%0.3%1%
IBTAIbotta Inc.$342M83%3.7%26%16%
MNTNMNTN Inc.$290M77%8.3%20%
INODInnodata Inc.$252M-0.8%-1%3%
AIC3.ai Inc.$250M67%-80.5%-36%-37%
NCMINational CineMedia Inc.$243M94%-1.5%-1%25%
OSPNOneSpan Inc.$243M68%1.4%1%5%
WEAVWeave Communications Inc.$239M63%-35.0%-111%-10%
Group median68%-0.2%-1%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what National CineMedia Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, National CineMedia Inc. earns about $60M on its 24.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’26−14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $15M on 94M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-07; net cash $37M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "National CineMedia Inc. (NCMI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NCMI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NCLH its page in the Manual NCNO →

Industry order: ← MNTN the Advertising & Marketing chapter OMC →