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IBTA, Ibotta Inc.

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Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

IBTA · Ibotta Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$342M

−6.8% YoY · 18% 3-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average

Revenue $340M 4-yr avg $310M

Gross margin 78% 4-yr avg 82%

Operating margin −2.6% 4-yr avg 1.4%

ROIC −5% 4-yr avg 63%

Owner-earnings margin 28% 4-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 25% 4-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 17% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.2%) on a 79% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 26%, above 15% in 2 of 3 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2022–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
					Income statement
$211M	$320M	$367M	$342M	$340M	RevenueRevenue
78%	86%	86%	79%	78%	Gross marginGross mgn
23%	16%	23%	26%	27%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
20%	16%	17%	18%	17%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($40M)	$56M	$28M	($841K)	($9M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−19.1%	17.5%	7.6%	−0.2%	−2.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($55M)	$38M	$69M	$4M	($7M)	Net incomeNet inc.
					Cash flow & returns
($56M)	$23M	$116M	$95M	$106M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$6M	$7M	$8M	$8M	$9M	DepreciationDeprec.
($14M)	($29M)	($8M)	$39M	$57M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$785K	$548K	$871K	$20M	$21M	CapexCapex
0.4%	0.2%	0.2%	5.9%	6.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($57M)	$22M	$115M	$87M	$97M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−27.2%	6.9%	31.3%	25.4%	28.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($57M)	$22M	$115M	$75M	$84M	Free cash flowFCF
−27.2%	6.9%	31.3%	21.9%	24.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$25K	$0	$31M	$233M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	163%	26%	-0%	-5%	ROICROIC
—	136%	15%	1%	-3%	Return on equityROE
—	136%	15%	1%	−3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
					Balance sheet
$18M	$63M	$349M	$187M	$165M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$226M	$221M	$209M	$183M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$9M	$7M	$11M	$7M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$218M	$214M	$198M	$176M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$298M	$582M	$408M	$361M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$198M	$204M	$208M	$201M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.5×	2.8×	2.0×	1.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$320M	$678M	$526M	$480M	Total assetsAssets
—	$64M	$0	$0	$0	Total debtDebt
—	$2M	($349M)	($187M)	($165M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($35M)	$28M	$457M	$288M	$249M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
3.1%	2.2%	12.8%	12.9%	13.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
					Per share
26.0M	26.9M	26.9M	30.1M	24.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$8.10	$11.89	$13.67	$11.37	$14.09	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.11	$1.42	$2.56	$0.12	$-0.30	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.20	$0.82	$4.28	$2.89	$4.01	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.20	$0.82	$4.28	$2.49	$3.49	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03	$0.02	$0.03	$0.67	$0.89	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-1.34	$1.04	$17.02	$9.56	$10.31	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	3-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+12.0%/yr	+12.0%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	+181.7%/yr	+181.7%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2022–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

30Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−0%low FY2025

Gross margin

79%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$87Mowner earningsvs.$4Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2023FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $87M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $8M it takes just to hold its position. It put $12M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $75M.

Reported net income$4M

Owner earnings$87M · 25% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$4M	$69M	$38M	($55M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$8M	+$8M	+$7M	+$6M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$44M	+$47M	+$7M	+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$39M	−$8M	−$29M	−$14M
Cash from operations	$95M	$116M	$23M	($56M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$8M	−$871K	−$548K	−$785K
Owner earnings	$87M	$115M	$22M	($57M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$12M	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$75M	$115M	$22M	($57M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	25%	31%	7%	-27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $8M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $12M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $44M), owner earnings is nearer $43M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$187M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $187M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $187M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 167d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 222 + DIO 0 − DPO 56 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 26%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

3-yr median, range -0%–163%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($421K) ÷ invested capital $101M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid through the cycle

4-yr median margin, range -27%–31%; latest $87M = operating cash $95M − maintenance capex $8M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 25% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 4 years. It chose to put $12M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $75M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $44M of SBC) leaves $43M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 26.65×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $95M ÷ net income $4M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 268%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $233M ÷ Owner Earnings $87M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $87M of Owner Earnings, $233M (268%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $233M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $44M stock comp, the real buyback was about $189M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 2.44×

Expanding

Capex $20M ÷ depreciation $8M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $342M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.96×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $200M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.52/share (latest year $0.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.91/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2022–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 4

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −1% → 4% (2-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −1% early to 4% lately, median −0% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2022 · −19.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“For example, rapid changes in AI/ML or the development of groundbreaking technological innovations in AI/ML, or innovations that would render AI/ML obsolete, could harm our AI/ML offerings.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$361M

Cash & short-term investments$165M
Receivables$183M
Other current assets$13M

Current liabilities$201M

Accounts payable$7M
Other current liabilities$194M

Current ratio1.80×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.80×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.82×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$160Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.8× → 1.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$249Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$130MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$26M$26M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2022–2025

Over the record, the business generated $177M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$22M · 13%
Buybacks$264M · 149%

Returned to owners$264M
158% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $264M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$109M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $109M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $264M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−7.2%
The diluted count fell from 26M to 24M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$44M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 13% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ibotta Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.

None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Advertising & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GRPNGroupon Inc.	$498M	49%	0.3%	—	1%
CCSIConsensus Cloud Solutions Inc.	$350M	83%	43.0%	24%	30%
TBRGTruBridge Inc.	$347M	52%	6.5%	6%	9%
DSPViant Technology Inc.	$344M	46%	1.2%	-8%	13%
AMPLAmplitude Inc.	$343M	70%	-32.2%	-77%	-4%
IBTAIbotta Inc.	$342M	83%	3.7%	26%	16%
MNTNMNTN Inc.	$290M	77%	8.3%	20%	—
NCMINational CineMedia Inc.	$243M	94%	-1.5%	-1%	25%
Group median	—	74%	2.4%	6%	13%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ibotta Inc. has delivered.

Ibotta Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Ibotta Inc. earns about $55M on its 16.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 25.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($55M) Net of stock comp (−$47M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($97M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+84%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $84M on 24M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $165M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($21M) runs well above depreciation ($9M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $97M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh IBTA against another business →

The owners of IBTA: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ibotta Inc. (IBTA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IBTA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IBRX its page in the Manual ICE →

Industry order: ← CRTO the Advertising & Marketing chapter IPG →