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GRPN, Groupon Inc.

E-Commerce & Marketplaces asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Groupon is a global scaled two-sided marketplace that connects consumers to merchants.

Consumers access our marketplace through our mobile applications and our websites, which are primarily localized groupon.com sites in thirteen countries.

We operate in two segments, North America and International, and in three categories, Local, Goods and Travel.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GRPN · Groupon Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$498M

+1.2% YoY · −19% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $498M 5-yr avg $614M

Operating margin 3.7% 5-yr avg −5.1%

Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg −9%

Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg −9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −0.5% through the cycle on a 53% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −21 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.0B	$2.8B	$2.6B	$2.2B	$1.4B	$967M	$599M	$515M	$493M	$498M	$498M	RevenueRevenue
42%	47%	50%	53%	48%	76%	—	—	—	—	—	Gross marginGross mgn
33%	32%	33%	36%	43%	53%	80%	68%	60%	55%	56%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($100M)	$29M	$54M	$40M	($277M)	($5M)	($168M)	($18M)	$9M	$24M	$18M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−3.3%	1.0%	2.0%	1.8%	−19.6%	−0.5%	−28.0%	−3.5%	1.8%	4.7%	3.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($195M)	$14M	($11M)	($22M)	($288M)	$119M	($238M)	($55M)	($59M)	($84M)	($104M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$118M	$128M	$191M	$71M	($64M)	($124M)	($136M)	($78M)	$56M	$64M	$55M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$117M	$115M	$101M	$91M	$78M	$64M	$54M	$43M	$28M	$17M	$16M	DepreciationDeprec.
$81M	($83M)	$36M	($79M)	$108M	($340M)	$17M	($80M)	$60M	$93M	$100M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$68M	$59M	$70M	$67M	$49M	$50M	$36M	$19M	$15M	$15M	$14M	CapexCapex
2.3%	2.1%	2.6%	3.0%	3.4%	5.1%	6.0%	3.7%	3.1%	2.9%	2.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$50M	$69M	$121M	$4M	($112M)	($174M)	($172M)	($97M)	$41M	$50M	$40M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.7%	2.4%	4.6%	0.2%	−7.9%	−17.9%	−28.7%	−18.9%	8.2%	10.0%	8.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$50M	$69M	$121M	$4M	($112M)	($174M)	($172M)	($97M)	$41M	$50M	$40M	Free cash flowFCF
1.7%	2.4%	4.6%	0.2%	−7.9%	−17.9%	−28.7%	−18.9%	8.2%	10.0%	8.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$58M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$165M	$61M	$10M	$46M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-74%	6%	-3%	-6%	-267%	57%	-2804%	—	-145%	—	—	Return on equityROE
−74%	6%	−3%	−6%	−267%	57%	n/m	—	−145%	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$863M	$907M	$851M	$751M	$851M	$499M	$281M	$142M	$229M	$296M	$244M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$71M	$98M	$69M	$55M	$43M	$37M	$45M	$50M	$34M	$26M	$20M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$31M	$26M	$34M	$25M	$1M	—	—	—	—	—	$1M	InventoryInvent.
$29M	$32M	$38M	$20M	$33M	$22M	$60M	$15M	$11M	$9M	$8M	Accounts payablePayables
$74M	$92M	$65M	$60M	$11M	$15M	($15M)	$35M	$23M	$17M	$13M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B	$1.1B	$999M	$888M	$934M	$588M	$367M	$256M	$315M	$374M	$302M	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.2B	$1.1B	$957M	$822M	$939M	$631M	$531M	$369M	$305M	$384M	$374M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×	0.9×	1.0×	1.1×	1.0×	0.9×	0.7×	0.7×	1.0×	1.0×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$275M	$287M	$325M	$325M	$215M	$216M	$179M	$179M	$179M	$179M	$179M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$793M	$571M	$613M	$670M	$596M	Total assetsAssets
$179M	$190M	$202M	$215M	$229M	$223M	$225M	$226M	$246M	$343M	$308M	Total debtDebt
($684M)	($717M)	($650M)	($536M)	($621M)	($275M)	($56M)	$85M	$17M	$47M	$64M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-6.3×	1.4×	2.5×	1.7×	-8.3×	-0.3×	-11.7×	-1.2×	1.0×	1.7×	1.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$264M	$251M	$381M	$394M	$108M	$210M	$8M	($41M)	$41M	($43M)	($63M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
3.8%	2.9%	2.5%	3.7%	2.8%	3.4%	5.0%	2.8%	5.4%	7.6%	8.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
28.8M	28.4M	28.3M	28.4M	28.6M	33.5M	30.2M	31.2M	39.2M	40.3M	40.5M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$104.58	$100.06	$93.09	$78.21	$49.53	$28.86	$19.86	$16.48	$12.57	$12.37	$12.30	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-6.75	$0.49	$-0.39	$-0.79	$-10.07	$3.54	$-7.88	$-1.77	$-1.51	$-2.07	$-2.55	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.74	$2.43	$4.28	$0.14	$-3.93	$-5.18	$-5.71	$-3.11	$1.04	$1.24	$0.99	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.74	$2.43	$4.28	$0.14	$-3.93	$-5.18	$-5.71	$-3.11	$1.04	$1.24	$0.99	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.37	$2.08	$2.46	$2.37	$1.70	$1.48	$1.20	$0.62	$0.39	$0.36	$0.36	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.18	$8.83	$13.46	$13.89	$3.76	$6.26	$0.28	$-1.30	$1.04	$-1.06	$-1.54	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/20 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−21.1%/yr	−24.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−3.7%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−18.8%/yr	−26.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

40Mpeak FY2025

Gross margin

76%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.9×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$50Mowner earningsvs.($84M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $84M loss into $50M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($84M)	($59M)	($55M)	($238M)	$119M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$17M	+$28M	+$43M	+$54M	+$64M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$38M	+$27M	+$14M	+$30M	+$33M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$93M	+$60M	−$80M	+$17M	−$340M
Cash from operations	$64M	$56M	($78M)	($136M)	($124M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$15M	−$15M	−$19M	−$36M	−$50M
Owner earnings	$50M	$41M	($97M)	($172M)	($174M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	10%	8%	-19%	-29%	-18%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $38M), owner earnings is nearer $12M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.7×

Thin

Operating income $24M ÷ interest expense $14M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $47M · 2.0× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $296M − debt $343M

What this means
Netting $296M of cash and short-term investments against $343M of debt leaves $47M owed, about 2.0× a year's operating profit (14.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $10M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $36M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -40d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 19 + DIO 10 − DPO 69 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median -1%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 0%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -29%–10%; latest $50M = operating cash $64M − maintenance capex $15M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $38M of SBC) leaves $12M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $64M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($84M) · cash from operations $64M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $50M

What this means
Of $50M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.85×

Maintaining

Capex $15M ÷ depreciation $17M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $498M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.98×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $343M vs ($9M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.74/share (latest year $-2.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −0% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −0% early, 1% lately, median −0%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · −28.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If we cannot claim ownership of AI-generated assets, our ability to prevent competitors from copying our content may be diminished.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$302M

Cash & short-term investments$234M
Receivables$20M
Inventory$1M
Other current assets$47M

Current liabilities$374M

Debt due within a year$46M
Accounts payable$8M
Other current liabilities$320M

Current ratio0.81×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.80×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.63×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($72M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$46M due · $234M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($244M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($356M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$314M$6M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $228M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$448M · 197%
Buybacks$282M · 124%

Returned to owners$282M
$0 as dividends and $282M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$502M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $502M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $179M to $308M, and cash and short-term investments drew down $629M.
Average price paid for buybacks$3.25
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $46M, about $3.25 each.
Net change in share count40.7%
The diluted count rose from 29M to 41M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$182M27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$73Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $448M of capital spent building

$145M written down across 2 years (2020, 2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$9.4M	$9.7M	($174M)
2021	$6.5M	$2.3M	($174M)
2022	$8.7M	−$524k	($172M)
2023	$3.3M	$28.4M	($97M)
2023	$907k	−$1.6M	($97M)
2024	$19.1M	$11.1M	$41M
2025	$745k	$14.0M	$50M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership36.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$38M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 160% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Groupon Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?40.7%
Diluted shares grew 40.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $282M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$179M → $308M
Debt rose from $179M to $308M while owner earnings went from about $80M to ($2M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, E-Commerce & Marketplaces

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CRTOCriteo S.A.	$1.9B	42%	6.3%	17%	9%
NABLN-able Inc.	$511M	83%	12.7%	3%	15%
INTAIntapp	$504M	67%	-9.8%	-23%	6%
GRPNGroupon Inc.	$498M	49%	0.3%	—	1%
PDPagerDuty	$493M	84%	-33.4%	-24%	3%
LIFLife360 Inc.	$489M	76%	-15.2%	-28%	-4%
IBTAIbotta Inc.	$342M	83%	3.7%	26%	16%
NCMINational CineMedia Inc.	$243M	94%	-1.5%	-1%	25%
Group median	—	80%	-0.6%	—	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Groupon Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle (($2M)) Net of stock comp (−$42M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $40M on 38M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $64M. The if-converted diluted count is 41M, 7% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GRPN against another business →

The owners of GRPN: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Groupon Inc. (GRPN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GRPN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GRNT its page in the Manual GS →

Industry order: ← GCT the E-Commerce & Marketplaces chapter HEPS →