Owner Scorecard


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NGG, NATIONAL GRID PLC

Pipelines & Midstream capital-intensive Capital build-out

Revenue is led by New York (38%) and New England (25%), with 4 more segments behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in GBP · 1 ADS = 5 ordinary shares
NGG · NATIONAL GRID PLC
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
£17.5B
−11.9% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue £17.5B 5-yr avg £18.4B
Operating margin 29.5% 5-yr avg 22.6%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 36% 5-yr avg 21%
Free cash flow margin −8% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.
Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 53% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 23% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Capital spending runs about 28% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 7 segments, the largest New York at 38%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • New York38%£6.7B
  • New England25%£4.3B
  • UK Electricity Transmission14%£2.5B
  • UK Electricity Distribution14%£2.4B
  • National Grid Ventures8%£1.4B
  • UK Electricity System Operator6%£1.0B
  • Other1%£116M
By geographyUnited States67%UK38%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMSep 2025
Income statement
£13.2B£15.0B£15.3B£14.9B£13.4B£13.7B£18.4B£21.7B£19.9B£18.4B£17.5BRevenueRevenue
£3.2B£3.2B£3.5B£2.9B£2.3B£2.4B£4.4B£4.9B£4.5B£4.9B£5.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
24.4%21.3%22.9%19.2%17.1%17.6%23.7%22.5%22.5%26.8%29.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
£2.6B£7.8B£3.5B£1.5B£1.3B£1.6B£2.4B£7.8B£2.3B£2.9B£2.9BNet incomeNet inc.
14%5%18%23%18%35%10%27%22%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
£4.3B£4.3B£4.7B£4.4B£4.1B£3.9B£5.5B£6.3B£6.9B£6.8B£7.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
£1.3B£1.5B£1.5B£1.7B£1.4B£1.5B£1.8B£2.0B£2.1B£2.2B£1.6BDepreciationDeprec.
£390M(£5.0B)(£370M)£1.1B£1.4B£751M£1.3B(£3.4B)£2.6B£1.7B£3.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
£2.9B£3.3B£3.7B£3.6B£4.3B£4.2B£5.1B£6.3B£6.9B£8.8B£9.2BCapexCapex
21.6%21.9%24.5%24.3%32.1%30.8%27.6%29.2%34.8%47.8%52.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
£3.0B£2.8B£3.2B£2.7B£2.7B£2.4B£3.7B£4.4B£4.9B£4.6B£6.3BOwner earningsOwner earn.
22.6%18.9%20.9%17.8%20.3%17.5%19.8%20.1%24.6%25.2%35.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
£1.4B£1.0B£972M£754M(£143M)(£333M)£392M£18M£35M(£2.0B)(£1.4B)Free cash flowFCF
10.9%6.8%6.4%5.0%−1.1%−2.4%2.1%0.1%0.2%−10.7%−8.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
£1.3B£1.5B£4.5B£1.2B£892M£1.4B£922M£1.6B£1.7B£1.5B£1.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
£267M£189M£1.0B£0£0BuybacksBuybacks
7%9%5%4%4%5%6%5%5%5%ROICROIC
19%38%19%8%6%8%10%26%8%8%8%Return on equityROE
9%31%−5%2%2%1%6%21%2%4%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
£3.1B£9.9B£3.0B£2.2B£2.1B£2.5B£3.3B£2.8B£4.3B£6.9B£4.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
£2.7B£2.8B£3.2B£3.0B£2.9B£3.7B£3.8B£3.4B£4.1B£2.8BReceivablesReceiv.
£403M£341M£370M£549M£439M£511M£876M£828M£557M£641MInventoryInvent.
£3.3B£3.5B£3.8B£3.6B£3.5B£4.9B£5.1B£4.1B£4.5B£4.3BAccounts payablePayables
(£214M)(£314M)(£246M)(£67M)(£159M)(£689M)(£362M)£167M£177M(£793M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
£13.6B£6.7B£7.9B£5.8B£9.9B£18.0B£9.1B£10.4B£14.3B£8.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
£10.5B£8.7B£9.1B£8.6B£9.4B£24.8B£9.1B£11.4B£10.6B£9.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×0.8×0.9×0.7×1.1×0.7×1.0×0.9×1.3×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
£6.1B£5.0B£5.4B£5.7B£4.6B£9.5B£9.8B£9.7B£9.5B£9.3BGoodwillGoodwill
£65.8B£59.2B£63.4B£67.6B£67.2B£94.9B£92.7B£98.3B£106.7B£103.8BTotal assetsAssets
£23.1B£22.2B£24.3B£26.7B£27.5B£33.3B£40.0B£42.2B£42.9B£42.3BTotal debtDebt
£13.3B£19.2B£22.0B£24.7B£25.0B£30.0B£37.3B£38.0B£35.9B£38.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.3×2.8×3.5×2.5×2.2×2.8×4.1×3.1×2.6×2.7×2.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
£13.6B£20.4B£19.0B£19.5B£19.8B£19.8B£23.8B£29.5B£29.9B£37.8B£37.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
3.77B3.76B3.46B3.39B3.46B3.52B3.60B3.96B3.99B4.71B4.93BShares out (diluted)Shares
£3.50£4.00£4.41£4.41£3.86£3.88£5.13£5.47£4.97£3.90£3.55Revenue / shareRev/sh
£0.69£2.07£1.03£0.45£0.37£0.47£0.65£1.97£0.57£0.62£0.58EPS (diluted)EPS
£0.79£0.75£0.92£0.78£0.78£0.68£1.02£1.10£1.22£0.98£1.27Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
£0.38£0.27£0.28£0.22£-0.04£-0.09£0.11£0.00£0.01£-0.42£-0.29Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
£0.35£0.39£1.30£0.34£0.26£0.40£0.26£0.41£0.43£0.32£0.33Dividends / shareDiv/sh
£0.76£0.88£1.08£1.07£1.24£1.19£1.42£1.60£1.73£1.87£1.88Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
£3.59£5.41£5.49£5.77£5.71£5.63£6.62£7.47£7.48£8.03£7.55Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.2%/yr+0.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+2.5%/yr+4.7%/yr
EPS−1.2%/yr+11.0%/yr
Dividends / share−1.0%/yr+4.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+10.5%/yr+8.5%/yr
Book value / share+9.3%/yr+7.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
4.7Bpeak FY2025
ROIC
5%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.8×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

£4.6Bowner earningsvs.£2.9Bnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned £4.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the £2.2B it takes just to hold its position. It put £6.6B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (£2.0B).

Reported net income£2.9B
Owner earnings£4.6B · 25% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income£2.9B£2.3B£7.8B£2.4B£1.6B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+£2.2B+£2.1B+£2.0B+£1.8B+£1.5B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+£1.7B+£2.6B−£3.4B+£1.3B+£751M
Cash from operations£6.8B£6.9B£6.3B£5.5B£3.9B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−£2.2B−£2.1B−£2.0B−£1.8B−£1.5B
Owner earnings£4.6B£4.9B£4.4B£3.7B£2.4B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−£6.6B−£4.8B−£4.3B−£3.3B−£2.7B
Free cash flow(£2.0B)£35M£18M£392M(£333M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue25%25%20%20%17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about £2.2B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other £6.6B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income £5.2B ÷ interest expense £1.8B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? £38.2B · 7.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash £887M + ST investments £3.2B − debt £42.3B
    What this means

    Netting £4.1B of cash and short-term investments against £42.3B of debt leaves £38.2B owed, about 7.4× a year's operating profit (8.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 4%–9%; 5% latest = NOPAT £3.9B ÷ invested capital £78.6B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 17%–25%; latest £6.3B = operating cash £7.8B − maintenance capex £1.6B
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 36% of revenue this year, a 20% median across 10 years. It chose to put £7.7B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (£1.4B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops £7.8B ÷ net income £2.9B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks £1.6B ÷ Owner Earnings £6.3B
    What this means

    Of £6.3B Owner Earnings, £1.6B (26%) went back to shareholders, £1.6B dividends, £0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 5.93×
    Expanding
    Capex £9.2B ÷ depreciation £1.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · £17.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.97×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · £42.3B vs (£258M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −7%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are £0.83/share (latest year £0.55), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is £7.15/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 23% → 24% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 23% early, 24% lately, median 23%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 17.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +2.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our top three emerging risks at the date of this report are: Emerging risk Impact on strategy Velocity Immediate 3 years Short term 3 5 years* Medium term 5 10 years Geopolitical tensions (business or supply chain disruption) Artificial intelligence (strategic opportunities or disruption) Affordability (customer afford…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Sep 30, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets£8.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments£4.1B
  • Receivables£2.8B
  • Inventory£641M
  • Other current assets£1.4B
Current liabilities£9.2B
  • Accounts payable£4.3B
  • Other current liabilities£4.9B
Current ratio0.97×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.90×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.44×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(£258M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value£24.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(£57.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases£43.1B£829M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue£86Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated £51.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested£49.1B · 96%
  • Dividends£16.5B · 32%
  • Buybacks£1.5B · 3%
  • Returned to owners£18.0B

    52% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, £16.5B as dividends and £1.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−£15.8B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran £15.8B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran £1.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count30.5%

    The diluted count rose from 3774M to 4926M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record£0.32/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained10%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (£15.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew £1.6B, so each retained £1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why NATIONAL GRID PLC is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?30.5%

    Diluted shares grew 30.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent £1.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Pipelines & Midstream

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LNGCheniere Energy Inc.$19.5B45%25.7%19%18%
EIXEdison International$19.3B13.1%4%7%
NGGNATIONAL GRID PLC£17.5B22.5%5%20%
TRGPTarga Resources Inc.$17.0B19%4.0%5%8%
KMIKinder Morgan Inc.$15.2B68%27.8%5%20%
WMBWilliams Companies Inc. (The)$14.9B77%22.1%6%20%
VGVenture Global Inc.$13.8B37.4%10%41%
ETREntergy Corporation$12.9B15.3%5%13%
Group median22.3%5%19%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares (ADSs) and each ADS represents five ordinary”; NATIONAL GRID PLC reports in GBP, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at GBP 1 = $1.349 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in GBP.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what NATIONAL GRID PLC has delivered.

NATIONAL GRID PLC’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, NATIONAL GRID PLC earns about $4.8B on its 20.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 35.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($1.9B) on 1040M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $51.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($12.5B) runs well above depreciation ($2.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $8.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "NATIONAL GRID PLC (NGG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NGG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NFGC its page in the Manual NICE →

Industry order: ← MPLX the Pipelines & Midstream chapter NGL →