What moves the needle: Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median -6%, above 12% in only 2 of 6 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	TTMTTMDec 2024
							Income statement
$612M	$737M	$1.7B	$4.8B	$8.0B	$11.5B	$11.5B	RevenueRevenue
$274M	$354M	$651M	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Noninterest incomeFee inc.
($93M)	($171M)	($165M)	($365M)	$1.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	33%	29%	29%	Effective tax rateTax rate
							Cash flow & returns
—	-1.7%	-0.8%	-1.2%	2.4%	3.9%	3.9%	Return on assetsROA
-15%	-39%	-4%	-7%	16%	26%	26%	Return on equityROE
−15%	−39%	−4%	−7%	16%	26%	26%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
-15%	-40%	-4%	-8%	18%	29%	29%	Return on tangible equityROTCE
							Balance sheet
—	$10.2B	$19.9B	$29.9B	$43.3B	$49.9B	$49.9B	Total assetsAssets
—	$5.6B	$9.7B	$15.8B	$23.7B	$28.9B	$28.9B	DepositsDeposits
—	$831K	$402M	$397M	$398M	$414M	$414M	GoodwillGoodwill
$612M	$438M	$4.4B	$4.9B	$6.4B	$7.6B	$7.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
							Per share
306M	405M	1.60B	4.68B	4.74B	4.79B	4.79B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$-0.30	$-0.42	$-0.10	$-0.08	$0.22	$0.41	$0.41	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.00	$1.08	$2.77	$1.05	$1.35	$1.60	$1.60	Book value / shareBVPS
$2.00	$1.05	$2.48	$0.92	$1.21	$1.44	$1.44	Tangible book / shareTBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.95 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.92 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	5-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.8%/yr	+3.8%/yr
Book value / share	−4.4%/yr	−4.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

4.8Bpeak FY2024

Revenue

$11.5Blow FY2019

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

Return on equity 26%

Very high (≥17%)

Net income $2.0B ÷ equity $7.6B

Industry peers: median 21%

What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
Return on tangible equity 29%

Very high (≥18%)

Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $414M − intangibles $348M)

Industry peers: median 25%

What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
Efficiency ratio —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 39%

What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.

Is it sound?

Capital (equity / assets) 15.3%

Well capitalized

Equity $7.6B ÷ assets $49.9B

What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
Deposit funding 58%

Mostly deposit-funded

Deposits $28.9B ÷ assets $49.9B

What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
Credit cost —

Not enough data

What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our use and provision of solutions powered by artificial intelligence could lead to operational or reputational damage, competitive harm, legal and regulatory risk and additional costs.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	ROE	ROTCE	Efficiency	NII / assets
AXPAmerican Express Company	$72.2B	30%	35%	73%	4.3%
NUNu Holdings Ltd.	$11.5B	-6%	-6%	—	—
DFSDiscover Financial Services	$17.9B	25%	26%	39%	8.6%
BKKTBakkt Inc.	$2.3B	-146%	-252%	—	0.5%
GDOTGreen DOT Corp	$2.0B	5%	13%	—	-0.1%
SOFISoFi Technologies	$3.6B	-6%	-9%	85%	3.6%
SYFSynchrony Financial	$19.0B	21%	25%	27%	15.5%
OMFOneMain Holdings Inc.	$4.9B	23%	48%	39%	15.3%
Group median	—	13%	19%	—	—

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Nu Holdings Ltd. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Nu Holdings Ltd.’s record justifies.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Cost of equity 10% Long-term growth 3%

Tangible book / share, delivered−6%/yr’19→’24

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book—

Justified by the return—

Normalized return on tangible equity−6%

Price / book—

Earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $6.9B on 4792M shares, a −6% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Weigh NU against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Nu Holdings Ltd. (NU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NTR its page in the Manual NVGS →

Industry order: ← NOAH the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter OPY →