Owner Scorecard


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ORI, Old Republic International

Old Republic International Corporation is a Chicago-based holding company engaged in the business of insurance underwriting and related services.

References herein to such segments apply to the Company's subsidiaries engaged in these respective segments of business.

The insurance business is distinguished from most others in that the prices (premiums) charged for most products are set without knowing what the ultimate loss costs will be.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ORI · Old Republic International
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$9.1B
+11.0% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $9.4B 5-yr avg $8.4B
Combined ratio 103% 5-yr avg 100%
Loss ratio 43% 5-yr avg 42%
Return on equity 17% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
It runs an underwriting loss, about a 103% combined ratio, and must earn the difference back on the float. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 5% a year across the record. The float runs about 2.5× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.9B$6.3B$6.3B$7.5B$7.2B$9.3B$8.1B$7.3B$8.2B$9.1B$9.4BRevenueRevenue
$4.9B$5.1B$5.7B$5.9B$6.3B$7.6B$7.3B$6.4B$7.0B$7.8B$7.9BPremiums earnedPremiums
$387M$409M$432M$451M$439M$434M$460M$578M$673M$709M$716MInvestment incomeInv. inc.
$467M$561M$371M$1.1B$559M$1.5B$686M$599M$853M$935M$1.0BNet incomeNet inc.
32%23%15%20%19%20%20%20%20%21%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$637M$453M$761M$936M$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$880M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
≈ 107%≈ 109%≈ 103%≈ 104%≈ 102%≈ 98%≈ 98%≈ 101%≈ 102%≈ 102%≈ 103%Combined ratioCombined
48%48%43%43%40%43%43%43%Loss ratioLoss
10%12%7%18%9%22%11%9%15%16%17%Return on equityROE
6%8%−2%9%5%7%2%5%10%3%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$9.2B$9.2B$9.5B$9.9B$10.7B$11.4B$12.2B$12.5B$13.7B$14.8B$15.0BFloat (reserves)Float
$18.6B$19.4B$19.3B$21.1B$22.8B$25.0B$25.2B$26.5B$27.8B$29.9B$29.6BTotal assetsAssets
$682M$670M$355M$563M$868M$724M$942M$1.2B$1.6B$1.9B$1.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4.5B$4.7B$5.1B$6.0B$6.2B$6.9B$6.2B$6.4B$5.6B$5.9B$5.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
296M299M301M301M299M304M303M285M263M251M249MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.58$1.87$1.23$3.51$1.87$5.05$2.26$2.10$3.24$3.72$4.09EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.65$0.66$1.66$1.79$0.84$3.36$1.91$0.97$1.03$3.11$3.64Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$15.05$15.81$17.10$19.92$20.70$22.70$20.35$22.46$21.37$23.53$23.71Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.9%/yr+8.7%/yr
EPS+10.0%/yr+14.8%/yr
Dividends / share+18.9%/yr+30.1%/yr
Book value / share+5.1%/yr+2.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
251Mpeak FY2021
Revenue
$9.1Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Combined ratio ≈ 102%
    Underwriting loss
    Total benefits, losses and expenses $8.0B ÷ premiums earned $7.8B
    What this means

    The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.

  • Strong
    Net income $935M ÷ equity $5.9B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • 2.5× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $14.8B, 2.5× equity
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • 4.8% on the float
    Net investment income $709M, 4.8% on the float
    What this means

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021Mr. Smiddy$2.4M$3.3M$1.5B
2022Mr. Smiddy$4.5M$5.1M$686M
2023Mr. Smiddy$5.9M$8.8M$599M
2024Mr. Smiddy$7.7M$13.4M$853M
2025Mr. Smiddy$8.2M$12.7M$935M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueCombined ratioLoss ratioROE
ORIOld Republic International$9.1B102%43%11%
VOYAVoya Financial Inc.$8.2B75%11%
AFGAmerican Financial Group$8.2B105%63%16%
FAFFirst American Fin$7.5B12%
GNWGenworth Financial Inc$7.3B2%
BHFBrighthouse Financial Inc.$6.8B2%
JXNJackson Financial Inc.$6.7B9%
THGHanover Insurance Group$6.6B99%64%12%
Group median102%64%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Old Republic International’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered2%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity12%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $5.7B on 243M shares, a 12% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Old Republic International (ORI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ORI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ORCL its page in the Manual ORLY →

Industry order: ← NODK the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter PGR →