Share count
104Mpeak FY2024
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OSW, OneSpaWorld Holdings Limited
OneSpaWorld Holdings Limited is the pre-eminent global operator of health and wellness centers onboard cruise ships and a leading operator of health and wellness centers at destination resorts worldwide.
Our highly trained and experienced staff offer guests a comprehensive suite of premium health, wellness, aesthetics and fitness services and products onboard cruise ships and at destination resorts globally.
Over the last 50 years, we have built our leading market position on our depth of staff expertise, broad and innovative service and product offerings, expansive global recruitment, training and logistics platform, as well as decades-long relationships with cruise line and destination resort partners.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$961M
+7.4% YoY · 51% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $989M 5-yr avg $668M
Revenue $248M +12.7% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 9.2% yr-ago 7.7%
Net income $21M yr-ago $15M
Net margin 8.6% yr-ago 7.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Services (79%) and Products (19%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 6.8% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −219% to 9.0% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Services is 79% of revenue, with Products the other meaningful line at 19%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Services79%$777M
- Products19%$184M
By geographyNot Connected Country94%Other2%United States2%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $507M | $541M | $121M | $144M | $546M | $794M | $895M | $961M | $989M | RevenueRevenue |
| 2% | 2% | 16% | 11% | 3% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $38M | $49M | ($265M) | ($52M) | $15M | $54M | $78M | $82M | $88M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 7.6% | 9.0% | −219.1% | −36.1% | 2.8% | 6.8% | 8.7% | 8.5% | 8.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $31M | $10M | ($288M) | ($69M) | $53M | ($3M) | $73M | $72M | $78M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 14% | 10% | — | — | 1% | — | 5% | 6% | 5% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $70M | $32M | ($37M) | ($35M) | $25M | $63M | $79M | $84M | $83M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $10M | $10M | $24M | $22M | $22M | $22M | $24M | $25M | $26M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $29M | $12M | $222M | $304K | ($64M) | $34M | ($27M) | ($24M) | ($30M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $3M | $5M | $2M | $3M | $5M | $5M | $7M | $15M | $18M | CapexCapex |
| 0.5% | 0.9% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 1.6% | 1.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $67M | $27M | ($39M) | ($38M) | $20M | $58M | $72M | $68M | $65M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 13.3% | 5.1% | −32.0% | −26.4% | 3.6% | 7.3% | 8.1% | 7.1% | 6.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $67M | $27M | ($39M) | ($38M) | $20M | $58M | $72M | $68M | $65M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 13.3% | 5.1% | −32.0% | −26.4% | 3.6% | 7.3% | 8.1% | 7.1% | 6.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $2M | — | — | — | $8M | $17M | $18M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | — | $9M | $19M | $75M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 15% | 21% | -41% | -8% | 3% | — | 12% | 13% | 13% | ROICROIC |
| 14% | — | -90% | -23% | 15% | -1% | 13% | 13% | 14% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −91% | — | — | — | 12% | 10% | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| — | $15M | $42M | $31M | $32M | $28M | $57M | $16M | $16M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $25M | $3M | $19M | $34M | $41M | $46M | $48M | $49M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $32M | $27M | $29M | $40M | $48M | $47M | $59M | $64M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $8M | $9M | $16M | $24M | $32M | $30M | $32M | $25M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $50M | $22M | $33M | $49M | $57M | $63M | $75M | $88M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $81M | $82M | $89M | $118M | $127M | $162M | $138M | $144M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $43M | $37M | $52M | $70M | $81M | $79M | $72M | $57M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.9× | 2.2× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.6× | 2.0× | 1.9× | 2.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $273M | $702M | $689M | $717M | $706M | $746M | $707M | $710M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $352M | $229M | $230M | $213M | $158M | $99M | $84M | $83M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $337M | $188M | $200M | $181M | $131M | $41M | $68M | $67M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | 1.4× | -18.0× | -3.9× | 1.0× | 2.5× | 7.8× | 14.4× | 15.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $225M | ($131M) | $321M | $294M | $366M | $434M | $554M | $543M | $562M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | 4.1% | 7.4% | 2.4% | 1.3% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 0.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | $190M | — | — | $2M | $376K | $3M | $3M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||
| — | — | 74.4M | 90.1M | 95.1M | 97.8M | 105M | 104M | 102M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | — | $1.63 | $1.60 | $5.74 | $8.12 | $8.53 | $9.27 | $9.67 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | $-3.87 | $-0.76 | $0.56 | $-0.03 | $0.69 | $0.69 | $0.76 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | $-0.52 | $-0.42 | $0.21 | $0.59 | $0.69 | $0.66 | $0.63 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | $-0.52 | $-0.42 | $0.21 | $0.59 | $0.69 | $0.66 | $0.63 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | $0.03 | — | — | — | $0.08 | $0.17 | $0.18 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.15 | $0.17 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | — | $4.31 | $3.26 | $3.85 | $4.44 | $5.28 | $5.23 | $5.49 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +41.6%/yr (5-yr) | +41.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +38.6%/yr (5-yr) | +38.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +38.4%/yr (5-yr) | +38.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | +3.9%/yr (5-yr) | +3.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
13%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.0×peak FY2018
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$68Mowner earningsvs.$72Mnet incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2017FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $72M of profit but $68M of owner earnings: $3M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $72M | $73M | ($3M) | $53M | ($69M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$25M | +$24M | +$22M | +$22M | +$22M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$10M | +$9M | +$10M | +$13M | +$11M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$24M | −$27M | +$34M | −$64M | +$304K |
| Cash from operations | $84M | $79M | $63M | $25M | ($35M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$15M | −$7M | −$5M | −$5M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | $68M | $72M | $58M | $20M | ($38M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | 8% | 7% | 4% | -26% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer $58M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 14.4×ComfortableOperating income $82M ÷ interest expense $6M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $73M · 0.9× operating profitModest net debtCash $16M − debt $89M
What this means
Netting $16M of cash and short-term investments against $89M of debt leaves $73M owed, about 0.9× a year's operating profit (1.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median, range -41%–21%; 12% latest = NOPAT $77M ÷ invested capital $615MIndustry peers: median -18%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median margin, range -32%–13%; latest $68M = operating cash $84M − maintenance capex $15MIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves $58M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $84M ÷ net income $72M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $93M ÷ Owner Earnings $68M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $68M of Owner Earnings, $93M (136%) went back to shareholders, $17M dividends, $75M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $10M stock comp, the real buyback was about $65M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.60×HarvestingCapex $15M ÷ depreciation $25M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $961M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.91×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $89M vs $66M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 3 of 8 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.46/share (latest year $0.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.34/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −68% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −68% early to 8% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 58%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −219.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +4.2%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“We have consistently expanded our onboard offerings with innovative and leading-edge service and product introductions, and developed powerful recruiting, training and logistics platforms, increasingly powered by emerging technologies, including generative and agentic artificial …”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$144M
- Cash & short-term investments$16M
- Receivables$49M
- Inventory$64M
- Other current assets$15M
Current liabilities$57M
- Accounts payable$25M
- Other current liabilities$32M
Current ratio2.52×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.40×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.28×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$87Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 2.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($135M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$93M$10M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $281M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$45M · 16%
- Dividends$28M · 10%
- Buybacks$103M · 37%
- Retained (debt / cash)$105M · 37%
- Returned to owners$132M
56% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $28M as dividends and $103M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $103M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count37.6%
The diluted count rose from 74M to 102M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.17/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 126% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$701M99% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity35%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 8 years buying other businesses, against $45M of capital spent building
$196M written down across 4 years (2020, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why OneSpaWorld Holdings Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.6%
Diluted shares grew 37.6% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $103M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?4 of 8 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 4 of the last 8 years, $202M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Hotels & Resorts
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DKNGDraftKings Inc. | $6.1B | 38% | -44.5% | -79% | -15% |
| TKOTKO Group Holdings Inc. | $4.7B | — | 17.6% | — | — |
| STUBStubHub Holdings Inc. | $1.7B | — | 7.8% | -73% | 15% |
| ACELAccel Entertainment Inc. | $1.3B | — | 7.7% | 14% | 7% |
| RSIRush Street Interactive Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | -19.3% | — | -1% |
| OSWOneSpaWorld Holdings Limited | $961M | — | 7.2% | 12% | 6% |
| LLYVALiberty Live Holdings, Inc. | $382M | 19% | -13.5% | -1% | — |
| SEGSeaport Entertainment Group Inc. | $130M | — | -91.7% | -18% | — |
| Group median | — | — | -3.2% | -10% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what OneSpaWorld Holdings Limited has delivered.
OneSpaWorld Holdings Limited’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, OneSpaWorld Holdings Limited earns about $59M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $65M on 102M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $67M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($18M) runs well above depreciation ($26M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $67M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "OneSpaWorld Holdings Limited (OSW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OSW, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← OSS its page in the Manual OTEX →
Industry order: ← MSC the Hotels & Resorts chapter PENN →