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PACB, Pacific Biosciences of California Inc.

Life Sciences Tools & Services capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a premier life science technology company that designs, develops, and manufactures advanced sequencing solutions that enable scientists and clinical researchers to improve their understanding of the genome and ultimately, resolve genetically complex problems.

Our products and technology, which include our HiFi long-read sequencing technology, address a broad set of applications including human germline sequencing, plant and animal sciences, infectious disease and microbiology, oncology, and other emerging applications.

Our focus is on creating some of the world's most advanced sequencing systems to provide our customers with the most complete and accurate view of genomes, transcriptomes, and epigenomes.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PACB · Pacific Biosciences of California Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$160M

+3.9% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $160M 5-yr avg $155M

Gross margin 37% 5-yr avg 32%

Operating margin −83.3% 5-yr avg −244.3%

ROIC −12% 5-yr avg −32%

Owner-earnings margin −73% 5-yr avg −129%

Free cash flow margin −73% 5-yr avg −130%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Consumable (51%), Instrument (34%) and Service and Other (15%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −161% through the cycle on a 37% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 26% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −51%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Consumable at 51%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Consumable51%$82M
Instrument34%$54M
Service And Other15%$24M

By geographyAmericas45%EMEA28%Asia Pacific27%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$91M	$93M	$79M	$91M	$79M	$131M	$128M	$201M	$154M	$160M	$160M	RevenueRevenue
49%	37%	32%	38%	41%	45%	38%	26%	24%	29%	37%	Gross marginGross mgn
53%	63%	81%	83%	92%	95%	125%	85%	114%	88%	83%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
75%	70%	80%	66%	81%	87%	150%	93%	88%	61%	55%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($71M)	($90M)	($101M)	($101M)	($104M)	($210M)	($307M)	($334M)	($474M)	($554M)	($133M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−78.5%	−96.1%	−128.4%	−110.6%	−132.3%	−161.2%	−239.4%	−166.8%	−308.0%	−346.2%	−83.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($74M)	($92M)	($103M)	($84M)	$29M	($181M)	($314M)	($307M)	($310M)	($546M)	($129M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($68M)	($68M)	($66M)	($78M)	$20M	($111M)	($263M)	($259M)	($206M)	($111M)	($112M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$4M	$8M	$7M	$7M	$6M	$7M	$9M	$11M	$14M	$13M	$10M	DepreciationDeprec.
($17M)	($4M)	$6M	($18M)	($34M)	($11M)	($37M)	($36M)	$19M	$381M	($30M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$8M	$10M	$2M	$3M	$1M	$6M	$17M	$9M	$6M	$3M	$4M	CapexCapex
9.0%	11.2%	2.4%	3.1%	1.3%	4.5%	13.1%	4.4%	4.0%	1.7%	2.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($72M)	($78M)	($68M)	($81M)	$18M	($117M)	($273M)	($268M)	($212M)	($114M)	($116M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−79.2%	−83.4%	−86.8%	−89.3%	23.4%	−89.7%	−212.5%	−133.7%	−137.8%	−71.2%	−72.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($76M)	($78M)	($68M)	($81M)	$18M	($117M)	($280M)	($268M)	($212M)	($114M)	($116M)	Free cash flowFCF
−83.9%	−83.4%	−86.8%	−89.3%	23.4%	−89.7%	−218.2%	−133.7%	−137.8%	−71.2%	−72.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$102K	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
-67%	-85%	-73%	-193%	-32%	-14%	-21%	-19%	-34%	-75%	-12%	ROICROIC
-88%	-107%	-90%	-153%	9%	-23%	-56%	-44%	-61%	-10215%	-5434%	Return on equityROE
−88%	−107%	−90%	−153%	9%	−23%	−56%	−44%	−61%	n/m	n/m	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$72M	$63M	$102M	$49M	$319M	$1.0B	$772M	$631M	$390M	$280M	$276M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$11M	$13M	$9M	$15M	$17M	$24M	$19M	$37M	$28M	$35M	$29M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$16M	$23M	$18M	$13M	$14M	$25M	$50M	$57M	$59M	$49M	$51M	InventoryInvent.
$8M	$9M	$7M	$8M	$4M	$11M	$12M	$15M	$17M	$21M	$14M	Accounts payablePayables
$19M	$27M	$20M	$20M	$27M	$38M	$57M	$78M	$70M	$64M	$67M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$109M	$102M	$132M	$81M	$356M	$1.1B	$852M	$742M	$496M	$375M	$370M	Current assetsCur. assets
$34M	$29M	$27M	$49M	$39M	$72M	$263M	$95M	$66M	$73M	$65M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.2×	3.5×	4.9×	1.6×	9.2×	15.4×	3.2×	7.8×	7.5×	5.1×	5.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	$410M	$410M	$462M	$318M	$318M	$318M	GoodwillGoodwill
$138M	$144M	$170M	$148M	$414M	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.3B	$784M	$782M	Total assetsAssets
$16M	$14M	$15M	$16M	—	$896M	$897M	$892M	$647M	$645M	$897M	Total debtDebt
($56M)	($49M)	($88M)	($33M)	—	($148M)	$124M	$261M	$258M	$366M	$621M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-22.0×	-30.7×	-41.7×	-38.5×	-391.0×	-16.8×	-20.9×	-23.3×	-35.4×	-79.6×	-19.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$85M	$86M	$114M	$55M	$335M	$791M	$563M	$701M	$507M	$5M	$2M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
21.6%	21.8%	29.4%	18.0%	22.2%	56.2%	61.3%	36.0%	46.1%	26.0%	23.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
89.1M	106M	135M	153M	175M	204M	225M	254M	288M	300M	306M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.02	$0.88	$0.58	$0.60	$0.45	$0.64	$0.57	$0.79	$0.53	$0.53	$0.52	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.83	$-0.87	$-0.76	$-0.55	$0.17	$-0.89	$-1.40	$-1.21	$-1.07	$-1.82	$-0.42	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.81	$-0.74	$-0.51	$-0.53	$0.11	$-0.57	$-1.21	$-1.06	$-0.74	$-0.38	$-0.38	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.85	$-0.74	$-0.51	$-0.53	$0.11	$-0.57	$-1.25	$-1.06	$-0.74	$-0.38	$-0.38	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.09	$0.10	$0.01	$0.02	$0.01	$0.03	$0.07	$0.03	$0.02	$0.01	$0.01	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.95	$0.81	$0.84	$0.36	$1.92	$3.87	$2.51	$2.77	$1.76	$0.02	$0.01	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−6.9%/yr	+3.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	−22.7%/yr	+8.8%/yr
Book value / share	−35.7%/yr	−60.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Instrument-18.2%
“Instrument Revenue Instrument revenue decreased for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the year ended December 31, 2024 primarily due to a lower number of Revio systems sold—61 units during the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to 97 Revio systems during the year ended December 31, 2024.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
Service And Other+35.7%
“Service and other revenue increased $6.4 million, or 36%, primarily driven by an increase in Revio service contracts.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

300Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−75%low FY2019

Gross margin

29%low FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($114M)owner earningsvs.($546M)net incomelow FY2022

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $546M loss into ($114M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($546M)	($310M)	($307M)	($314M)	($181M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$13M	+$14M	+$11M	+$9M	+$7M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$42M	+$71M	+$72M	+$79M	+$73M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$381M	+$19M	−$36M	−$37M	−$11M
Cash from operations	($111M)	($206M)	($259M)	($263M)	($111M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$3M	−$6M	−$9M	−$9M	−$6M
Owner earnings	($114M)	($212M)	($268M)	($273M)	($117M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$7M	—
Free cash flow	($114M)	($212M)	($268M)	($280M)	($117M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-71%	-138%	-134%	-213%	-90%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $42M), owner earnings is nearer ($156M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -79.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($554M) ÷ interest expense $7M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $617M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $64M + ST investments $216M − debt $897M

What this means
Netting $280M of cash and short-term investments against $897M of debt leaves $617M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 172d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 81 + DIO 157 − DPO 66 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -67%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -193%–-14%; -52% latest = NOPAT ($438M) ÷ invested capital $838M

Industry peers: median -20%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -52% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -89%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -213%–23%; latest ($114M) = operating cash ($111M) − maintenance capex $3M

Industry peers: median -17%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -71% of revenue this year, a -89% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $42M of SBC) leaves ($156M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($111M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($546M) · cash from operations ($111M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.21×

Harvesting

Capex $3M ÷ depreciation $13M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $160M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 5.15×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $897M vs $302M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.25/share (latest year $-1.76), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.02/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −101% → −274% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −101% early to −274% lately, median −161% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −31%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2025 · −346.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$370M

Cash & short-term investments$276M
Receivables$29M
Inventory$51M
Other current assets$13M

Current liabilities$65M

Debt due within a year$182K
Accounts payable$14M
Other current liabilities$52M

Current ratio5.65×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio4.87×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio4.22×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$304Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$182K due · $276M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway2.4 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters8.0× → 5.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($329M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($410M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$956M$59M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$20Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$333M42% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$102Kover 10 years buying other businesses, against $65M of capital spent building

$160M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Christian O. Henry	$2.9M	−$6.4M	($117M)
2022	Christian O. Henry	$6.6M	−$13.1M	($273M)
2023	Christian O. Henry	$8.0M	$10.1M	($268M)
2024	Christian O. Henry	$9.2M	−$6.0M	($212M)
2025	Christian O. Henry	$4.3M	$5.5M	($114M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership3.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio22:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$42M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 26% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Pacific Biosciences of California Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$16M → $897M
Debt rose from $16M to $897M while owner earnings went from about ($73M) to ($198M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?30% → 50% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $27M to $80M while revenue grew 76%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (30% of revenue then, 50% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
COHUCohu Inc	$453M	39%	0.8%	1%	7%
LUNRIntuitive Machines Inc.	$207M	—	-33.6%	—	-17%
PACBPacific Biosciences of California Inc.	$160M	38%	-146.8%	-51%	-88%
BFLYButterfly Network Inc.	$98M	37%	-263.0%	-134%	-179%
LABStandard BioTools Inc.	$85M	50%	-63.7%	-28%	-43%
FEIMFrequency Electronics Inc.	$63M	26%	-8.6%	-6%	2%
AEHRAehr Test Systems	$59M	39%	-11.0%	-13%	-13%
EYPTEyePoint Inc.	$31M	—	-243.5%	-161%	-276%
Group median	—	38%	-48.7%	-28%	-30%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Pacific Biosciences of California Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered14%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−73%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh PACB against another business →

The owners of PACB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Pacific Biosciences of California Inc. (PACB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PACB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PAA its page in the Manual PACK →

Industry order: ← ONMD the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter PSNL →