Owner Scorecard


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SEB, Seaboard Corporation

Agricultural Products capital-intensive

Seaboard's operations are heavily commodity-driven and financial performance for certain segments is cyclical based on respective global commodity markets and trends in economic activity.

During 2025, the U.S. government imposed tariffs and trade restrictions on certain products from some foreign jurisdictions, and in response to these actions, some countries imposed retaliatory tariffs on certain products produced in the U.S.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SEB · Seaboard Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$9.7B
+7.1% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $9.8B 5-yr avg $9.8B
Gross margin 8% 5-yr avg 7%
Operating margin 3.0% 5-yr avg 2.8%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin −0% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by CT&M (53%) and Pork (21%), with 4 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 8.1% and operating margin about 3.4% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −0.9% to 5.8% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 6 segments, the largest CT&M at 53%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • CT&M53%$5.2B
  • Pork21%$2.0B
  • Marine16%$1.6B
  • Liquid Fuels6%$605M
  • Power2%$232M
  • All Other and Corporate1%$113M
By geographyCaribbean Central And South America45%Africa26%United States22%Canada/Mexico3%Pacific Basin and Far East2%Europe1%All Other0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$5.4B$5.8B$6.6B$6.8B$7.1B$9.2B$11.2B$9.6B$9.1B$9.7B$9.8BRevenueRevenue
9%9%8%7%8%9%9%3%6%7%8%Gross marginGross mgn
5%5%5%5%5%4%3%4%5%5%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%2%2%2%2%4%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$230M$240M$236M$110M$245M$458M$657M($87M)$156M$239M$297MOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.3%4.1%3.6%1.6%3.4%5.0%5.8%−0.9%1.7%2.5%3.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$312M$247M$3M$287M$283M$570M$580M$226M$88M$496M$583MNet incomeNet inc.
18%42%1%1%10%-1%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$427M$245M$238M$171M$291M$92M$676M$710M$519M$568M$534MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$102M$118M$134M$138M$172M$178M$235M$283M$311M$318M$323MDepreciationDeprec.
$13M($120M)$101M($254M)($164M)($656M)($139M)$201M$120M($246M)($372M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$158M$173M$162M$349M$259M$460M$474M$506M$511M$562M$549MCapexCapex
2.9%3.0%2.5%5.1%3.6%5.0%4.2%5.3%5.6%5.8%5.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$325M$127M$76M$33M$119M($86M)$441M$427M$208M$250M$211MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.0%2.2%1.2%0.5%1.7%−0.9%3.9%4.5%2.3%2.6%2.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$269M$72M$76M($178M)$32M($368M)$202M$204M$8M$6M($15M)Free cash flowFCF
5.0%1.2%1.2%−2.6%0.4%−4.0%1.8%2.1%0.1%0.1%−0.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$219M$54M$264M$7M$27M$7M$58M$58MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$7M$7M$10M$10M$10M$10M$10M$9M$9M$9MDividends paidDiv. paid
$5M$17M$13M$600M$8M$39MBuybacksBuybacks
5%4%3%5%8%12%-2%1%4%5%ROICROIC
10%7%0%8%7%13%12%5%2%10%11%Return on equityROE
7%−0%8%7%13%11%5%2%9%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.4B$1.7B$1.5B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.3B$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$627M$482M$551M$646M$532M$762M$923M$749M$791M$756M$748MReceivablesReceiv.
$762M$780M$815M$1.1B$1.2B$1.7B$1.7B$1.5B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7BInventoryInvent.
$194M$256M$238M$368M$276M$404M$429M$400M$418M$397M$355MAccounts payablePayables
$1.2B$1.0B$1.1B$1.4B$1.4B$2.0B$2.2B$1.8B$1.8B$1.9B$2.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.8B$3.1B$3.0B$3.4B$3.4B$4.0B$4.0B$3.4B$3.5B$3.6B$3.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$785M$818M$784M$1.2B$1.1B$1.6B$1.5B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.6×3.8×3.9×2.9×3.1×2.6×2.6×2.5×2.5×2.4×2.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$19M$22M$167M$164M$167M$163M$154M$160M$164M$168M$168MGoodwillGoodwill
$4.8B$5.2B$5.3B$6.3B$6.4B$7.5B$7.9B$7.6B$7.7B$8.2B$8.4BTotal assetsAssets
$499M$482M$778M$792M$762M$716M$702M$997M$987M$977M$982MTotal debtDebt
($855M)($1.2B)($752M)($767M)($779M)($775M)($583M)($32M)($186M)($253M)($179M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
7.9×8.3×5.4×3.1×12.9×35.2×16.4×-1.5×2.2×3.4×4.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.2B$3.4B$3.3B$3.6B$3.8B$4.4B$5.0B$4.6B$4.7B$5.2B$5.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.2M1.2M1.2M1.2M1.2M1.2M1.2M1.1M971K964K958KShares out (diluted)Shares
$4595.28$4962.62$5624.09$5867.43$6135.03$7950.70$9685.74$8555.56$9371.25$10108.77$10263.17Revenue / shareRev/sh
$266.54$211.01$2.56$246.19$243.64$491.05$499.66$202.21$90.62$514.46$608.69EPS (diluted)EPS
$277.65$108.50$64.93$28.31$102.45$-74.09$379.92$382.06$214.20$259.31$220.30Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$229.81$61.51$64.93$-152.69$27.55$-317.03$174.02$182.53$8.24$6.22$-15.66Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$5.98$5.98$8.58$8.61$8.61$8.61$8.95$9.27$9.34$9.40Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$134.98$147.79$138.40$299.38$222.98$396.29$408.35$452.74$526.23$582.92$573.19Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2701.29$2902.05$2834.68$3080.40$3286.19$3804.34$4304.01$4130.15$4869.96$5406.01$5571.14Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.2%/yr+10.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share−0.8%/yr+20.4%/yr
EPS+7.6%/yr+16.1%/yr
Dividends / share+5.7%/yr (8-yr)+1.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+17.7%/yr+21.2%/yr
Book value / share+8.0%/yr+10.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
964Kpeak FY2016
ROIC
4%low FY2023
Gross margin
7%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$250Mowner earningsvs.$496Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $250M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $318M it takes just to hold its position. It put $244M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $6M.

Reported net income$496M
Owner earnings$250M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$496M$88M$226M$580M$570M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$318M+$311M+$283M+$235M+$178M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$246M+$120M+$201M−$139M−$656M
Cash from operations$568M$519M$710M$676M$92M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$318M−$311M−$283M−$235M−$178M
Owner earnings$250M$208M$427M$441M($86M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$244M−$200M−$223M−$239M−$282M
Free cash flow$6M$8M$204M$202M($368M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%2%4%4%-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $318M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $244M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $239M ÷ interest expense $70M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • Net cash
    Cash $178M + ST investments $1.1B − debt $985M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $245M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 28 + DIO 61 − DPO 16 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -2%–12%; 4% latest = NOPAT $239M ÷ invested capital $6.0B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $250M = operating cash $568M − maintenance capex $318M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. It chose to put $244M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $6M — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $568M ÷ net income $496M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $48M ÷ Owner Earnings $250M
    What this means

    Of $250M Owner Earnings, $48M (19%) went back to shareholders, $9M dividends, $39M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.77×
    Expanding
    Capex $562M ÷ depreciation $318M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $9.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.40×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $985M vs $2.1B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Near
    Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +44%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $281.90/share (latest year $517.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5441.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to 1% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −0.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
  • Receivables$748M
  • Inventory$1.7B
  • Other current assets$133M
Current liabilities$1.6B
  • Debt due within a year$8M
  • Accounts payable$355M
  • Other current liabilities$1.2B
Current ratio2.38×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.29×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.73×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$8M due · $1.2B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 4, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$5.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$693MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.4B$374M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.5B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$101Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$177M
'27$124M
'28$90M
'29$45M
'30$32M
later$105M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$177Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$573Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$482Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$985M
Lease obligations (present value)$482M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.5B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.5B, of which the leases are 33%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$3.6B · 92%
  • Dividends$82M · 2%
  • Buybacks$682M · 17%
  • Returned to owners$764M

    40% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $82M as dividends and $682M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$441M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $441M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $499M to $982M, and cash and short-term investments drew down $193M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $682M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−18.2%

    The diluted count fell from 1M to 1M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$9.34/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained5%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $119M, so each retained $1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021R. Steer$5.7M$4.2M($86M)
2022R. Steer$5.4M$4.4M$441M
2023R. Steer$5.7M$4.1M$427M
2024R. Steer$6.2M$4.4M$208M
2025R. Steer$7.0M$5.0M$250M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership74.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Seaboard Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Agricultural Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UNFIUnited Natural Foods$31.8B14%0.4%5%1%
GLPGlobal Partners LP Common$18.6B6%1.4%1%
ANDEAndersons$11.0B6%1.0%4%1%
SEBSeaboard Corporation$9.7B8%3.5%4%2%
CAPLCrossAmerica Partners LP Common$3.7B8%1.8%2%
CENTCentral Garden & Pet$3.1B30%7.4%10%7%
ASHAshland$1.8B30%3.0%2%4%
MGPIMGP Ingredients Inc.$536M28%13.3%14%8%
Group median11%2.4%5%2%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Seaboard Corporation has delivered.

Seaboard Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Seaboard Corporation earns about $218M on its 2.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+0%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($15M) on 1M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net cash $179M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($549M) runs well above depreciation ($323M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $216M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Seaboard Corporation (SEB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SEB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SDRL its page in the Manual SEDG →

Industry order: ← PFAI the Agricultural Products chapter UVV →