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PLAY, Dave & Buster's Entertainment Inc.

Restaurants consumer brand Cyclical

Dave & Buster's Entertainment Inc. is the owner and operator of 243 venues in North America that offer premier entertainment and dining experiences for both adults and families under the Dave & Buster's and Main Event brands.

As of February 3, 2026, the Company had 179 Dave & Buster's branded stores in 43 states, Puerto Rico, and Canada that offer guests the opportunity to "Eat Drink Play and Watch", all in one location.

Internationally, the Company is in early-stage growth as a franchisor of the Dave & Buster's brand, with four franchised locations currently open.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

PLAY · Dave & Buster's Entertainment Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$2.1B

−1.4% YoY · 37% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $1.9B

Gross margin 86% 5-yr avg 85%

Operating margin 3.3% 5-yr avg 11.2%

Owner-earnings margin −2% 5-yr avg 8%

Free cash flow margin −2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 83% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −58% to 15% — on a steadier 83% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Capital spending runs about 17% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 4 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMay 2026
											Income statement
$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$437M	$1.3B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.1B	RevenueRevenue
82%	83%	83%	83%	83%	84%	84%	84%	85%	86%	86%	Gross marginGross mgn
5%	5%	5%	5%	11%	6%	7%	5%	5%	6%	6%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$151M	$166M	$161M	$148M	($253M)	$187M	$263M	$307M	$220M	$86M	$70M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
15.0%	14.5%	12.7%	10.9%	−57.9%	14.4%	13.4%	13.9%	10.3%	4.1%	3.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$91M	$121M	$117M	$100M	($207M)	$109M	$137M	$127M	$58M	($49M)	($65M)	Net incomeNet inc.
37%	23%	21%	21%	—	15%	21%	22%	17%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$231M	$265M	$338M	$289M	($49M)	$283M	$444M	$364M	$312M	$291M	$309M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$88M	$103M	$118M	$132M	$139M	$138M	$169M	$209M	$238M	$279M	$287M	DepreciationDeprec.
$46M	$32M	$95M	$49M	$12M	$24M	$118M	$13M	$11M	$41M	$67M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$181M	$220M	$216M	$228M	$83M	$92M	$234M	$330M	$530M	$391M	$342M	CapexCapex
18.0%	19.3%	17.1%	16.8%	19.0%	7.1%	11.9%	15.0%	24.9%	18.6%	16.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$143M	$162M	$219M	$156M	($132M)	$191M	$275M	$156M	$74M	$11M	($33M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
14.2%	14.2%	17.3%	11.6%	−30.3%	14.6%	14.0%	7.1%	3.5%	0.5%	−1.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$51M	$45M	$121M	$61M	($132M)	$191M	$210M	$34M	($218M)	($101M)	($33M)	Free cash flowFCF
5.0%	3.9%	9.6%	4.5%	−30.3%	14.6%	10.7%	1.5%	−10.2%	−4.8%	−1.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$819M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$12M	$16M	$5M	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$29M	$152M	$149M	$297M	$0	$0	$25M	$300M	$172M	$24M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
14%	17%	17%	15%	-27%	23%	14%	16%	11%	—	—	ROICROIC
21%	29%	30%	59%	-135%	39%	33%	51%	40%	-53%	-65%	Return on equityROE
—	—	27%	50%	−138%	39%	33%	—	—	—	−65%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$20M	$19M	$22M	$25M	$12M	$26M	$182M	$37M	$7M	$17M	$20M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$22M	$28M	$27M	$34M	$24M	$40M	$45M	$37M	$40M	$40M	$40M	InventoryInvent.
$55M	$55M	$60M	$65M	$36M	$62M	$85M	$119M	$134M	$126M	$142M	Accounts payablePayables
($33M)	($27M)	($33M)	($31M)	($13M)	($22M)	($39M)	($81M)	($95M)	($86M)	($101M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$76M	$95M	$91M	$79M	$119M	$146M	$294M	$138M	$94M	$124M	$131M	Current assetsCur. assets
$178M	$208M	$244M	$291M	$272M	$312M	$438M	$436M	$434M	$435M	$452M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.4×	0.5×	0.4×	0.3×	0.4×	0.5×	0.7×	0.3×	0.2×	0.3×	0.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$273M	$273M	$273M	$273M	$273M	$273M	$745M	$743M	$743M	$743M	$743M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$3.8B	$3.8B	$4.0B	$4.1B	$4.1B	Total assetsAssets
$264M	$366M	$393M	$648M	$596M	$431M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Total debtDebt
$244M	$347M	$372M	$623M	$584M	$405M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
21.5×	19.1×	12.3×	7.1×	-6.8×	3.5×	3.0×	2.4×	1.6×	0.6×	0.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$439M	$422M	$388M	$170M	$153M	$275M	$411M	$251M	$146M	$91M	$100M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.8%	0.6%	0.5%	1.6%	1.0%	1.0%	0.7%	0.2%	0.9%	0.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
43.3M	42.6M	40.0M	34.1M	43.5M	49.3M	49.2M	44.1M	40.0M	34.7M	34.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$23.22	$26.77	$31.65	$39.73	$10.02	$26.47	$39.95	$50.04	$53.30	$60.65	$59.94	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.10	$2.84	$2.93	$2.94	$-4.75	$2.21	$2.79	$2.88	$1.46	$-1.40	$-1.85	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.30	$3.80	$5.49	$4.59	$-3.04	$3.88	$5.59	$3.53	$1.85	$0.33	$-0.95	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.17	$1.05	$3.04	$1.78	$-3.04	$3.88	$4.27	$0.77	$-5.45	$-2.90	$-0.95	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	$0.29	$0.46	$0.11	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.17	$5.16	$5.41	$6.69	$1.91	$1.87	$4.76	$7.49	$13.25	$11.29	$9.79	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.15	$9.90	$9.70	$4.98	$3.52	$5.59	$8.35	$5.70	$3.64	$2.63	$2.85	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+11.3%/yr	+43.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−22.6%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+11.7%/yr	+42.7%/yr
Book value / share	−13.9%/yr	−5.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

35Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

11%low FY2021

Gross margin

86%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

132.1×peak FY2026

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$11Mowner earningsvs.($49M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $11M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $279M it takes just to hold its position. It put $112M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($101M).

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	($49M)	$58M	$127M	$137M	$109M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$279M	+$238M	+$209M	+$169M	+$138M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$20M	+$5M	+$16M	+$20M	+$13M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$41M	+$11M	+$13M	+$118M	+$24M
Cash from operations	$291M	$312M	$364M	$444M	$283M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$279M	−$238M	−$209M	−$169M	−$92M
Owner earnings	$11M	$74M	$156M	$275M	$191M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$112M	−$292M	−$122M	−$65M	—
Free cash flow	($101M)	($218M)	$34M	$210M	$191M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	3%	7%	14%	15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $279M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $112M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20M), owner earnings is nearer ($8M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $86M ÷ interest expense $154M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.5B · 17.5× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $17M − debt $1.5B

What this means
Netting $17M of cash and short-term investments against $1.5B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 17.5× a year's operating profit (17.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 15%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median, range -27%–23%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 12%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -30%–17%; latest $11M = operating cash $291M − maintenance capex $279M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. It chose to put $112M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($101M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves ($8M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $291M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($49M) · cash from operations $291M

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 210%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $24M ÷ Owner Earnings $11M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $11M of Owner Earnings, $24M (210%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $24M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $20M stock comp, the real buyback was about $4M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.40×

Expanding

Capex $391M ÷ depreciation $279M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.29×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.5B vs ($311M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −59%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.31/share (latest year $-1.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 14% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 9% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth −13%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 13% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −57.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −2.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 5, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$131M

Cash & short-term investments$20M
Inventory$40M
Other current assets$71M

Current liabilities$452M

Debt due within a year$7M
Accounts payable$142M
Other current liabilities$303M

Current ratio0.29×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.20×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($321M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$7M due · $20M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 5, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.2× → 0.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($647M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$3.1B$1.6B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.2B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$17Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$7M

'27$7M

'28$7M

'29$868M

'30$7M

later$656M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$7Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$14Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$868Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$1.6Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, May 5, 2026$20M

One year of owner earnings (FY2026)$11M

Together, against $7M due next year4.4×

Cash on hand as of May 5, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $31M against the $7M due in the twelve months after the Feb 3, 2026 schedule: 4.4 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Feb 3, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$208M

'27$229M

'28$228M

'29$223M

'30$210M

later$1.6B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$208Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$2.7Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.7Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.5B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.7B

Total fixed claims on the business$3.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.2B, of which the leases are 53%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Feb 3, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $2.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.5B · 91%
Dividends$32M · 1%
Buybacks$1.1B · 41%

Returned to owners$1.2B
94% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $32M as dividends and $1.1B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$918M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $918M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $264M to $1.5B.
Average price paid for buybacks$56.42
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 3M shares were bought for $181M, about $56.42 each.
Net change in share count−19.3%
The diluted count fell from 43M to 35M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$746M18% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$819Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.5B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	$7.4M	$1.0M	$191M
2023	$12.8M	$12.9M	$275M
2023	$3.1M	$2.6M	$275M
2024	$2.3M	$7.3M	$156M
2025	$2.2M	−$14.6M	$74M
2025	$490k	$48k	$74M
2026	$14.5M	$8.0M	$11M
2026	$7.8M	$4.9M	$11M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$20M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 23% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Dave & Buster's Entertainment Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.7% vs 15.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 15.3% early in the record and 3.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$264M → $1.5B
Debt rose from $264M to $1.5B while owner earnings went from about $175M to $80M — about 1.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 19 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CAKECheesecake Factory Incorporated (The)	$3.8B	77%	3.7%	13%	5%
CBRLCracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc	$3.5B	69%	6.9%	20%	5%
PLAYDave & Buster's Entertainment Inc.	$2.1B	83%	13.0%	15%	13%
PZZAPapa John's International Inc.	$2.1B	—	6.0%	37%	4%
JACKJack in the Box	$1.5B	56%	19.1%	19%	8%
BJRIBJ's Restaurants Inc.	$1.4B	74%	2.2%	6%	3%
FWRGFirst Watch Restaurant Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	2.3%	2%	4%
CAVACAVA Group	$1.2B	—	0.6%	10%	7%
Group median	—	74%	4.9%	14%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Dave & Buster's Entertainment Inc. has delivered.

Dave & Buster's Entertainment Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Dave & Buster's Entertainment Inc. earns about $269M on its 12.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($269M) Net of stock comp (−$19M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($29M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−35%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−13%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($33M) on 35M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-10; net debt $1.5B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($342M) runs well above depreciation ($287M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $29M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PLAY against another business →

The owners of PLAY: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Dave & Buster's Entertainment Inc. (PLAY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PLAY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PLAG its page in the Manual PLD →

Industry order: ← NATH the Restaurants chapter PTLO →