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PZZA, Papa John's International Inc.

Restaurants consumer brand

Papa John's International, Inc., a Delaware corporation, operates and franchises pizza delivery and carryout restaurants and, in certain international markets, dine-in and delivery restaurants under the trademark "Papa Johns."

As Papa Johns transforms the business to accelerate profitable growth across its restaurant system, we are focused on the following strategic priorities: Focusing on our core product proposition and improving innovation across the barbell.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PZZA · Papa John's International Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.1B

−0.3% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $2.1B

Operating margin 4.3% 5-yr avg 6.4%

ROIC 22% 5-yr avg 42%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Commissary (45%) and Company-owned restaurant sales (33%), with 3 more lines behind.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 5.2% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from 1.5% to 10% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 37%, above 15% in 7 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Commissary at 45%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Commissary45%$930M
Company-owned restaurant sales33%$676M
Franchisor9%$191M
Advertising8%$167M
Other revenues4%$91M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.0B	RevenueRevenue
9%	8%	12%	14%	11%	10%	10%	10%	9%	12%	12%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$165M	$151M	$32M	$25M	$90M	$168M	$109M	$147M	$157M	$89M	$86M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.6%	8.5%	1.9%	1.5%	5.0%	8.1%	5.2%	6.9%	7.6%	4.3%	4.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$103M	$102M	$2M	$5M	$58M	$120M	$68M	$82M	$83M	$31M	$29M	Net incomeNet inc.
33%	25%	51%	—	20%	18%	18%	20%	26%	35%	36%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$150M	$135M	$92M	$62M	$186M	$185M	$118M	$193M	$107M	$126M	$102M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$41M	$44M	$46M	$47M	$50M	$49M	$52M	$64M	$69M	$92M	$92M	DepreciationDeprec.
($4M)	($21M)	$34M	($6M)	$62M	($1M)	($20M)	$29M	($56M)	($12M)	($34M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$56M	$53M	$42M	$38M	$36M	$69M	$78M	$77M	$72M	$65M	$66M	CapexCapex
3.2%	2.9%	2.5%	2.3%	2.0%	3.3%	3.7%	3.6%	3.5%	3.2%	3.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$109M	$82M	$50M	$24M	$151M	$136M	$66M	$116M	$34M	$61M	$36M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.4%	4.6%	3.0%	1.5%	8.3%	6.6%	3.1%	5.5%	1.7%	3.0%	1.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$95M	$82M	$50M	$24M	$151M	$116M	$39M	$116M	$34M	$61M	$36M	Free cash flowFCF
5.5%	4.6%	3.0%	1.5%	8.3%	5.6%	1.9%	5.5%	1.7%	3.0%	1.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$13M	$21K	—	—	$0	$699K	$1M	$6M	$125K	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$28M	$31M	$29M	$29M	$29M	$40M	$55M	$58M	$61M	$61M	$61M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$122M	$210M	$158M	—	$3M	$72M	$125M	$210M	$2M	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
40%	35%	6%	—	—	62%	34%	46%	42%	25%	22%	ROICROIC
											Balance sheet
$16M	$22M	$33M	$28M	$130M	$71M	$47M	$41M	$38M	$35M	$41M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$60M	$65M	$78M	$70M	$90M	$81M	$103M	$104M	$102M	$103M	$101M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$25M	$31M	$27M	$28M	$30M	$35M	$41M	$36M	$35M	$34M	$36M	InventoryInvent.
$43M	$32M	$27M	$29M	$37M	$28M	$62M	$75M	$62M	$61M	$67M	Accounts payablePayables
$42M	$63M	$78M	$69M	$83M	$88M	$82M	$65M	$75M	$76M	$69M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$146M	$170M	$196M	$182M	$306M	$255M	$251M	$231M	$231M	$237M	$240M	Current assetsCur. assets
$128M	$133M	$189M	$208M	$289M	$287M	$265M	$305M	$278M	$291M	$285M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×	1.3×	1.0×	0.9×	1.1×	0.9×	0.9×	0.8×	0.8×	0.8×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$86M	$87M	$85M	$80M	$81M	$81M	$71M	$76M	$75M	$68M	$67M	GoodwillGoodwill
$513M	$556M	$596M	$731M	$873M	$886M	$864M	$875M	$889M	$838M	$832M	Total assetsAssets
$300M	$467M	$621M	$367M	$348M	$481M	$597M	$757M	$742M	$715M	$735M	Total debtDebt
$284M	$444M	$588M	$339M	$218M	$410M	$550M	$717M	$704M	$681M	$695M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
22.2×	13.4×	1.2×	1.2×	5.3×	8.8×	4.1×	—	—	—	3.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($4M)	($122M)	($319M)	($332M)	($282M)	($188M)	($286M)	($459M)	($430M)	($445M)	($449M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	0.9%	0.8%	0.5%	0.7%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
37.6M	36.5M	32.3M	31.6M	32.7M	35.3M	35.7M	33.2M	32.8M	32.9M	33.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$45.57	$48.83	$51.48	$51.19	$55.42	$58.53	$58.85	$64.41	$62.75	$62.34	$60.95	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.73	$2.80	$0.08	$0.15	$1.77	$3.40	$1.90	$2.48	$2.54	$0.93	$0.86	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.91	$2.26	$1.56	$0.76	$4.61	$3.84	$1.84	$3.51	$1.04	$1.86	$1.09	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.52	$2.26	$1.56	$0.76	$4.61	$3.29	$1.10	$3.51	$1.04	$1.86	$1.09	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.74	$0.84	$0.90	$0.90	$0.90	$1.14	$1.53	$1.76	$1.85	$1.86	$1.85	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.48	$1.44	$1.30	$1.19	$1.09	$1.94	$2.19	$2.31	$2.21	$1.96	$1.99	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.10	$-3.33	$-9.88	$-10.51	$-8.62	$-5.31	$-8.02	$-13.85	$-13.09	$-13.50	$-13.59	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.5%/yr	+2.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−4.8%/yr	−16.6%/yr
EPS	−11.3%/yr	−12.1%/yr
Dividends / share	+10.7%/yr	+15.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+3.2%/yr	+12.5%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Commissary+3.4%
“Commissary revenues, which includes sales from our North American and International QC Centers, increased $30.3 million or 3.4%, for the year ended December 28, 2025 compared to the prior year. The increase in Commissary revenues was primarily a result of higher prices and higher transaction volumes, partially offset by changes in product mix as compared to the prior year comparable period.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Company-owned restaurant sales-6.8%
“Company-owned restaurant sales, which include sales from both Domestic and International Company-owned restaurants, decreased $49.0 million, or 6.8% for the year ended December 28, 2025 compared to the prior year, primarily due to the transactions discussed above.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

33Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

25%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

11.1×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$61Mowner earningsvs.$31Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $31M of profit into $61M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$31M

Owner earnings$61M · 3% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$31M	$83M	$82M	$68M	$120M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$92M	+$69M	+$64M	+$52M	+$49M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$15M	+$10M	+$18M	+$18M	+$17M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$12M	−$56M	+$29M	−$20M	−$1M
Cash from operations	$126M	$107M	$193M	$118M	$185M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$65M	−$72M	−$77M	−$52M	−$49M
Owner earnings	$61M	$34M	$116M	$66M	$136M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$26M	−$20M
Free cash flow	$61M	$34M	$116M	$39M	$116M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	2%	5%	3%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer $46M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.3×

Adequate

Operating income $89M ÷ interest expense $27M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $681M · 7.6× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $35M − debt $715M

What this means
Netting $35M of cash and short-term investments against $715M of debt leaves $681M owed, about 7.6× a year's operating profit (8.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $2M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $679M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 35%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

8-yr median, range 6%–62%; 25% latest = NOPAT $58M ÷ invested capital $236M

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 25% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 1%–8%; latest $61M = operating cash $126M − maintenance capex $65M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves $46M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 4.13×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $126M ÷ net income $31M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 100%

Returns most of it

Dividends + buybacks $61M ÷ Owner Earnings $61M

What this means
Of $61M Owner Earnings, $61M (100%) went back to shareholders, $61M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.70×

Harvesting

Capex $65M ÷ depreciation $92M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.82×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $715M vs ($54M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −6%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.99/share (latest year $0.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-13.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 7% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 7% early, 6% lately, median 5%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −7%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 1.5% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −1.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“The implementation and use of artificial intelligence technologies also present various risks and uncertainties, and failure to incorporate artificial intelligence technologies into our business as successfully as our competitors could adversely impact us, as could any deficiencies, unreliability or other failures of a…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$240M

Cash & short-term investments$39M
Receivables$101M
Inventory$36M
Other current assets$65M

Current liabilities$285M

Debt due within a year$8M
Accounts payable$67M
Other current liabilities$209M

Current ratio0.84×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.72×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($44M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$8M due · $39M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−7.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($516M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$913M$178M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$29Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$584M · 43%
Dividends$421M · 31%
Buybacks$903M · 67%

Returned to owners$1.3B
159% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $421M as dividends and $903M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$554M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $554M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $300M to $735M.
Average price paid for buybacks$79.06
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $569M, about $79.06 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $58.54 (2018) to $122.05 (2021); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $83.37 ($210M).
Net change in share count−12.1%
The diluted count fell from 38M to 33M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.86/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership1.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$15M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 17% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Papa John's International Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.4% vs 4.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 4.7% early in the record and 3.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$300M → $735M
Debt rose from $300M to $735M while owner earnings went from about $81M to $71M — about 3.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 10 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?5% → 7% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $85M to $137M while revenue grew 18%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (5% of revenue then, 7% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BLMNBloomin' Brands Inc.	$4.0B	69%	3.5%	13%	3%
CAKECheesecake Factory Incorporated (The)	$3.8B	77%	3.7%	13%	5%
CBRLCracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc	$3.5B	69%	6.9%	20%	5%
PLAYDave & Buster's Entertainment Inc.	$2.1B	83%	13.0%	15%	13%
PZZAPapa John's International Inc.	$2.1B	—	6.0%	37%	4%
JACKJack in the Box	$1.5B	56%	19.1%	19%	8%
BJRIBJ's Restaurants Inc.	$1.4B	74%	2.2%	6%	3%
FWRGFirst Watch Restaurant Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	2.3%	2%	4%
Group median	—	—	4.9%	14%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Papa John's International Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Papa John's International Inc. earns about $80M on its 3.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($80M) Net of stock comp (−$16M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−17%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−7%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $36M on 33M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $695M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PZZA against another business →

The owners of PZZA: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Papa John's International Inc. (PZZA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PZZA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PYPL its page in the Manual Q →

Industry order: ← PTLO the Restaurants chapter QSR →