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PRDO, Perdoceo Education Corporation

Perdoceo's accredited academic institutions offer a quality postsecondary education to a diverse student population, with fully online, campus-based and hybrid learning programs.

The Company's academic institutions Colorado Technical University (" CTU "), the American InterContinental University System (" AIUS " or " AIU System ") and University of St.

CTU and AIUS continue to show innovation in higher education, advancing personalized learning technologies like their intellipath learning platform and using data analytics and technology to serve and educate students while enhancing overall learning and academic experiences.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PRDO · Perdoceo Education Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$846M

+24.2% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $855M 5-yr avg $725M

Operating margin 24.3% 5-yr avg 22.0%

ROIC 18% 5-yr avg 19%

Owner-earnings margin 26% 5-yr avg 22%

Free cash flow margin 26% 5-yr avg 22%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 19% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −4.6% to 26% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$704M	$596M	$581M	$628M	$687M	$693M	$695M	$710M	$681M	$846M	$855M	RevenueRevenue
68%	68%	67%	69%	61%	60%	61%	56%	54%	49%	48%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($32M)	$34M	$71M	$86M	$143M	$149M	$130M	$150M	$174M	$196M	$207M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−4.6%	5.7%	12.3%	13.8%	20.8%	21.5%	18.6%	21.2%	25.6%	23.2%	24.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($19M)	($32M)	$55M	$70M	$124M	$110M	$96M	$148M	$148M	$160M	$170M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	25%	24%	15%	26%	29%	23%	27%	26%	26%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$6M	($22M)	$57M	$73M	$180M	$191M	$148M	$112M	$162M	$225M	$230M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$23M	$14M	$9M	$9M	$15M	$17M	$20M	$17M	$15M	$42M	$39M	DepreciationDeprec.
($797K)	($9M)	($13M)	($15M)	$28M	$50M	$24M	($61M)	($11M)	$12M	$8M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M	$6M	$7M	$5M	$10M	$10M	$13M	$6M	$5M	$9M	$9M	CapexCapex
0.6%	1.1%	1.2%	0.8%	1.4%	1.5%	1.8%	0.9%	0.7%	1.0%	1.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2M	($28M)	$50M	$68M	$170M	$181M	$136M	$106M	$157M	$217M	$221M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
0.3%	−4.7%	8.6%	10.8%	24.8%	26.1%	19.5%	14.9%	23.0%	25.6%	25.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2M	($28M)	$50M	$68M	$170M	$181M	$136M	$106M	$157M	$217M	$221M	Free cash flowFCF
0.3%	−4.7%	8.6%	10.8%	24.8%	26.1%	19.5%	14.9%	23.0%	25.6%	25.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	$40M	$57M	$84M	—	$138M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	$4M	$18M	$25M	$23M	$8M	$7M	$121M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-9%	6%	17%	20%	27%	33%	15%	16%	15%	17%	18%	ROICROIC
-6%	-11%	16%	16%	22%	17%	13%	18%	15%	16%	17%	Return on equityROE
											Balance sheet
$197M	$174M	$32M	$109M	$106M	$320M	$109M	$118M	$109M	$111M	$322M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$23M	$19M	$29M	$55M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$55M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2M	$1M	$763K	$576K	$596K	$904K	$2M	$5M	$3M	$4M	$3M	InventoryInvent.
$10M	$9M	$9M	$12M	$13M	$11M	$14M	$11M	$13M	$14M	$19M	Accounts payablePayables
$15M	$11M	$20M	$44M	($13M)	($10M)	($12M)	($6M)	($9M)	($10M)	$40M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$248M	$211M	$269M	$360M	$467M	$554M	$575M	$655M	$640M	$697M	$747M	Current assetsCur. assets
$169M	$113M	$97M	$104M	$104M	$140M	$163M	$111M	$132M	$138M	$155M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×	1.9×	2.8×	3.5×	4.5×	4.0×	3.5×	5.9×	4.8×	5.1×	4.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$87M	$87M	$87M	$87M	$118M	$163M	$244M	$241M	$258M	$266M	$266M	GoodwillGoodwill
$560M	$447M	$482M	$599M	$722M	$847M	$957M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	Total assetsAssets
($197M)	($174M)	($32M)	($109M)	($106M)	($320M)	($109M)	($118M)	($109M)	($111M)	($322M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-55.4×	75.7×	104.7×	517.7×	855.9×	162.0×	324.1×	372.4×	284.3×	30.3×	32.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$322M	$296M	$355M	$431M	$556M	$650M	$726M	$841M	$960M	$972M	$1000M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%	0.8%	1.0%	1.5%	1.9%	2.2%	1.3%	1.1%	1.5%	1.4%	1.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
68.4M	68.9M	71.5M	72.1M	71.3M	70.9M	69.0M	67.8M	67.2M	66.2M	63.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$10.30	$8.65	$8.13	$8.71	$9.64	$9.78	$10.07	$10.47	$10.13	$12.79	$13.48	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.27	$-0.46	$0.77	$0.97	$1.74	$1.55	$1.39	$2.18	$2.19	$2.42	$2.68	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.03	$-0.41	$0.70	$0.94	$2.39	$2.55	$1.96	$1.56	$2.33	$3.28	$3.48	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.03	$-0.41	$0.70	$0.94	$2.39	$2.55	$1.96	$1.56	$2.33	$3.28	$3.48	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.06	$0.09	$0.09	$0.07	$0.14	$0.15	$0.18	$0.09	$0.07	$0.13	$0.14	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.70	$4.30	$4.97	$5.98	$7.80	$9.17	$10.51	$12.41	$14.27	$14.70	$15.76	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.4%/yr	+5.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+65.9%/yr	+6.5%/yr
EPS	—	+6.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+8.9%/yr	−1.1%/yr
Book value / share	+13.5%/yr	+13.5%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income+12.5%
“Operating income for the current year increased by 12.5% to $196.0 million as compared to operating income of $174.3 million in the prior year, driven by increased operating income within all three of our academic institutions as well as reduced operating losses within Corporate and Other.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

66Mpeak FY2019

ROIC

17%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$217Mowner earningsvs.$160Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $160M of profit into $217M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$160M

Owner earnings$217M · 26% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$160M	$148M	$148M	$96M	$110M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$42M	+$15M	+$17M	+$20M	+$17M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$12M	+$10M	+$8M	+$9M	+$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$12M	−$11M	−$61M	+$24M	+$50M
Cash from operations	$225M	$162M	$112M	$148M	$191M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$9M	−$5M	−$6M	−$13M	−$10M
Owner earnings	$217M	$157M	$106M	$136M	$181M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	26%	23%	15%	20%	26%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $205M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 30.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $196M ÷ interest expense $6M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$267M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $111M + ST investments $156M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $267M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 16%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range -9%–33%; 17% latest = NOPAT $145M ÷ invested capital $861M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 15%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -5%–26%; latest $217M = operating cash $225M − maintenance capex $9M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $205M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.41×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $225M ÷ net income $160M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 62%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $135M ÷ Owner Earnings $217M

What this means
Of $217M Owner Earnings, $135M (62%) went back to shareholders, $14M dividends, $121M buybacks. Net of $12M stock comp, the real buyback was about $109M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.21×

Harvesting

Capex $9M ÷ depreciation $42M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $846M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 5.06×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $559M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +9855%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.42/share (latest year $2.55), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.51/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin 4% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 23% lately, median 19% — pricing power intact or improving.
Worst year 2016 · −4.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.4%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Technology is a key enabler for us, and we are continuing to explore and utilize artificial intelligence (" AI ") within the student enrollment and academic life cycle to enhance student experiences.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$747M

Cash & short-term investments$322M
Receivables$55M
Inventory$3M
Other current assets$367M

Current liabilities$155M

Accounts payable$19M
Other current liabilities$137M

Current ratio4.82×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio4.79×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio2.08×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$592Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters5.4× → 4.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$660Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$50M$50M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$52Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$75M · 7%
Dividends$14M · 1%
Buybacks$206M · 18%
Retained (debt / cash)$838M · 74%

Returned to owners$220M
21% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $14M as dividends and $206M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$18.89
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 11M shares were bought for $202M, about $18.89 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $11.00 (2021) to $29.46 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($121M).
Net change in share count−7.2%
The diluted count fell from 68M to 63M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.21/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained24%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($639M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $152M, so each retained $1 added about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$344M28% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity27%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$320Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $75M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$5.0M	$4.6M	$181M
2022	$4.5M	$5.7M	$136M
2022	$2.5M	$3.0M	$136M
2023	$4.5M	$9.3M	$106M
2023	$4.1M	$1.1M	$106M
2024	$6.7M	$13.9M	$157M
2025	$5.5M	$7.8M	$217M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$12M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Perdoceo Education Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?4% → 7% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $25M to $58M while revenue grew 21%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (4% of revenue then, 7% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $23M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Education Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GHCGraham Holdings Company	$4.9B	—	4.6%	3%	5%
LRNStride Inc.	$2.4B	35%	5.8%	11%	11%
STRAStrategic Education Inc.	$1.3B	—	10.9%	6%	9%
LOPEGrand Canyon Education Inc.	$1.1B	—	28.1%	27%	24%
PRDOPerdoceo Education Corporation	$846M	—	19.7%	16%	17%
UTIUniversal Technical Institute Inc	$836M	—	1.5%	2%	4%
Group median	—	—	8.3%	8%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Perdoceo Education Corporation has delivered.

Perdoceo Education Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Perdoceo Education Corporation earns about $145M on its 17.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 25.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($145M) Net of stock comp (−$12M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+4%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2018+23%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $221M on 63M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $322M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PRDO against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Perdoceo Education Corporation (PRDO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PRDO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PRCT its page in the Manual PRG →

Industry order: ← LRN the Education Services chapter STRA →