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LRN, Stride Inc.

We are a technology company providing an educational platform to deliver online learning to students throughout the U.S.

Our platform hosts products and services to attract, enroll, educate, track progress, and support students.

We provide a wide range of products and services across our platform with the ability to deliver customized solutions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LRN · Stride Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.4B

+17.9% YoY · 18% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.5B 5-yr avg $1.9B

Gross margin 38% 5-yr avg 36%

Operating margin 15.8% 5-yr avg 10.5%

ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 16%

Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 12%

Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 35% and operating margin about 4.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 1.5% to 15% — on a steadier 35% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$873M	$889M	$918M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.4B	$2.5B	RevenueRevenue
—	37%	35%	35%	33%	35%	35%	35%	37%	39%	38%	Gross marginGross mgn
35%	34%	33%	30%	30%	28%	26%	26%	25%	22%	20%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$14M	$13M	$26M	$45M	$32M	$110M	$157M	$165M	$250M	$360M	$402M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.6%	1.5%	2.8%	4.5%	3.1%	7.2%	9.3%	9.0%	12.2%	15.0%	15.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$9M	$451K	$28M	$37M	$25M	$71M	$107M	$127M	$204M	$288M	$308M	Net incomeNet inc.
37%	—	-3%	22%	26%	26%	27%	26%	24%	24%	23%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$122M	$89M	$105M	$142M	$80M	$134M	$207M	$203M	$279M	$433M	$415M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$68M	$74M	$75M	$71M	$72M	$90M	$98M	$110M	$110M	$115M	$123M	DepreciationDeprec.
$26M	($9M)	($18M)	$16M	($40M)	($67M)	($17M)	($54M)	($67M)	($7M)	($58M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$5M	$2M	$9M	$5M	$2M	$4M	$10M	$4M	$2M	$2M	$1M	CapexCapex
0.6%	0.2%	1.0%	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%	0.6%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$117M	$87M	$97M	$136M	$79M	$131M	$197M	$199M	$277M	$431M	$414M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
13.4%	9.7%	10.5%	13.4%	7.6%	8.5%	11.7%	10.8%	13.6%	17.9%	16.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$117M	$87M	$97M	$136M	$79M	$131M	$197M	$199M	$277M	$431M	$414M	Free cash flowFCF
13.4%	9.7%	10.5%	13.4%	7.6%	8.5%	11.7%	10.8%	13.6%	17.9%	16.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$20M	$9M	$7M	$13M	$168M	—	—	—	—	—	$164M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
3%	2%	7%	10%	5%	11%	14%	13%	17%	24%	21%	ROICROIC
2%	0%	5%	6%	4%	9%	13%	13%	17%	19%	19%	Return on equityROE
2%	0%	5%	6%	4%	9%	13%	13%	17%	19%	19%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$214M	$231M	$231M	$283M	$212M	$386M	$389M	$523M	$692M	$985M	$806M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$170M	$192M	$176M	$192M	$236M	$369M	$419M	$464M	$473M	$560M	$855M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$31M	$31M	$26M	$30M	$28M	$40M	$36M	$37M	$37M	$38M	$22M	InventoryInvent.
$26M	$30M	$29M	$50M	$40M	$62M	$62M	$49M	$41M	$44M	$45M	Accounts payablePayables
$174M	$193M	$173M	$171M	$224M	$347M	$393M	$452M	$469M	$553M	$831M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$446M	$474M	$454M	$530M	$501M	$858M	$951M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
$123M	$118M	$116M	$156M	$273M	$306M	$302M	$309M	$244M	$303M	$283M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.6×	4.0×	3.9×	3.4×	1.8×	2.8×	3.1×	3.4×	5.1×	5.4×	6.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$87M	$87M	$90M	$90M	$175M	$240M	$241M	$247M	$247M	$247M	$247M	GoodwillGoodwill
$734M	$735M	$742M	$820M	$1.1B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$2.4B	Total assetsAssets
—	—	—	—	—	$299M	$411M	$413M	$415M	$416M	$418M	Total debtDebt
—	—	—	—	—	($87M)	$22M	($110M)	($278M)	($569M)	($388M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$559M	$574M	$587M	$633M	$675M	$805M	$813M	$947M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.1%	2.5%	2.3%	1.6%	2.3%	2.6%	1.1%	1.1%	1.5%	1.5%	1.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
38.9M	39.5M	40.6M	40.9M	40.7M	41.9M	42.4M	42.7M	43.5M	48.4M	47.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$22.46	$22.49	$22.58	$24.81	$25.59	$36.70	$39.74	$43.00	$46.86	$49.68	$53.26	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.23	$0.01	$0.68	$0.91	$0.60	$1.71	$2.52	$2.97	$4.69	$5.95	$6.47	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.01	$2.19	$2.38	$3.32	$1.94	$3.12	$4.64	$4.65	$6.35	$8.90	$8.70	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.01	$2.19	$2.38	$3.32	$1.94	$3.12	$4.64	$4.65	$6.35	$8.90	$8.70	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.13	$0.06	$0.22	$0.13	$0.04	$0.09	$0.23	$0.10	$0.05	$0.04	$0.02	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.38	$14.54	$14.45	$15.47	$16.61	$19.22	$19.15	$22.17	$27.01	$30.56	$34.49	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.2%/yr	+14.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+12.8%/yr	+35.7%/yr
EPS	+43.4%/yr	+58.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	−13.0%/yr	−2.3%/yr
Book value / share	+8.7%/yr	+13.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

48Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

24%low FY2017

Gross margin

39%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$431Mowner earningsvs.$288Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $288M of profit into $431M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$288M

Owner earnings$431M · 18% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$288M	$204M	$127M	$107M	$71M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$115M	+$110M	+$110M	+$98M	+$90M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$37M	+$31M	+$20M	+$19M	+$39M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$7M	−$67M	−$54M	−$17M	−$67M
Cash from operations	$433M	$279M	$203M	$207M	$134M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$2M	−$2M	−$4M	−$10M	−$4M
Owner earnings	$431M	$277M	$199M	$197M	$131M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	18%	14%	11%	12%	8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $37M), owner earnings is nearer $394M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$569M

Net cash

Cash $782M + ST investments $203M − debt $416M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $569M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 83d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 85 + DIO 9 − DPO 11 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range 2%–24%; 24% latest = NOPAT $272M ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 24% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 8%–18%; latest $431M = operating cash $433M − maintenance capex $2M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $37M of SBC) leaves $394M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.50×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $433M ÷ net income $288M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 6%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $27M ÷ Owner Earnings $431M

What this means
Of $431M Owner Earnings, $27M (6%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $27M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($37M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.02×

Harvesting

Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $115M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 5.39×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $416M vs $1.3B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +1568%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.85/share (latest year $6.77), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $34.79/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 12% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +15%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.
Worst year 2017 · 1.5% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +2.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“As our business and market strategy evolves, we also will need to respond to technological advances and emerging industry standards in a cost-effective and timely manner in order to remain competitive, such as the ubiquitous use of tablets for public school applications, AI and machine learning, adaptive learning techn…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.8B

Cash & short-term investments$806M
Receivables$855M
Inventory$22M
Other current assets$77M

Current liabilities$283M

Accounts payable$45M
Other current liabilities$238M

Current ratio6.21×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio6.14×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio2.85×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters5.1× → 6.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$954MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$430M$12M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$20Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$45M · 2%
Buybacks$27M · 2%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.7B · 96%

Returned to owners$27M
2% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $27M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $592M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $27M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count22.5%
The diluted count rose from 39M to 48M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained23%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($869M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $202M, so each retained $1 added about 0.23 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$4.7M	$7.8M	$131M
2021	$6.0M	$4.4M	$131M
2022	$7.7M	$10.6M	$197M
2023	$9.7M	$9.3M	$199M
2024	$15.6M	$44.4M	$277M
2025	$21.5M	$110.5M	$431M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio377:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$37M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Stride Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?22.5%
Diluted shares grew 22.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $27M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?23% → 35% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $200M to $876M while revenue grew 191%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (23% of revenue then, 35% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Education Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GHCGraham Holdings Company	$4.9B	—	4.6%	3%	5%
LRNStride Inc.	$2.4B	35%	5.8%	11%	11%
STRAStrategic Education Inc.	$1.3B	—	10.9%	6%	9%
LOPEGrand Canyon Education Inc.	$1.1B	—	28.1%	27%	24%
PRDOPerdoceo Education Corporation	$846M	—	19.7%	16%	17%
UTIUniversal Technical Institute Inc	$836M	—	1.5%	2%	4%
Group median	—	—	8.3%	8%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Stride Inc. has delivered.

Stride Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Stride Inc. earns about $271M on its 11.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 17.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($271M) Net of stock comp (−$42M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+15%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $414M on 43M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $388M. The if-converted diluted count is 48M, 12% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh LRN against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Stride Inc. (LRN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LRN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LRCX its page in the Manual LSAK →

Industry order: ← LOPE the Education Services chapter PRDO →