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LOPE, Grand Canyon Education Inc.

GCE is an education services company with 20 university partners as of December 31, 2025.

Grand Canyon Education, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("GCE" or the "Company") is a publicly traded education services company dedicated to serving colleges and universities.

GCE has developed significant technological solutions, infrastructure and operational processes to provide services to these institutions on a large scale.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LOPE · Grand Canyon Education Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.1B

+7.1% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $982M

Operating margin 24.3% 5-yr avg 26.8%

ROIC 30% 5-yr avg 40%

Owner-earnings margin 23% 5-yr avg 25%

Free cash flow margin 23% 5-yr avg 24%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 27% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (24%–34% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 27%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 24% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$873M	$974M	$846M	$779M	$844M	$897M	$911M	$961M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	RevenueRevenue
3%	3%	4%	6%	5%	5%	5%	4%	4%	4%	4%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$237M	$283M	$258M	$265M	$277M	$282M	$238M	$249M	$275M	$266M	$273M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
27.2%	29.0%	30.5%	34.1%	32.9%	31.5%	26.1%	25.9%	26.7%	24.0%	24.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$149M	$203M	$229M	$259M	$257M	$260M	$185M	$205M	$226M	$216M	$220M	Net incomeNet inc.
37%	28%	20%	18%	23%	21%	23%	21%	22%	23%	23%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$238M	$305M	$199M	$306M	$309M	$313M	$221M	$244M	$290M	$273M	$294M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$45M	$54M	$36M	$18M	$21M	$21M	$22M	$23M	$28M	$31M	$31M	DepreciationDeprec.
$44M	$48M	($65M)	$29M	$31M	$31M	$14M	$16M	$36M	$26M	$33M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$178M	$114M	$95M	$22M	$29M	$29M	$35M	$45M	$37M	$35M	$34M	CapexCapex
20.4%	11.7%	11.2%	2.9%	3.5%	3.2%	3.9%	4.6%	3.6%	3.2%	3.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$193M	$251M	$164M	$284M	$288M	$292M	$199M	$221M	$262M	$239M	$260M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
22.1%	25.8%	19.3%	36.5%	34.1%	32.5%	21.8%	23.0%	25.4%	21.6%	23.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$59M	$191M	$105M	$284M	$279M	$284M	$186M	$199M	$253M	$239M	$260M	Free cash flowFCF
6.8%	19.6%	12.4%	36.5%	33.1%	31.7%	20.4%	20.7%	24.5%	21.6%	23.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$20M	$11M	$25M	$44M	$134M	$804M	$604M	$137M	$173M	$265M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
18%	23%	18%	15%	15%	50%	35%	34%	47%	32%	30%	ROICROIC
19%	21%	19%	18%	16%	25%	29%	29%	29%	29%	32%	Return on equityROE
19%	21%	19%	18%	16%	25%	29%	29%	29%	29%	32%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$184M	$243M	$120M	$122M	$246M	$601M	$120M	$146M	$325M	$112M	$165M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$10M	$11M	$47M	$49M	$62M	$70M	$77M	$79M	$83M	$84M	$113M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$25M	$29M	$14M	$15M	$17M	$24M	$20M	$18M	$27M	$24M	$29M	Accounts payablePayables
($15M)	($18M)	$33M	$34M	$46M	$46M	$57M	$61M	$56M	$60M	$84M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$230M	$375M	$309M	$208M	$334M	$681M	$273M	$338M	$420M	$400M	$380M	Current assetsCur. assets
$227M	$238M	$81M	$95M	$119M	$98M	$100M	$97M	$111M	$110M	$138M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	1.6×	3.8×	2.2×	2.8×	7.0×	2.7×	3.5×	3.8×	3.6×	2.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3M	$3M	$3M	$161M	$161M	$161M	$161M	$161M	$161M	$161M	$161M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.2B	$833M	$930M	$1.0B	$992M	$968M	Total assetsAssets
$98M	$67M	$60M	$141M	$108M	—	—	—	—	—	$108M	Total debtDebt
($86M)	($176M)	($60M)	$19M	($138M)	—	—	—	—	—	($57M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
178.6×	130.4×	168.1×	23.4×	63.0×	78.4×	118750.0×	7553.2×	68849.8×	—	68337.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$774M	$986M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.0B	$638M	$718M	$784M	$747M	$696M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
47.1M	48.2M	48.4M	48.3M	47.2M	44.0M	32.2M	30.1M	29.3M	28.0M	26.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$18.53	$20.20	$17.46	$16.13	$17.90	$20.40	$28.27	$31.87	$35.29	$39.47	$41.89	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.15	$4.22	$4.73	$5.37	$5.45	$5.92	$5.73	$6.80	$7.73	$7.71	$8.18	EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.09	$5.21	$3.38	$5.88	$6.11	$6.64	$6.16	$7.32	$8.96	$8.52	$9.68	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.26	$3.97	$2.16	$5.88	$5.92	$6.47	$5.76	$6.61	$8.63	$8.52	$9.68	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.78	$2.35	$1.95	$0.46	$0.62	$0.66	$1.09	$1.48	$1.27	$1.24	$1.27	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.42	$20.44	$25.07	$29.91	$33.38	$23.77	$19.78	$23.82	$26.78	$26.65	$25.91	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.8%/yr	+17.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+8.5%/yr	+6.9%/yr
EPS	+10.5%/yr	+7.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	−11.6%/yr	+14.8%/yr
Book value / share	+5.5%/yr	−4.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Net income-4.4%
“Our net income for the year ended December 31, 2025 was $216.2 million, a decrease of $10.0 million, or 4.4% as compared to $226.2 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, due primarily to the litigation settlement and the other factors discussed above.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

28Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

32%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$239Mowner earningsvs.$216Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $216M of profit into $239M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$216M

Owner earnings$239M · 22% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$216M	$226M	$205M	$185M	$260M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$31M	+$28M	+$23M	+$22M	+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$26M	+$36M	+$16M	+$14M	+$31M
Cash from operations	$273M	$290M	$244M	$221M	$313M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$35M	−$28M	−$23M	−$22M	−$21M
Owner earnings	$239M	$262M	$221M	$199M	$292M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$9M	−$21M	−$13M	−$7M
Free cash flow	$239M	$253M	$199M	$186M	$284M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	22%	25%	23%	22%	33%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 66477.5×

Comfortable

Operating income $266M ÷ interest expense $4K

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$93M

Net cash

Cash $112M + ST investments $89M − debt $108M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $93M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 23%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range 15%–50%; 28% latest = NOPAT $205M ÷ invested capital $743M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 28% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 23%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 19%–36%; latest $239M = operating cash $273M − maintenance capex $35M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 22% of revenue this year, a 23% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves $229M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.27×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $273M ÷ net income $216M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 111%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $265M ÷ Owner Earnings $239M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $239M of Owner Earnings, $265M (111%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $265M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $10M stock comp, the real buyback was about $255M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.12×

Maintaining

Capex $35M ÷ depreciation $31M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.65×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $108M vs $290M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +11%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.14/share (latest year $8.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.17/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 29% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 29% early to 26% lately, median 27% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +1%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.
Worst year 2025 · 24.0% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −5.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“While we expect our use of AI to help grow our business and benefit our university partners, the use of AI presents various risks, challenges, and potential unintended consequences that could disrupt our ability to effectively integrate and leverage these technologies and it is not certain that we will realize our desi…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$380M

Cash & short-term investments$165M
Receivables$113M
Other current assets$102M

Current liabilities$138M

Accounts payable$29M
Other current liabilities$109M

Current ratio2.75×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.75×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$242Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.6× → 2.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$386Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$108MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$212M$104M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$619M · 23%
Buybacks$2.2B · 82%

Returned to owners$2.2B
93% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.2B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$138M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $138M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2.2B over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
Net change in share count−43.0%
The diluted count fell from 47M to 27M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$312M31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity22%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$361Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $619M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Mueller	$1.8M	$1.9M	$292M
2022	Mr. Mueller	$2.0M	$2.9M	$199M
2023	Mr. Mueller	$2.0M	$3.1M	$221M
2024	Mr. Mueller	$2.0M	$3.2M	$262M
2025	Mr. Mueller	$2.0M	$2.2M	$239M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Grand Canyon Education Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?1% → 10% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $10M to $113M while revenue grew 29%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (1% of revenue then, 10% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Education Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GHCGraham Holdings Company	$4.9B	—	4.6%	3%	5%
LRNStride Inc.	$2.4B	35%	5.8%	11%	11%
STRAStrategic Education Inc.	$1.3B	—	10.9%	6%	9%
LOPEGrand Canyon Education Inc.	$1.1B	—	28.1%	27%	24%
PRDOPerdoceo Education Corporation	$846M	—	19.7%	16%	17%
UTIUniversal Technical Institute Inc	$836M	—	1.5%	2%	4%
Group median	—	—	8.3%	8%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Grand Canyon Education Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Grand Canyon Education Inc. earns about $267M on its 24.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($267M) Net of stock comp (−$10M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+1%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+8%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $260M on 27M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net cash $57M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh LOPE against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Grand Canyon Education Inc. (LOPE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LOPE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LOOP its page in the Manual LOW →

Industry order: ← LINC the Education Services chapter LRN →