Owner Scorecard


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UTI, Universal Technical Institute Inc

Education Services diversified Cyclical

Universal Technical Institute Inc market served by UTI The market for qualified transportation or skilled trades technicians across the programs that UTI offers is large and growing.

Lastly, UTI provides dealer technician training or instructor staffing services to manufacturers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UTI · Universal Technical Institute Inc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$836M
+14.0% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $869M 5-yr avg $586M
Operating margin 6.3% 5-yr avg 6.3%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 15%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −0.6% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$347M$324M$317M$332M$301M$335M$419M$607M$733M$836M$869MRevenueRevenue
49%45%54%49%49%46%45%42%39%40%42%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($19M)($2M)($35M)($8M)($4M)$15M$22M$21M$59M$83M$55MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−5.4%−0.6%−11.1%−2.4%−1.3%4.5%5.3%3.5%8.0%10.0%6.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
($48M)($8M)($33M)($8M)$8M$15M$26M$12M$42M$63M$43MNet incomeNet inc.
4%32%25%25%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$7M$1M($13M)$22M$11M$55M$46M$49M$86M$97M$82MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$15M$14M$13M$13M$12M$14M$17M$25M$29M$33M$35MDepreciationDeprec.
$35M($8M)$5M$15M($11M)$25M($1M)$8M$6M($8M)($7M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$7M$8M$21M$6M$9M$61M$79M$57M$24M$42M$80MCapexCapex
2.2%2.5%6.5%1.9%3.1%18.3%19.0%9.3%3.3%5.0%9.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($111K)($7M)($26M)$15M$2M$41M$29M$24M$62M$64M$47MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−0.0%−2.2%−8.3%4.6%0.6%12.3%7.0%3.9%8.4%7.7%5.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($111K)($7M)($34M)$15M$2M($6M)($33M)($8M)$62M$55M$2MFree cash flowFCF
−0.0%−2.2%−10.7%4.6%0.6%−1.8%−8.0%−1.2%8.4%6.6%0.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M$0$0$0$0$27M$16M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$1M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
-84%-2%-41%-13%-3%17%10%6%20%22%11%ROICROIC
-35%-6%-26%-7%5%8%12%5%16%19%13%Return on equityROE
−36%−6%−26%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$119M$50M$58M$65M$77M$134M$66M$152M$162M$127M$162MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$15M$15M$21M$18M$35M$17M$16M$25M$31M$46M$45MReceivablesReceiv.
$12M$10M$9M$10M$12M$14M$22M$14M$26M$39M$43MAccounts payablePayables
$3M$6M$12M$8M$23M$3M($5M)$11M$5M$7M$2MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$162M$147M$117M$118M$180M$183M$136M$205M$222M$247M$244MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$95M$86M$92M$97M$122M$133M$138M$185M$205M$230M$208MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.7×1.3×1.2×1.5×1.4×1.0×1.1×1.1×1.1×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$9M$9M$8M$8M$8M$8M$17M$28M$28M$28M$28MGoodwillGoodwill
$297M$274M$282M$271M$442M$513M$553M$741M$745M$826M$852MTotal assetsAssets
$260K$31M$68M$162M$126M$87M$131MTotal debtDebt
($77M)($103M)$1M$11M($36M)($40M)($31M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-5.4×-0.5×-10.7×-2.4×-387.1×41.0×11.2×2.2×6.2×14.8×12.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$137M$126M$127M$114M$177M$189M$215M$226M$260M$328M$340MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%0.9%0.6%0.4%0.7%0.5%1.0%0.6%1.2%1.1%1.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
36.5M37.1M37.7M38.2M45.2M49.7M50.6M51.7M50.9M55.6M55.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.52$8.75$8.41$8.69$6.66$6.74$8.27$11.74$14.41$15.03$15.59Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.31$-0.22$-0.87$-0.21$0.18$0.29$0.51$0.24$0.83$1.13$0.77EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.00$-0.19$-0.70$0.40$0.04$0.83$0.58$0.46$1.21$1.16$0.85Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.00$-0.19$-0.90$0.40$0.04$-0.12$-0.66$-0.15$1.21$1.00$0.03Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.21$0.22$0.55$0.17$0.21$1.23$1.57$1.10$0.48$0.75$1.44Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.75$3.39$3.36$3.00$3.91$3.79$4.26$4.37$5.12$5.90$6.10Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2024 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.2%/yr+17.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+96.8%/yr
EPS+44.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+15.6%/yr+29.8%/yr
Book value / share+5.2%/yr+8.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+14.0%
    “Revenue increased primarily due to a 14.5% increase in average full-time active students.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
56Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
22%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$64Mowner earningsvs.$63Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $64M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $33M it takes just to hold its position. It put $9M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $55M.

Reported net income$63M
Owner earnings$64M · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$63M$42M$12M$26M$15M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$33M+$29M+$25M+$17M+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$9M+$9M+$4M+$4M+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$8M+$6M+$8M−$1M+$25M
Cash from operations$97M$86M$49M$46M$55M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$33M−$24M−$25M−$17M−$14M
Owner earnings$64M$62M$24M$29M$41M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$9M−$31M−$63M−$47M
Free cash flow$55M$62M($8M)($33M)($6M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%8%4%7%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $33M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $9M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $55M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $83M ÷ interest expense $6M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $127M − debt $87M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $40M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -84%–22%; 22% latest = NOPAT $62M ÷ invested capital $288M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $64M = operating cash $97M − maintenance capex $33M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 4%)
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $9M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $55M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $55M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $97M ÷ net income $63M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $17M ÷ Owner Earnings $64M
    What this means

    Of $64M Owner Earnings, $17M (26%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $17M buybacks. Net of $9M stock comp, the real buyback was about $8M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.27×
    Expanding
    Capex $42M ÷ depreciation $33M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $836M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $87M vs $17M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.71/share (latest year $1.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −6% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to 7% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 48%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Worst year 2018 · −11.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$244M
  • Cash & short-term investments$162M
  • Receivables$45M
  • Other current assets$37M
Current liabilities$208M
  • Debt due within a year$3M
  • Accounts payable$43M
  • Other current liabilities$162M
Current ratio1.17×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.17×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.78×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$36Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $162M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$290Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($268M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$316M$185M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$74Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $362M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$316M · 87%
  • Dividends$1M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$44M · 12%
  • Returned to owners$1M

    1% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count52.8%

    The diluted count rose from 36M to 56M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained90%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($68M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $61M, so each retained $1 added about 0.90 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Grant$2.2M$2.2M$41M
2022Mr. Grant$1.9M$2.0M$29M
2023Mr. Grant$3.0M$3.9M$24M
2024Mr. Grant$3.5M$8.6M$62M
2025Mr. Grant$5.1M$15.2M$64M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership9.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio67:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$9M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Universal Technical Institute Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?52.8%

    Diluted shares grew 52.8% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Education Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GHCGraham Holdings Company$4.9B4.6%3%5%
LRNStride Inc.$2.4B35%5.8%11%11%
STRAStrategic Education Inc.$1.3B10.9%6%9%
LOPEGrand Canyon Education Inc.$1.1B28.1%27%24%
PRDOPerdoceo Education Corporation$846M19.7%16%17%
UTIUniversal Technical Institute Inc$836M1.5%2%4%
Group median8.3%8%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Universal Technical Institute Inc has delivered.

Universal Technical Institute Inc’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Universal Technical Institute Inc earns about $36M on its 4.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $2M on 55M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $31M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($80M) runs well above depreciation ($35M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $49M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Universal Technical Institute Inc (UTI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UTI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UTHR its page in the Manual UTL →

Industry order: ← TAL the Education Services chapter YOUL →