Owner Scorecard


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PRKS, United Parks & Resorts Inc.

Casinos & Gaming capital-intensive Cyclical

Parks that are grouped in key markets across the United States and in the United Arab Emirates.

We own or license a portfolio of recognized brands including SeaWorld, Busch Gardens, Aquatica, Discovery Cove and Sesame Place.

We use our brands, intellectual property and the work we do to care for animals to increase awareness of our theme parks, drive attendance to our theme parks and create "out-of-park" experiences for our guests as a way to connect with them before they visit our theme parks and to stay connected with them after their visit.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PRKS · United Parks & Resorts Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.7B
−3.6% YoY · 31% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.7B
Operating margin 20.6% 5-yr avg 26.7%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 22%
Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 19%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 16%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Admission (53%) and Food, Merchandise and Other (47%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 15% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −56% and 29% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 13% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 5 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Admission at 53%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Admission53%$883M
  • Food, Merchandise and Other47%$779M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$432M$1.5B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7BRevenueRevenue
18%18%17%19%22%12%12%13%13%14%14%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$60M($201M)$152M$213M($242M)$432M$508M$460M$463M$365M$340MOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.4%−15.9%11.1%15.2%−56.0%28.7%29.3%26.6%26.9%22.0%20.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($13M)($202M)$45M$89M($312M)$257M$291M$234M$227M$168M$150MNet incomeNet inc.
29%31%-0%25%25%22%26%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$280M$192M$294M$348M($121M)$503M$565M$505M$480M$380M$421MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$200M$163M$161M$161M$151M$149M$153M$154M$163M$174M$178MDepreciationDeprec.
$56M$208M$66M$87M$34M$58M$103M$99M$76M$20M$75MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$161M$173M$180M$195M$109M$129M$201M$305M$248M$217M$230MCapexCapex
11.9%13.7%13.1%14.0%25.3%8.6%11.6%17.7%14.4%13.1%13.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$120M$20M$114M$153M($230M)$374M$412M$351M$317M$163M$243MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.9%1.6%8.3%11.0%−53.2%24.9%23.8%20.3%18.4%9.8%14.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$120M$20M$114M$153M($230M)$374M$364M$200M$232M$163M$191MFree cash flowFCF
8.9%1.6%8.3%11.0%−53.2%24.9%21.0%11.6%13.4%9.8%11.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$65M$2M$325K$96KDividends paidDiv. paid
$98M$150M$12M$216M$694M$18M$483M$160MBuybacksBuybacks
-9%6%9%-12%26%24%21%22%16%15%ROICROIC
-3%-70%17%42%Return on equityROE
−17%−71%17%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$69M$33M$34M$40M$434M$444M$79M$247M$116M$100M$29MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$37M$38M$58M$50M$30M$77M$71M$74M$79M$77M$91MReceivablesReceiv.
$29M$31M$36M$33M$31M$29M$55M$49M$46M$52M$57MInventoryInvent.
$88M$101M$120M$133MAccounts payablePayables
($22M)($31M)($26M)$83M$61M$106M$126M$123M$125M$129M$15MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$154M$119M$147M$169M$507M$567M$234M$390M$270M$283M$241MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$264M$253M$311M$403M$317M$372M$409M$411M$413M$385M$455MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×0.5×0.5×0.4×1.6×1.5×0.6×0.9×0.7×0.7×0.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$336M$66M$66M$66M$66M$66M$66M$66M$66M$66M$66MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B$2.1B$2.1B$2.3B$2.6B$2.6B$2.3B$2.6B$2.6B$2.6B$2.6BTotal assetsAssets
$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$2.2B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1B$2.2B$2.2B$2.3BTotal debtDebt
$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.8B$1.7B$2.0B$1.9B$2.1B$2.1B$2.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.0×-2.6×1.9×2.5×-2.4×3.7×4.3×3.1×2.8×2.7×2.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$461M$287M$265M$211M($106M)($34M)($438M)($208M)($462M)($436M)($557M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.8%1.8%1.6%0.8%1.7%2.6%1.0%1.0%0.8%1.0%1.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
84.9M85.8M86.9M81.0M78.2M79.6M70.3M64.5M60.0M55.0M49.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.83$14.72$15.79$17.25$5.52$18.90$24.63$26.77$28.75$30.23$33.47Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.15$-2.36$0.52$1.10$-3.99$3.22$4.14$3.63$3.79$3.06$3.04EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.41$0.23$1.31$1.89$-2.94$4.70$5.86$5.44$5.28$2.96$4.92Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.41$0.23$1.31$1.89$-2.94$4.70$5.18$3.10$3.86$2.96$3.86Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.77$0.02$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.89$2.01$2.07$2.41$1.40$1.62$2.86$4.73$4.14$3.95$4.66Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.43$3.35$3.05$2.60$-1.35$-0.43$-6.23$-3.23$-7.69$-7.93$-11.28Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.5%/yr+40.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.6%/yr
Dividends / share−93.0%/yr (2-yr)−93.0%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share+8.5%/yr+23.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Food, Merchandise and Other-0.8%
    “Food, merchandise and other revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025 decreased $6.5 million, or 0.8% to $779.2 million as compared to $785.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The decrease results from the decrease in attendance discussed above, partially offset by improved in-park per capita spending.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
55Mpeak FY2018
ROIC
16%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
13.1×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$163Mowner earningsvs.$168Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $168M of profit but $163M of owner earnings: $6M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$168M
Owner earnings$163M · 10% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$168M$227M$234M$291M$257M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$174M+$163M+$154M+$153M+$149M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$17M+$14M+$17M+$18M+$40M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$20M+$76M+$99M+$103M+$58M
Cash from operations$380M$480M$505M$565M$503M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$217M−$163M−$154M−$153M−$129M
Owner earnings$163M$317M$351M$412M$374M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$85M−$151M−$48M
Free cash flow$163M$232M$200M$364M$374M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%18%20%24%25%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $145M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $365M ÷ interest expense $134M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 5.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $100M − debt $2.2B
    What this means

    Netting $100M of cash and short-term investments against $2.2B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 5.8× a year's operating profit (6.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -12%–26%; 16% latest = NOPAT $272M ÷ invested capital $1.7B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -53%–25%; latest $163M = operating cash $380M − maintenance capex $217M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves $145M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $380M ÷ net income $168M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $161M ÷ Owner Earnings $163M
    What this means

    Of $163M Owner Earnings, $161M (99%) went back to shareholders, $325K dividends, $160M buybacks. Net of $17M stock comp, the real buyback was about $143M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.25×
    Expanding
    Capex $217M ÷ depreciation $174M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.74×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.2B vs ($102M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.46/share (latest year $3.57), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-9.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −0% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −0% early to 25% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −56.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −4.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$241M
  • Cash & short-term investments$29M
  • Receivables$91M
  • Inventory$57M
  • Other current assets$64M
Current liabilities$455M
  • Debt due within a year$15M
  • Accounts payable$133M
  • Other current liabilities$306M
Current ratio0.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.41×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($213M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$15M due · $29M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−3.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($639M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.4B$127M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$221Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.9B · 56%
  • Dividends$67M · 2%
  • Buybacks$1.8B · 53%
  • Returned to owners$1.9B

    106% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $67M as dividends and $1.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$388M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $388M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.6B to $2.3B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$46.10

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 40M shares were bought for $1.8B, about $46.10 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $26.41 (2020) to $58.42 (2021); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $55.83 ($694M).

  • Net change in share count−41.8%

    The diluted count fell from 85M to 49M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 3 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 93% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$82M3% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.9B of capital spent building

$269M written down across 1 year (2017): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Marc G. Swanson$2.0M$11.3M$374M
2022Marc G. Swanson$1.1M$512k$412M
2023Marc G. Swanson$1.1M$1.1M$351M
2024Marc G. Swanson$1.1M$636k$317M
2025Marc G. Swanson$4.9M$3.8M$163M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$17M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why United Parks & Resorts Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?5% → 9% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $65M to $148M while revenue grew 23%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (5% of revenue then, 9% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Casinos & Gaming

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LTHLife Time Group Holdings Inc.$3.0B47%8.9%4%7%
MTNVail Resorts Inc.$3.0B18.3%12%18%
PRKSUnited Parks & Resorts Inc.$1.7B18.6%16%10%
PLNTPlanet Fitness$1.3B81%28.6%16%20%
LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation$1.2B30%11.4%8%4%
MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp.$1.0B-3.4%-3%7%
MSGEMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp.$863M12.6%13%
PRSUPursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.$452M91%6.3%4%2%
Group median12.0%10%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what United Parks & Resorts Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, United Parks & Resorts Inc. earns about $172M on its 10.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $191M on 47M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $2.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 49M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "United Parks & Resorts Inc. (PRKS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PRKS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PRK its page in the Manual PRLB →

Industry order: ← NIPG the Casinos & Gaming chapter PRSU →