Owner Scorecard


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RM, Regional Management Corp.

Consumer Finance diversified Cyclical

We are a diversified consumer finance company that provides installment loan products primarily to customers with limited access to consumer credit from banks, thrifts, credit card companies, and other lenders.

Most of our loan products are secured, and each is structured on a fixed-rate, fixed-term basis with fully amortizing equal monthly installment payments, repayable at any time without penalty.

We source our loans through our omni-channel platform, which includes our branches, centrally-managed direct mail campaigns, digital partners, and our consumer website.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
RM · Regional Management Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$646M
+9.7% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $660M 5-yr avg $544M
Operating margin 72.6% 5-yr avg 13.7%
Owner-earnings margin 49% 5-yr avg 45%
Free cash flow margin 49% 5-yr avg 45%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 20% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from 3.8% to 34% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 43% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$241M$272M$307M$356M$374M$428M$507M$551M$589M$646M$660MRevenueRevenue
49%48%46%44%47%46%44%44%42%40%39%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$59M$64M$79M$99M$74M$144M$65M$21M$54M$58M$479MOperating incomeOp. inc.
24.5%23.6%25.9%27.9%19.7%33.6%12.9%3.8%9.2%8.9%72.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$24M$30M$35M$45M$27M$89M$51M$16M$41M$44M$49MNet incomeNet inc.
38%26%23%24%26%21%22%23%24%23%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$100M$115M$146M$158M$165M$189M$224M$249M$269M$309M$326MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$6M$7M$9M$11M$13M$12M$13M$15M$14M$16M$17MDepreciationDeprec.
$66M$74M$97M$97M$119M$81M$150M$207M$202M$237M$250MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$6M$5M$5M$6M$4M$4M$6M$5M$5M$5M$5MCapexCapex
2.7%1.7%1.7%1.6%1.1%0.8%1.2%0.9%0.9%0.7%0.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$94M$111M$141M$152M$161M$185M$218M$244M$264M$304M$322MOwner earningsOwner earn.
39.0%40.6%46.0%42.8%43.1%43.3%43.1%44.3%44.8%47.1%48.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$94M$111M$141M$152M$161M$185M$218M$244M$264M$304M$322MFree cash flowFCF
39.0%40.6%46.0%42.8%43.1%43.3%43.1%44.3%44.8%47.1%48.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$25M$25M$12M$67M$21M$4M$24MBuybacksBuybacks
5%6%7%7%6%9%3%1%2%2%ROICROIC
12%13%13%15%10%31%17%5%12%12%13%Return on equityROE
12%13%13%15%10%31%17%5%12%12%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$13M$22M$50M$56M$72M$149M$132M$129M$136M$98M$103MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$716K$716K$716K$716K$716K$716K$716K$716KGoodwillGoodwill
$712M$829M$956M$1.2B$1.1B$1.5B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$2.1BTotal assetsAssets
$490M$567M$651M$799M$762M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6BTotal debtDebt
$477M$545M$601M$742M$690M$948M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.0×2.7×2.4×2.5×1.9×4.6×15.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$207M$239M$279M$303M$272M$283M$309M$322M$357M$373M$376MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.7%1.3%1.7%1.4%1.5%1.7%2.1%2.1%1.9%1.8%1.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
12.1M11.8M12.1M11.8M11.1M10.6M9.7M9.6M10.0M10.0M9.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$19.90$23.12$25.39$30.21$33.55$40.25$52.53$57.48$59.10$64.66$68.30Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.99$2.54$2.93$3.80$2.40$8.33$5.30$1.66$4.14$4.45$5.05EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.76$9.39$11.67$12.94$14.45$17.42$22.62$25.48$26.50$30.48$33.31Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$7.76$9.39$11.67$12.94$14.45$17.42$22.62$25.48$26.50$30.48$33.31Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.53$0.40$0.44$0.49$0.35$0.34$0.61$0.49$0.51$0.48$0.48Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.17$20.32$23.11$25.72$24.42$26.57$31.96$33.59$35.86$37.37$38.90Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+14.0%/yr+14.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+16.4%/yr+16.1%/yr
EPS+9.4%/yr+13.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.2%/yr+6.2%/yr
Book value / share+9.0%/yr+8.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
10Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
2%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.1×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$304Mowner earningsvs.$44Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $44M of profit into $304M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$44M
Owner earnings$304M · 47% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$44M$41M$16M$51M$89M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$16M+$14M+$15M+$13M+$12M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$12M+$11M+$12M+$11M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$237M+$202M+$207M+$150M+$81M
Cash from operations$309M$269M$249M$224M$189M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$5M−$5M−$5M−$6M−$4M
Owner earnings$304M$264M$244M$218M$185M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue47%45%44%43%43%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $292M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $465M ÷ interest expense $31M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.5B · 3.3× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $98M − debt $1.6B
    What this means

    Netting $98M of cash and short-term investments against $1.6B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 3.3× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 1%–9%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 39%–47%; latest $304M = operating cash $309M − maintenance capex $5M
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 47% of revenue this year, a 43% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $292M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $309M ÷ net income $44M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $24M ÷ Owner Earnings $304M
    What this means

    Of $304M Owner Earnings, $24M (8%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $24M buybacks. Net of $12M stock comp, the real buyback was about $12M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.29×
    Harvesting
    Capex $5M ÷ depreciation $16M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $646M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× ·
    What this means

    Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +14%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.68/share (latest year $4.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $40.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 25% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 25% early to 7% lately, median 20% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 3.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$50M · 3%
  • Buybacks$178M · 9%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.7B · 88%
  • Returned to owners$178M

    9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $178M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.1B and cash and short-term investments rose $90M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$37.53

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $153M, about $37.53 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $26.68 (2019) to $47.17 (2022); its heaviest year, 2021, paid $46.51 ($67M).

  • Net change in share count−20.0%

    The diluted count fell from 12M to 10M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained69%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($225M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $156M, so each retained $1 added about 0.69 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$3.7M$8.2M$185M
2022$4.9M$366k$218M
2023$5.3M$4.2M$244M
2024$4.9M$7.2M$264M
2025$587k$593k$304M
2025$4.8M$7.5M$304M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership10.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio88:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$12M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Regional Management Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$490M → $1.6B

    Debt rose from $490M to $1.6B while owner earnings went from about $115M to $271M — about 4.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Consumer Finance

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CACCCredit Acceptance Corporation$2.3B45.7%10%54%
ONITOnity Group Inc.$1.1B41.0%2%15%
PWPPerella Weinberg Partners$751M-7.6%15%
RMRegional Management Corp.$646M21.6%6%43%
JCAPJefferson Capital Inc.$613M50.8%13%
WRLDWorld Acceptance Corporation$585M16.9%8%44%
DAVEDave Inc.$554M-4.2%-12%13%
FIGRFigure Technology Solutions Inc.$507M2.7%4%
Group median19.3%6%29%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Regional Management Corp. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Regional Management Corp. earns about $279M on its 43.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 47.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $322M on 9M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $1.5B. The if-converted diluted count is 10M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Regional Management Corp. (RM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RLMD its page in the Manual RMBS →

Industry order: ← PRAA the Consumer Finance chapter SLM →