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RRR, Red Rock Resorts

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive Cyclical

Red Rock Resorts is a holding company that owns an indirect equity interest in and manages Station Casinos LLC, through which we conduct all of our operations.

Our casino properties are conveniently located throughout the Las Vegas valley and provide our customers a wide variety of entertainment and dining options.

We provide friendly service and exceptional value in a comfortable environment.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

RRR · Red Rock Resorts

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.0B

+3.7% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $1.8B

Operating margin 29.0% 5-yr avg 30.0%

Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%

Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Casino (67%) and Food and beverage (18%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 25% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 7.5% and 34% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 16% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Casino is 67% of revenue, with Food and beverage the other meaningful line at 18%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Casino67%$1.3B
Food and beverage18%$362M
Complimentary Goods and Services10%$196M
Room9%$190M
Other5%$101M
Management Service1%$18M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.0B	RevenueRevenue
23%	23%	22%	27%	21%	21%	22%	22%	22%	22%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$331M	$372M	$186M	$89M	$402M	$561M	$559M	$569M	$597M	$587M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
20.2%	22.1%	10.0%	7.5%	24.8%	33.7%	32.4%	29.3%	29.7%	29.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$35M	$158M	($3M)	($150M)	$242M	$205M	$176M	$154M	$188M	$186M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	13%	—	—	—	18%	20%	19%	20%	20%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$290M	$346M	$317M	$213M	$610M	$542M	$494M	$548M	$610M	$623M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$178M	$180M	$222M	$231M	$158M	$128M	$133M	$187M	$197M	$205M	DepreciationDeprec.
$68M	($3M)	$81M	$121M	$198M	$191M	$166M	$176M	$192M	$200M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$248M	$579M	$353M	$58M	$61M	$329M	$700M	$284M	$319M	$368M	CapexCapex
15.1%	34.5%	19.0%	4.9%	3.8%	19.7%	40.6%	14.6%	15.9%	18.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$42M	($233M)	($37M)	$154M	$549M	$214M	($205M)	$264M	$291M	$255M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
2.5%	−13.9%	−2.0%	13.0%	33.9%	12.8%	−11.9%	13.6%	14.4%	12.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$42M	($233M)	($37M)	$154M	$549M	$214M	($205M)	$264M	$291M	$255M	Free cash flowFCF
2.5%	−13.9%	−2.0%	13.0%	33.9%	12.8%	−11.9%	13.6%	14.4%	12.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$27M	$28M	$28M	$7M	$204M	$117M	$59M	$118M	$121M	$121M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	$376K	$0	$500M	$142M	$0	$4M	$79M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
9%	30%	-1%	-43%	407%	469%	104%	72%	90%	130%	Return on equityROE
2%	25%	−6%	−45%	64%	203%	70%	17%	32%	46%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$231M	$115M	$129M	$121M	$275M	$117M	$138M	$164M	$142M	$134M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$49M	$51M	$57M	$35M	$37M	$44M	$62M	$64M	$74M	$68M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$13M	$15M	$18M	$13M	$12M	$13M	$15M	$16M	$18M	$18M	InventoryInvent.
$22M	$26M	$34M	$11M	$17M	$11M	$25M	$32M	$22M	$17M	Accounts payablePayables
$40M	$40M	$40M	$37M	$31M	$45M	$52M	$49M	$70M	$69M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$342M	$262M	$282M	$225M	$379M	$221M	$282M	$295M	$287M	$278M	Current assetsCur. assets
$245M	$334M	$276M	$200M	$205M	$293M	$349M	$325M	$363M	$345M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×	0.8×	1.0×	1.1×	1.8×	0.8×	0.8×	0.9×	0.8×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$196M	$196M	$196M	$196M	$196M	$196M	$196M	$196M	$196M	$196M	GoodwillGoodwill
$3.6B	$4.0B	$4.1B	$3.7B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$4.0B	$4.0B	$4.2B	$4.2B	Total assetsAssets
$2.6B	$2.9B	$3.0B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$3.0B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.4B	$3.5B	Total debtDebt
$2.4B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$2.8B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.3B	$3.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.5×	2.6×	1.2×	0.7×	3.9×	4.3×	3.1×	2.5×	3.0×	2.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$379M	$520M	$501M	$353M	$59M	$44M	$169M	$215M	$208M	$143M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%	0.7%	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	1.1%	1.1%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
77.3M	77.9M	69.6M	70.5M	116M	105M	103M	104M	103M	59.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$21.25	$21.58	$26.69	$16.76	$13.89	$15.90	$16.70	$18.70	$19.61	$34.04	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.46	$2.02	$-0.05	$-2.13	$2.08	$1.96	$1.71	$1.49	$1.83	$3.14	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.54	$-2.99	$-0.53	$2.19	$4.71	$2.04	$-1.99	$2.55	$2.83	$4.30	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.54	$-2.99	$-0.53	$2.19	$4.71	$2.04	$-1.99	$2.55	$2.83	$4.30	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.35	$0.36	$0.40	$0.10	$1.75	$1.11	$0.57	$1.14	$1.18	$2.03	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.21	$7.44	$5.08	$0.83	$0.53	$3.14	$6.78	$2.74	$3.11	$6.20	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.90	$6.67	$7.20	$5.00	$0.51	$0.42	$1.64	$2.07	$2.03	$2.40	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×1/1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1.65 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.73 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−1.0%/yr	+3.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+23.1%/yr	+5.3%/yr
EPS	+18.9%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+16.4%/yr	+62.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	−0.4%/yr	+30.3%/yr
Book value / share	−10.4%/yr	−16.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

103Mpeak FY2021

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

11.2×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$291Mowner earningsvs.$188Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $188M of profit into $291M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$188M

Owner earnings$291M · 14% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$188M	$154M	$176M	$205M	$242M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$197M	+$187M	+$133M	+$128M	+$158M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$32M	+$31M	+$20M	+$18M	+$13M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$192M	+$176M	+$166M	+$191M	+$198M
Cash from operations	$610M	$548M	$494M	$542M	$610M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$319M	−$284M	−$700M	−$329M	−$61M
Owner earnings	$291M	$264M	($205M)	$214M	$549M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	14%	14%	-12%	13%	34%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $32M), owner earnings is nearer $258M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.0×

Adequate

Operating income $597M ÷ interest expense $202M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.3B · 5.4× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $142M − debt $3.4B

What this means
Netting $142M of cash and short-term investments against $3.4B of debt leaves $3.3B owed, about 5.4× a year's operating profit (5.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 13%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range -14%–34%; latest $291M = operating cash $610M − maintenance capex $319M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $32M of SBC) leaves $258M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.24×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $610M ÷ net income $188M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 69%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $200M ÷ Owner Earnings $291M

What this means
Of $291M Owner Earnings, $200M (69%) went back to shareholders, $121M dividends, $79M buybacks. Net of $32M stock comp, the real buyback was about $47M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.62×

Expanding

Capex $319M ÷ depreciation $197M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.79×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.4B vs ($76M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +173%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.97/share (latest year $3.23), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 17% → 30% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 17% early to 30% lately, median 25% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · 7.5% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −1.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$278M

Cash & short-term investments$134M
Receivables$68M
Inventory$18M
Other current assets$58M

Current liabilities$345M

Debt due within a year$17M
Accounts payable$17M
Other current liabilities$311M

Current ratio0.81×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.76×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.39×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($67M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$17M due · $134M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($133M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($3.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$3.6B$35M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$11Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$100K

'27$100K

'28$691M

'29$100K

'30$100K

later$1.0B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$100Kthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$200Kthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$691Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$1.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$134M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$291M

Together, against $100K due next year4245.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $425M against the $100K due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 4245 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.9B · 74%
Dividends$708M · 18%
Buybacks$725M · 18%

Returned to owners$1.4B
138% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $708M as dividends and $725M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$395M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $395M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.6B to $3.5B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $97M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $725M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−23.2%
The diluted count fell from 77M to 59M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.18/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. F. Fertitta	$3.2M	$3.2M	$549M
2022	Mr. F. Fertitta	$3.3M	$3.3M	$214M
2023	Mr. F. Fertitta	$3.5M	$3.5M	($205M)
2024	Mr. F. Fertitta	$3.3M	$3.3M	$264M
2025	Mr. F. Fertitta	$13.3M	$13.9M	$291M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership19.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio283:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$32M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Red Rock Resorts is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.6B → $3.5B
Debt rose from $2.6B to $3.5B while owner earnings went from about ($76M) to $117M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
WYNNWynn Resorts Limited	$7.1B	—	12.4%	6%	8%
PENNPENN Entertainment Inc.	$7.0B	—	12.1%	12%	8%
BYDBoyd Gaming	$4.1B	—	16.3%	14%	13%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts	$2.5B	—	13.0%	4%	8%
RRRRed Rock Resorts	$2.0B	—	24.8%	—	13%
XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts Inc.	$1.1B	32%	9.8%	4%	10%
SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.	$960M	—	13.6%	5%	9%
MCRIMonarch Casino & Resort Inc.	$545M	—	17.8%	13%	19%
Group median	—	—	13.3%	—	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Red Rock Resorts has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Red Rock Resorts earns about $258M on its 12.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($258M) Net of stock comp (−$32M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($304M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−8%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+10%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $255M on 58M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $3.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($368M) runs well above depreciation ($205M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $304M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh RRR against another business →

The owners of RRR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Red Rock Resorts (RRR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RRR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RRC its page in the Manual RRX →

Industry order: ← PLNT the Hotels & Resorts chapter RXO →