Owner Scorecard


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SBSW, D/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADS

Gold & Precious Metals capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-outCyclical

Revenue is led by Gold (33%) and Platinum (18%), with 7 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · figures as filed, in ZAR · 1 ADS = 4 ordinary shares
SBSW · D/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADS
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
R 112.1B
−1.4% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue R 112.1B 5-yr avg R 132.7B
Gross margin 6% 5-yr avg 23%
Operating margin −1.1% 5-yr avg 9.2%
ROIC −1% 5-yr avg 12%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin −10% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A metals and mining business, a price-taker on a global commodity.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 19% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 12% and operating margin about 2.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −32% and 29% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price and the cost position. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Gold at 33%.

Revenue by product line, FY2024
  • Gold33%R 37.1B
  • Platinum18%R 20.6B
  • Palladium18%R 19.9B
  • Rhodium13%R 14.7B
  • Chrome5%R 6.1B
  • Zinc3%R 3.8B
  • Other9%R 9.9B
By geographySouth Africa Region73%United States20%Australia4%Europe2%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMDec 2024
Income statement
R 45.9BR 50.7BR 72.9BR 127.4BR 172.2BR 138.3BR 113.7BR 112.1BR 112.1BRevenueRevenue
8%5%13%35%37%27%12%6%6%Gross marginGross mgn
(R 4.4B)R 1.7BR 1.6BR 37.3BR 49.3BR 30.2B(R 36.9B)(R 1.2B)(R 1.2B)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−9.6%3.4%2.2%29.3%28.6%21.8%−32.4%−1.1%−1.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
(R 4.4B)(R 2.5B)R 62MR 29.3BR 33.1BR 18.4B(R 37.8B)(R 7.3B)(R 7.3B)Net incomeNet inc.
14%29%33%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
R 2.7BR 12.2BR 9.5BR 27.2BR 32.3BR 15.5BR 7.1BR 10.1BR 10.1BOperating cash flowOp. cash
R 5.7BR 6.6BR 7.2BR 7.6BR 8.3BR 7.1BR 10.0BR 8.8BR 8.8BDepreciationDeprec.
R 1.5BR 8.1BR 2.2B(R 9.8B)(R 9.1B)(R 9.9B)R 34.9BR 8.6BR 8.6BWorking capital & otherWC & other
R 6.1BR 7.1BR 7.7BR 9.6BR 12.7BR 15.9BR 22.4BR 21.6BR 21.6BCapexCapex
13.3%14.0%10.6%7.5%7.4%11.5%19.7%19.2%19.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
(R 3.4B)R 5.1BR 1.8BR 19.6BR 24.0BR 8.5B(R 2.9B)R 1.3BR 1.3BOwner earningsOwner earn.
−7.3%10.1%2.4%15.4%13.9%6.1%−2.6%1.2%1.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
(R 3.4B)R 5.1BR 1.8BR 17.5BR 19.5B(R 356M)(R 15.3B)(R 11.5B)(R 11.5B)Free cash flowFCF
−7.3%10.1%2.4%13.8%11.3%−0.3%−13.5%−10.2%−10.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
R 560MR 600KR 85MR 1.7BR 18.2BR 9.5BR 5.3BR 173MR 173MDividends paidDiv. paid
R 0R 84MR 8.5BR 0R 0BuybacksBuybacks
-8%49%50%24%-61%-1%-1%ROICROIC
-19%-11%0%43%42%21%-78%-17%-17%Return on equityROE
−21%−11%−0%41%19%10%−88%−17%−17%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
R 2.1BR 2.5BR 5.6BR 20.2BR 30.3BR 26.1BR 25.6BR 16.0BR 16.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
R 6.2BR 6.8BR 4.6BR 6.9BR 7.4BR 7.5BR 8.9BR 5.7BR 5.7BReceivablesReceiv.
R 3.5BR 5.3BR 15.5BR 25.0BR 25.1BR 26.4BR 26.4BR 25.5BR 25.5BInventoryInvent.
R 6.7BR 7.9BR 11.5BR 13.2BR 15.2BR 15.7BR 16.5BR 15.6BR 15.6BAccounts payablePayables
R 3.0BR 4.3BR 8.7BR 18.6BR 17.3BR 18.2BR 18.8BR 15.7BR 15.7BOperating working capitalOper. WC
R 12.0BR 15.2BR 26.2BR 52.2BR 64.8BR 60.8BR 61.8BR 48.4BR 48.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
R 8.4BR 14.6BR 14.3BR 17.5BR 20.5BR 20.2BR 36.4BR 20.9BR 20.9BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.0×1.8×3.0×3.2×3.0×1.7×2.3×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
R 6.4BR 6.9BR 6.9BR 7.2BR 7.7BR 8.2BR 499MR 782MR 782MGoodwillGoodwill
R 76.1BR 84.9BR 101.1BR 134.1BR 153.0BR 166.6BR 142.9BR 138.0BR 138.0BTotal assetsAssets
R 24.0BR 18.3BR 23.7BR 17.5BR 20.2BR 22.6BR 24.9BR 41.1BR 41.1BTotal debtDebt
R 21.9BR 15.8BR 18.1B(R 2.7B)(R 10.1B)(R 3.5B)(R 614M)R 25.1BR 25.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.5×0.5×0.5×11.8×19.8×10.6×-11.2×-0.3×-0.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
R 24.0BR 23.8BR 29.7BR 67.9BR 79.4BR 88.1BR 48.7BR 44.0BR 44.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.93B2.26B2.51B2.73B2.90B2.83B2.83B2.83B2.83BShares out (diluted)Shares
R 23.74R 22.38R 29.08R 46.68R 59.40R 48.93R 40.16R 39.61R 39.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
R -2.29R -1.10R 0.02R 10.74R 11.40R 6.51R -13.34R -2.58R -2.58EPS (diluted)EPS
R -1.74R 2.26R 0.70R 7.17R 8.27R 2.99R -1.03R 0.46R 0.46Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
R -1.74R 2.26R 0.70R 6.43R 6.73R -0.13R -5.41R -4.05R -4.05Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
R 0.29R 0.00R 0.03R 0.62R 6.27R 3.34R 1.88R 0.06R 0.06Dividends / shareDiv/sh
R 3.15R 3.13R 3.07R 3.52R 4.39R 5.63R 7.92R 7.62R 7.62Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
R 12.40R 10.51R 11.83R 24.90R 27.39R 31.17R 17.22R 15.54R 15.54Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.6%/yr+6.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−8.1%/yr
Dividends / share−19.9%/yr+12.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.4%/yr+19.9%/yr
Book value / share+3.3%/yr+5.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
2.8Bpeak FY2021
ROIC
−1%low FY2023
Gross margin
6%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
19.3×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

R 1.3Bowner earningsvs.(R 7.3B)net incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business earned R 1.3B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the R 8.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put R 12.8B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (R 11.5B).

FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income(R 7.3B)(R 37.8B)R 18.4BR 33.1BR 29.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+R 8.8B+R 10.0B+R 7.1B+R 8.3B+R 7.6B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+R 8.6B+R 34.9B−R 9.9B−R 9.1B−R 9.8B
Cash from operationsR 10.1BR 7.1BR 15.5BR 32.3BR 27.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−R 8.8B−R 10.0B−R 7.1B−R 8.3B−R 7.6B
Owner earningsR 1.3B(R 2.9B)R 8.5BR 24.0BR 19.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−R 12.8B−R 12.4B−R 8.8B−R 4.4B−R 2.0B
Free cash flow(R 11.5B)(R 15.3B)(R 356M)R 19.5BR 17.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%-3%6%14%15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about R 8.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other R 12.8B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income (R 1.2B) ÷ interest expense R 4.6B
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash R 16.0B − debt R 41.1B
    What this means

    Netting R 16.0B of cash and short-term investments against R 41.1B of debt leaves R 25.1B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 19 + DIO 89 − DPO 54 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -61%–50%; -1% latest = NOPAT (R 972M) ÷ invested capital R 69.1B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -7%–15%; latest R 1.3B = operating cash R 10.1B − maintenance capex R 8.8B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 8 years. It chose to put R 12.8B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (R 11.5B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income (R 7.3B) · cash from operations R 10.1B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks R 173M ÷ Owner Earnings R 1.3B
    What this means

    Of R 1.3B Owner Earnings, R 173M (13%) went back to shareholders, R 173M dividends, R 0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.45×
    Expanding
    Capex R 21.6B ÷ depreciation R 8.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · R 112.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.32×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · R 41.1B vs R 27.6B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (8)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are R -3.14/share (latest year R -2.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is R 15.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −1% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    The recent-years average (−4%) sits below the early years (−1%), but the latest year (−1%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 2% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2023 · −32.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +5.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“The use of AI may not meet the existing and rapidly evolving regulatory standards and could introduce security or other operational risks that may expose confidential data, lead to the loss of competitive information and result in operational failures.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2024

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsR 48.4B
  • Cash & short-term investmentsR 16.0B
  • ReceivablesR 5.7B
  • InventoryR 25.5B
  • Other current assetsR 1.1B
Current liabilitiesR 20.9B
  • Accounts payableR 15.6B
  • Other current liabilitiesR 5.3B
Current ratio2.32×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.77×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalR 27.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueR 41.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leasesR 41.5BR 378M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueR 1.7Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2024

Over the record, the business generated R 116.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • ReinvestedR 103.1B · 88%
  • DividendsR 35.5B · 30%
  • BuybacksR 8.6B · 7%
  • Returned to ownersR 44.1B

    82% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, R 35.5B as dividends and R 8.6B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−R 30.6B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran R 30.6B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from R 24.0B to R 41.1B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran R 8.6B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count46.4%

    The diluted count rose from 1934M to 2831M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend recordR 0.06/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 20% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why D/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADS is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2024.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?46.4%

    Diluted shares grew 46.4% over 2017–2024, even as the company spent R 8.6B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?21% → 28% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from R 9.7B to R 31.3B while revenue grew 144%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (21% of revenue then, 28% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Gold & Precious Metals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SBSWD/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADSR 112.1B13%2.8%11%4%
FCXFreeport-McMoRan Inc.$25.2B29%25.5%15%13%
NEMNewmont Corporation$22.7B12.0%4%19%
CLFCleveland-Cliffs$18.6B14%8.4%16%9%
SCCOSouthern Copper Corporation$13.4B52%41.5%18%24%
CDECoeur Mining Inc.$2.1B79%4.3%2%2%
MUXMcEwen Inc.$198M77%-43.0%-9%-7%
IAUXi-80 Gold Corp.$95M-177.0%-15%-157%
Group median41%6.4%8%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing four ordinary”; D/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADS reports in ZAR, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at ZAR 1 = $0.061 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in ZAR.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what D/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADS has delivered.

D/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADS’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, D/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADS earns about $291M on its 4.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($698M) on 708M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $1.5B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.3B) runs well above depreciation ($537M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $79M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "D/B/A Sibanye-Stillwater Limited ADS (SBSW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SBSW, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SBS its page in the Manual SCAG →

Industry order: ← PAAS the Gold & Precious Metals chapter SVM →